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 The online recruitment efforts of ISIS have raised questions about the new role of 
the internet in the spread of terrorism. However, the use of the mass media by terrorist 
groups to recruit and spread is not unique to ISIS or the digital age and has been an aspect 
of terrorism since its modern conception. To explain the spread of terrorism historically 
and understand the unique dimensions of terrorism and the internet, a cultural explanation 
is proposed to explain the process through terrorism spreads as well as the content that 
inspires violence. This study includes two major parts: a virtual ethnography of ISIS; and 
a comparative-historical study of the prior international waves of terrorism. The first part 
examines the presence of ISIS online, with the goal of understanding the virtual 
environment in which people become radicalized. The second part is a comparative-
historical study examines the shared cultural aspects of terrorist groups involved in the 
anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves, as well as constructing a social network of 
the ideological and influential connections between the groups. The final analysis of the 
dissertation examines ISIS in the historical context of other international waves of 
terrorism, and the insights gained from the in-depth examination of the media 
environment of ISIS. This research describes the characteristics of the virtual caliphate, 
and finds that it largely reflects general trends observed in historical groups. Specifically, 
terrorist groups possess a consistent set of cultural elements, exhibiting all of the criteria 
of subcultures. Furthermore, these cultural elements can be traced across time and space, 
iv 




Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii 
Chapter 1 Introduction .........................................................................................................1 
Chapter 2 International Terrorism and Subculture Theory ................................................12 
Chapter 3 Methodology .....................................................................................................32 
Chapter 4 A Virtual Ethnography of ISIS Online ..............................................................65 
Chapter 5 History Echoes: Anarchist, Anticolonial, and New Left Terrorism ................128 
Chapter 6 The Lineage of Terror .....................................................................................180 
Chapter 7 Explaining the International Diffusion of Terrorism ......................................210 






The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] may have been defeated, but its 
international reach serves as an example of the changing face of terrorism in an internet 
age. ISIS is unique not in its use of the internet, but its proficiency in its use through 
social media platforms. ISIS’s use of the internet has prompted several studies examining 
the group’s ideology, the structure of its social network across Twitter, the discourse on 
its videos on Arabic language Youtube, and analyses of the group’s propaganda 
magazine (Andersen and Sandberg 2018; Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and 
Shay 2016; Klausen 2015). The ability of ISIS to attract foreign recruits and inspire 
domestic acts of terrorism demands explanation, and the group’s notorious social media 
presence and the unclear ramifications of the internet for society make the group’s virtual 
recruitment campaign an obvious suspect. However, the internet alone cannot explain the 
international spread of ISIS. Just as ISIS is not unique in using the internet, it is also not 
the first terrorist group or ideology to spread internationally.  
The international diffusion of terrorism has occurred since its modern conception 
(Parker and Sitter 2016; Sedgwick 2007; Rapoport 2004). Examining the prior cases of 
terrorism spreading internationally demonstrates that the spread of ISIS is the newest 
manifestation of a consistent aspect of terrorism, and that the internet’s responsibility for 
this spread is limited to the degree to which it differs from the previous preferred medium 
of terrorist groups, papers, pamphlets, books, and manifestos. As forms of the mass 
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media, the internet and print are merely vessels for the spread of terrorist groups 
internationally. The content that is transmitted and inspires terrorist behavior is as 
important to understand as the mechanisms through which it spreads. 
The spread of terrorism beyond national boundaries suggests a factor that is 
beyond the scope of the local social structure of independent nations. This dissertation 
proposes that the international diffusion of terrorism can be explained through cultural 
factors. This cultural explanation of the international diffusion of terrorism focuses on 
two specific aspects. First, it is argued here that cultural elements, such as norms, values, 
beliefs, knowledge, and symbols, contribute to the adoption of terrorism. Second, these 
cultural elements are argued to have spread internationally and inspired other groups 
primarily through the mass media, and the characteristics of this spread has been 
impacted by the development in communication technologies.  
Specifically, this research found a common set of cultural elements present across 
ISIS and terrorist groups historically. Furthermore, mass media sources that contain these 
cultural elements have been consistently observed within the context of national terrorist 
movements, as cited influences of terrorist groups within international waves of terrorism 
and connect the international waves of terrorism through several central sources. The 
common cultural elements of terrorism include the Role of the Revolutionist, an identity 
to which terrorists aspire to that is characterized as romantic and heroic, is defined by 
sacrifice, and describes the terrorist as an expert in all dimensions of revolutionary 
warfare, from espionage to weaponry. In addition to this role, terrorist groups often 
ascribe a value to their violence that extends beyond its utility in achieving social change. 
Violence is viewed as necessary, obligatory, inherently good, and even therapeutic. This 
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violence is supported by a set of interrelated beliefs and values that constitute the 
morality of terrorism, which divides society into a battle between good and evil, 
dehumanizes enemies, and defines violence as altruistic. The last cultural element of 
terrorism is the pursuit and possession of The Truth – terrorists’ understanding of society, 
its problems, and solutions.   
In order to explain the cultural factors of terrorism, subculture theory is proposed 
to explain the international spread of terrorism, including the recruitment of foreign 
nationals and the development of groups within other nations. This topic is interesting 
theoretically not only as a specific aspect of terrorism, but as an aspect that 
fundamentally challenges many of the dominant theories of terrorism. A cultural 
explanation, drawing from subculture theory, not only provides an explanation of 
international diffusion of terrorism, but also provides an important mediating link 
between the two dominant explanations of terrorism, strain and grievance theories and 
rational choice models.  
The role of culture in the adoption of terrorism and its international diffusion is 
examined here using a mixed methods approach. This approach provides a robust 
analysis of terrorism at multiple levels of analysis, addresses the shortcomings of each 
individual part of the study, as well as enhancing them with additional context and 
insights (Small 2011). Furthermore, adopting different methods is necessary to 
understand the context and environment in which individuals adopt terrorism. The 
radicalization of foreign nationals cannot be understood through their individual 
characteristics alone, but requires an understanding of the environment that led to that 
radicalization. The international spread of terrorism is not unique to the internet age or 
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Islamic fundamentalism, but is a historical trend, of which ISIS is merely the largest 
contemporary example (Rapaport 2004). A virtual ethnography of ISIS’s online presence 
will be undertaken to describe the environment of self-radicalization. The findings of this 
study are contextualized by a comparative-historical analysis is proposed to examine the 
linkages between and across the historical waves of terrorism.  
Focusing specifically on the international diffusion of terrorism has several 
distinct benefits. Within the literature on terrorism, the mechanisms through which it 
spreads across nations has not been the focus of studies. Research has instead focused on 
the national and individual characteristics, implicitly assuming that groups across nations 
connected by an overarching ideology are independent of each other in their causes 
(Krieger and Meierricks 2011; Victoroff 2005). Furthermore, the subject matter is 
inherently important and timely. Self-radicalization, the internet, and so-called “lone 
wolf” attacks are some of the defining features of contemporary terrorism, from ISIS to 
the Neo-Nazi movement (Mueller 2006). Academically, this aspect of terrorism provides 
a significant challenge to the dominant theoretical explanations. These explanations tend 
to explain terrorism as arising out of societal and institutional conditions, but do not 
readily explain the involvement of individuals outside those conditions. Theoretically, 
providing an explanation that addresses this aspect of terrorism connects and reinforces 
the major theories using culture as a mediating variable, as well as expanding and 
updating subculture theory to this end. 
1.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
 This dissertation examines the role of culture in the adoption of terrorism and how 
the spread of these cultural elements has contributed to the international diffusion of 
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terrorism. This is undertaken to understand the contemporary issue of the international 
threat posed by ISIS, as well as placing this modern problem in a larger socio-historical 
context. ISIS has achieved a global reach, inspiring attacks internationally and attracting 
recruits from around the world. The spread of ISIS has been facilitated through the 
group’s use of the internet to broadcast its message and indoctrinate recruits. Research on 
ISIS’s use of the internet to recruit and gain support has focused on narrowly on the 
group’s use of Twitter, Telegram, or Youtube and the details of its doctrine, providing 
detailed analyses of specific dimensions of the group (Andersen and Sandberg 2018; 
Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and Shay 2016; Klausen 2015). This research 
includes a specific analysis of the group’s official propaganda, which has highlighted the 
framing done by the group to gain support as well as the subcultural style portrayed in its 
depiction of the mujahidin (Andersen and Sandberg 2018). The attraction of foreign 
support for ISIS is a part of a larger aspect of terrorism, its international diffusion. 
ISIS is not the only terrorist group to spread internationally. The international 
spread of terrorism has been a reoccurring characteristic of the phenomenon since its 
modern inception. The anarchists spread from Russia at the turn of the 20th century, 
followed by anticolonial movements in the wake of World War I, the global uprising of 
the New Left, communist groups of the 1960’s, and the current era of terrorism that is 
generally defined by religious goals (Rappaport 2004). These waves represent the 
dominant periods of the international diffusion of terrorism, although they do not 
encompass all terrorist groups that have existed or spread internationally (Park and Sitter 
2016; Sedgwick 2007). Alternative conceptions of the spread of terrorism have proposed 
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a lineage approach, examining the spread of terrorism of different types, such as socialist 
or nationalist, geographically and temporally (Park and Sitter 2016).  
 This dissertation focuses upon explaining the international diffusion of terrorism, 
the spread of a terrorist group’s influence beyond its national origins, either by attracting 
foreign support and recruits or inspiring groups and individuals to engage in terrorism. 
Subculture theory provides an explanation of the international diffusion of terrorism as 
the spread of cultural elements conducive to violence through communication interlocks, 
mechanisms through which culture is transmitted. This explanation also provides a 
mediating link between the dominant explanations of terrorism, but also provides a 
means to understand the spread of terrorism in a digital age.   
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 To study role of culture in the international diffusion of terrorism, and the spread 
of ISIS online specifically, this dissertation uses a mixed methods approach. First, a 
virtual ethnography of ISIS was conducted, examining the group’s online presence and 
the virtual environment in which individuals become radicalized. In order to provide the 
necessary context to this virtual ethnography, a historical-comparative study was also 
conducted. This allows this dissertation to compare the spread of ISIS through the 
internet to the prior historical waves of international terrorism, discerning the unique 
aspects of ISIS’s spread and the degree to which ISIS reflects the general patterns of how 
terrorism spreads internationally. The use of the mixed methods approach provides a 
useful means to ground the virtual ethnography of ISIS in its historical context, but it also 
provides greater insights into how the previous waves of terrorism spread through the 
detailed observations provided through the virtual ethnography. Taken together, these 
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two studies, and the cross-analysis between them, provide robust, multi-dimensional 
evidence supporting a subcultural explanation of terrorism.  
In order to understand the role of the internet in the ISIS’s foreign recruitment and 
inspired attacks, a virtual ethnography of the group’s online presence was engaged in 
over the course of 2018 and 2019. This ethnography specifically focused on ISIS’s 
presence on the traditional internet with the explicit goal of describing the groups 
presentation of itself and the environment in which individuals are allegedly becoming 
radicalized. The virtual ethnography of ISIS is limited in its generalizability, and alone it 
is unclear what significant role the internet plays in the international spread of the group. 
To address this, the second part of this study examines the prior waves of terrorism. 
The second part of this dissertation is a comparative-historical study of terrorist 
groups involved in the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of international 
terrorism. Using secondary sources, a list of terrorist groups participating in these waves 
is developed, after which detailed information about each group was collected. 
Specifically, this research focused on information regarding the grievance and rational 
choice explanations of terrorism, subcultural indicators, and the relationships between 
groups and their influences. This data was then examined for overarching themes and 
used to construct a social network of terrorist groups and their influences. As a result of 
this data, the general support for a subcultural explanation of terrorism is demonstrated, 
and the cultural elements that accompany these groups are traced across and between the 





 The purpose of this study was to determine the role of culture in the adoption of 
terrorism and explain its international diffusion through the mechanisms that transmit 
these cultural elements. Overall, this research has supported a cultural explanation of the 
international diffusion of terrorism. The virtual ethnography of ISIS and the comparative-
historical study of the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of international 
terrorism demonstrate a set of common cultural elements present across terrorist groups. 
These elements include an identity in the Role of the Revolutionist, a Value of Violence, 
the Morality of Terrorism, and a belief in the possession of The Truth. Both studies 
illustrate the importance of the mass media as a means for the transmission of these 
cultural elements. The virtual ethnography of ISIS illustrates how the internet has 
facilitated the transmission of these cultural elements, as well as how this differs from 
previous waves. The comparative-historical study demonstrates the consistent role of the 
media in national contexts, as well as its role in the international spread of terrorism 
throughout the waves. Furthermore, these cultural elements are represented in several 
common sources that connect the international waves of terrorism.  
The virtual ethnography of ISIS provides a holistic overview of the group’s online 
existence to complement the prior detailed studies on specific dimensions of it. The 
process of navigating ISIS’s online presence in the time period after the group has been 
largely deplatformed relies on an understanding of the group’s language, the platforms on 
which it still has a presence, and the tools that can be used to find its content. The actors 
participating in the virtual caliphate are not uniform in their level of support or 
engagement with the group, instead representing varying levels of supporters and 
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sympathizers, related social movements and communities, as well as critics and 
antagonists. These various actors engage the material associated with ISIS to varying 
degrees. These materials comprise the textual basis of ISIS online, including official 
documents, videos, images, and music, which convey the narrative and doctrine of the 
group. This narrative involves an account of history that revolves around conflict with the 
West that is inevitably progressing towards an apocalyptic final conflict in which ISIS 
will be victorious. Although essential to the group’s narrative, its apocalypticism is 
among the aspects of ISIS that is shares with other Islamic and jihadist communities 
(Filiu 2011). The unique aspects of ISIS’s doctrine are the group’s conception of Sharī’ah 
and its implementation in the Islamic State, its emphasis on traveling to the Islamic State 
as a fundamental part of the practice of Islam, and the group’s condemnation and 
persecution of Muslims that do not subscribe to ISIS’s interpretation of Islam.  
 Several aspects of ISIS’s doctrine are reflected in the common cultural elements 
found across the terrorist groups involved in the first international waves of terrorism. 
These cultural elements include a terrorist identity that is glorified and defines members, 
which is used to distinguish the groups from the larger social movements that they 
emerge from. Terrorist groups also share a common set of beliefs and values that 
comprise a moral justification of terrorism based on a criticism of state violence, the 
altruistic motivations of terrorism, and a conception of their struggle as a battle between 
good and evil. Furthermore, violence is rarely viewed purely in utilitarian terms, and is 
often viewed as the necessary and sole means to achieve social change in addition to 
providing therapeutic benefits for its perpetrator. These cultural elements are not limited 
to the boundaries of terrorist groups and organizations but are distributed across larger 
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national terrorist movements that include various individuals, groups, and organizations 
including terrorists, supporters, and sympathizers. These national terrorist movements are 
further connected to each other internationally through cooperation and their shared 
influences and founding texts.  
 The elements that comprise the terrorist subculture are shared within the 
individual waves of international terrorism through shared ideologies, texts, influences, 
and examples. This has been observed through the frequent references by groups of their 
influences, and the social network constructed on the basis of thee connections illustrates 
that the first three international waves of terrorism are strongly interrelated in their 
influences. This occurs primarily through the influence of Vladimir Lenin, who would be 
influenced by, and participate in, the Russian populist movement that would contribute to 
the anarchist wave. Marx and the Russian terrorists would influence the anticolonial and 
New Left waves of terrorism through Lenin’s writings, and his influence on other 
advocates of political violence. The shared cultural elements of terrorist groups and the 
interrelatedness of their influences provides a strong basis for the explaining terrorism as 
a product of cultural diffusion. 
1.4 OUTLINE 
 In the next chapter, the research on the causes of international terrorism, its 
diffusion, and the subcultural explanation for the phenomenon. Chapter Three provides 
an overview of the methodology of this study, a mixed methods approach using a virtual 
ethnography of ISIS in conjunction with a comparative-historical study of the 
international waves of terrorism. In Chapter Four, the findings from the virtual 
ethnography of ISIS are presented, describing the process of navigating the virtual 
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caliphate, the online environment it exists in, and the doctrine of the group. Chapter Five 
examines the common, overarching observations across terrorist groups involved in the 
anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of terrorism. These observations include the 
fundamental characteristics common to terrorist groups in this sample, observations 
related to the dominant explanations of terrorism, and a description of the common 
cultural elements observed across terrorist groups. Chapter Six describes the connections 
between the terrorist groups of the historical waves and their influences, tracing the 
cultural elements discussed in the previous chapter to their origins in the Russian populist 
movement. The findings of the virtual ethnography and comparative-historical study are 
integrated in Chapter Seven, providing an examination of the evidence to support a 
subcultural explanation of terrorism. The conclusions of this study are summarized in 




INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBCULTURE THEORY
The international diffusion of terrorism has not been a major focus of research, 
but is a defining characteristic of modern terrorism. The first part of this review examines 
the international diffusion as it exists today, primarily in the form of foreign support for 
ISIS, but also demonstrates that this is a part of a larger historical trend. After this 
discussion, international terrorism and international diffusion are clearly defined within 
this study. The major theoretical explanations of terrorism, the rational actor approach 
and strain theory, are then examined, followed by a discussion of how subculture theory 
can enhance and connect these theoretical perspectives.  
This dissertation argues that international terrorism can be best understood using a 
cultural framework that serves as a mediating factor between the major theoretical 
explanations of the behavior, grievances and rationality. In defining international 
terrorism, the primary focus of research has been on attacks occurring across national 
boundaries, despite the history of global waves of terrorist groups inspired by an 
overarching ideology (Krieger and Meierricks 2011; Victoroff 2005; Rapoport 2004). As 
a consequence of this focus on transnational attacks, and the majority of terrorist groups 
being domestic in nature, most of the current theories of terrorism are based on individual 
and national level characteristics. The strain and grievance based theories argue that 
problems rooted in the social structure motivate terrorist activities (Agnew 2010; LaFree 
and Ackerman 2009; Krueger 2007). The rational choice models of terrorism, in contrast, 
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focus on the adoption of terrorism as a response to the perceived costs and benefits of it 
as a strategy (Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004). Both 
perspectives offer incomplete explanations for the phenomenon that are made particularly 
clear in the case of the international diffusion of terrorism. As a response, it is argued 
here that a cultural explanation, building off of subculture theory, can connect these 
approaches, provide a mediating link between the two, and provide an explanation of the 
spread of terrorism across national borders.  
2.1 DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM 
The international diffusion of terrorism is an aspect of the phenomenon since its 
modern conception. ISIS’s use of the internet to recruit globally is an evolution of this 
general pattern of international terrorism, reflective of the changes in communications 
technology. However, this is predominantly a change in form only, since several 
international waves of terrorism have occurred throughout history. These historical 
groups spread through older forms of the mass media, in addition to general migration, 
using pamphlets and books to spread their message and inspire new groups in foreign 
lands. Before examining this phenomenon in detail, it is first essential to define and 
clarify terrorism and its international diffusion.  
2.1.1 The Global Reach of ISIS 
Terror attacks in the West are no longer characterized by the organizational 
structure and extensive planning by foreign extremists that resulted in the 9/11 attacks. 
Today, the perpetrators of terror attacks in the West are more likely to be citizens of those 
nations, self-radicalized online through ISIS's social media campaign of propaganda, 
alternate news, memes, and guides to facilitate communication with the group and carry 
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out attacks (Frenkel 2016; Koerner 2016). From the shootings in San Bernardino, 
California and the Pulse nightclub in Orlando to an attack on the London Bridge with a 
van and knives, terror attacks in the West are now defined by the role of the internet in 
the radicalization of the perpetrators (Frenkel 2016; Koerner 2016; Mueller 2006).  
Attackers are only the tip of the iceberg, however, with ISIS attracting over 
30,000 individuals to travel thousands of miles to Syria and Iraq to join the group 
(Koerner 2016). In addition to those fighting directly, sympathizers further expand the 
virtual impact of the group, adding to the group's online presence. ISIS has effectively 
crowdsourced its online propaganda, giving up security and control over the message in 
exchange for publicity and an effective social media presence (Koerner 2016). In 2016, 
Google stated that over 50,000 users searched for the phrase 'join ISIS' every month 6 
(Frenkel 2016).  
The internet presence of ISIS is not limited to social media accounts and internet 
memes. Literature and videos emphasize the group's 'utopian' aspects, and the group 
attempts to present a positive image of itself to specific, targeted audiences across the 
world (Frenkel 2016). The online presence is not even limited to explicit materials related 
to the group. One source recounts a recruitment attempt through an online dating site 
(Koerner 2016). The group's online presence is extensive, including both official sources 
and support from sympathizers without a direct connection to the group, and has been 
successful at inspiring attacks abroad and attracting foreign recruits. 
A great deal of research focuses on understanding ISIS’s use of the internet. This 
research is typically focused on particular ideological aspects of the group, a specific 
publication of the group, or the group’s presence on specific platforms. Research 
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examining one of ISIS’s official magazines, Dabiq, has found that it includes a range of 
cultural elements and narratives to appeal and influence its audiences, while also 
presenting a subcultural style the subcultural elements of provocation, violence, 
machismo, and excitement seeking (Andersen and Sandberg 2018). Similarly, research 
has focused on the group’s unique conception of the Islamic concept of hijrah, and the 
implications this has for the group’s belief system (Uberman and Shay 2016). Other 
research has focused on ISIS’s use of particular platforms. Klausen (2015) describes the 
relationships between ISIS accounts on Twitter, examining how several central actors 
significantly impact the distribution of ISIS materials. Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan (2017) 
focus on the Telegram app, examining the discussions among ISIS followers through the 
apps and noting the dominance in discussion of doctrinal debate.  
The spread of ISIS is consistent with larger societal changes in the wake of 
advancements in communications technologies. The internet and social media have 
produced an environment wherein there are few limitations in terms of space and time on 
an individual’s access to information and exposure to other people, cultures, and ideas 
(Kay 2018). This wide availability of content facilitates the aggregation of people around 
common interests, narratives, and worldviews, resulting in homogenous and polarized 
worldviews (Vicario et. al. 2016). As a result, one’s identity is arguably less shackled to 
the limitations of one’s own immediate environment and social structure (Kay 2018). 
Findings have shown that internet users tend to select and share content according to a 
specific narrative and ignore other sources (Vicario et. al. 2016). Whether or not claims 
are accepted is determined primarily by social norms and the claims’ adherence to an 
individual’s belief system. In reference to terrorism, this suggests the importance of 
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understanding the virtual environment in which individuals can find and adopt narratives 
conducive to violence.  
2.1.2 International Waves of Terrorism through History 
This 'new' threat posed by terrorism is not without precedent. The history of 
terrorism contains many examples of terrorist groups or ideologies expanding far beyond 
their nation's borders. Of these, several epochs of international terrorism have been 
observed. Over the course of almost two centuries the world has experienced four major 
waves of terrorism, each characterized by the spread of a particular form of terrorist 
ideology globally (Rapoport 2004). The anarchists originated in Russia and would spread 
across Europe and beyond. A wave of separatist terrorism would fight against 
colonialism in the following generation, and the communist groups would emerge all 
around the world from the 1960s to the end of the century. Today, the current wave of 
terrorism is characterized by religious ideologies, including Islamic fundamentalism but 
also including cults and Christian fundamentalist groups (Rapoport 2004). According to 
Parker and Sitter (2016), the wave theory of terrorism ignores a significant number of 
terrorist groups that occur outside of the wave schema. They propose instead that four 
variations of terrorism have developed and spread globally from a small number of 
original innovators. Sedgwick (2007) argues for an alternative classification of the global 
waves of terrorism, one that emphasizes a contagion based explanation of terrorism. 
This history of terrorism includes many texts that each respective movement 
would draw inspiration from, such as the infamous Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerilla of 
the New Left terrorist groups from the 1970s (Carr 2007). Today, there are a cornucopia 
of stories on individuals becoming self-radicalized online and aligning their actions to 
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ISIS. This is a part of a larger phenomenon seen throughout the history of terrorism, a 
change that is not unique to the Internet age and ISIS but an evolution of the relationship 
between mass media and terrorist recruitment. Foreign recruitment, support, and the 
adoption of terrorist ideologies have been hallmarks of terrorism since its modern 
conception, albeit less studied than other aspects of larger phenomenon. Research on 
terrorism has often focused instead on domestic terrorism or international terrorism in the 
form of foreign based groups carrying out attacks in other nations or the international 
cooperation of terrorist groups (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011).  
2.1.3 Defining International Terrorism  
There is considerable debate surrounding the definition of terrorism. Almost 
every government, organization, and researcher has developed a unique definition of 
terrorism (Beck and Miner 2013; Thomas 2004). Furthermore, international terrorism has 
been defined in practice primarily by whether or not attacks are perpetrated by foreign 
groups. As a consequence, other qualities of international terrorism have been excluded 
from analysis, particularly the spread of groups and their ideologies as well as the 
recruitment of foreigners to their cause.  
Turk (2004) has argued for a definition of terrorism based on the randomness of 
the victims and the intent to influence a third party, while also recognizing the politically 
oriented social construction of acts as terrorism (Oliverio 2005). Organizational 
differences in how terrorism is defined demonstrate the influence of group ideology, 
targets and tactics (Beck and Miner 2013; Thomas 2004). An approach to studying 
terrorism as a form of deviance and criminality is fruitful in moving beyond its political 
nature. In comparing terrorism to crime, Lafree and Dugan (2004) observe that the two 
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are similar, with the major distinctions being the altruistic orientation of terrorists, their 
motivations, and the absence of a specific crime of terrorism. For the purposes of this 
discussion terrorism is defined as nonstate actors using actual or threatened violence 
against persons or property in the pursuit of a political, social, or religious goal. This 
definition benefits from a focus on the unique features of terrorism as agenda motivated, 
non-state violence without including assumptions about a group’s tactics, strategy, goals, 
or morality. 
International terrorism denotes cooperation, support, attacks, movement and/or 
recruitment across nation-state boundaries, or involving a collaboration between two 
groups across national boundaries. Most research on international terrorism has focused 
on attacks that originate from a group based in a foreign nation or national characteristics 
that are the product of a nation’s international relations and position in the global order 
(Krieger and Meierricks 2011). The spread of a terrorist ideology or groups across 
national borders has largely been left unstudied. Despite the lack of attention that this 
aspect of international terrorism has received, it has been a significant characteristic in 
the history of international terrorism. In describing the international waves of terrorism, 
Rapoport (2004) demonstrates that there have been major periods wherein a particular 
terrorist ideology or group has spread globally. Furthermore, cases of foreign support and 
the international diffusion of groups not associated with these major waves have also 
been observed.  
2.2 EXPLANATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM  
The dominant explanations of the causes of terrorism explain it as a product of 
societal strains or as the result of rational actors in political situations where terrorism is 
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seen as a productive strategy. The strain and rational choice theories of terrorism are not 
incompatible with a subculture theory of terrorism. The cultural approach to 
understanding terrorism provides a bridge between the two theories, as well as 
strengthening these theories by providing a mediating factor in their impact on terrorism.  
2.2.1 Rational Choice and Terrorism  
Rational actor theories of terrorism argue that individuals and groups, typically 
involved in a social movement, adopt terrorism in the course of pursuing a social, 
political, or religious agenda when other means are ineffective or unavailable and the 
costs of terrorism are low (Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; Beck 2008; Brents and 
Mshigeni 2004). This approach is based on 3 core assumptions; 1) terrorists possess 
stable political preferences, 2) they evaluate the expected political payoffs of their 
available options, 3) they adopt terrorism only when the expected political return is 
superior to alternative options (Abrahms 2008). Additional research has focused on 
institutional factors that condition the costs and benefits of terrorism and the relational 
dynamics between groups in society (Crenshaw 1981; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; 
Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004; Alimi 2011; Goodwin 2009).  
This theory lacks an explanation for the goals of terrorists, or their evaluation of 
the feasibility or effectiveness of a terrorist campaign. Some researchers have 
demonstrated that the rational actor model only applies to terrorism under particular 
conditions (Abrahms 2008). Furthermore, the theory requires reduced assumptions when 
applied to terrorism, in part due to the irrational beliefs associated with terrorist groups 
(Caplan 2006). In addition to these direct criticisms, understanding the perceptions and 
beliefs of terrorist groups is necessary to understand their decision calculus (Crenshaw 
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1981). Perceptions, beliefs, and ideologies are cultural products, and are essential to a 
complete explanation of terrorist groups since these factors structure their decisions 
(Hamm 2004; Arena and Arrigo 2005; Beck 2008).  
2.2.2 Strains and Grievances  
The strain explanation of terrorism possesses mixed empirical support, but 
remains an enduring theoretical explanation of terrorism (Agnew 2010). Strain theories 
explain terrorism as the product of social grievances, collective problems, or negative 
social conditions. Specifically, Agnew (2010) argues strains that are high in magnitude, 
unjust, and inflicted by more powerful others are argued to increase the likelihood of 
terrorism. The negative consequences of globalization, economic development, material 
deprivation, inequality, lack of opportunity, education level, human rights offenses, and 
feelings of alienation or humiliation have all been examined as potential determinants of 
terrorism with varying levels of empirical support (Krieger and Daniel Meierricks 2011; 
Agnew 2010; Krueger 2007; LaFree and Ackerman 2009; Nasser 2005; Krueger and 
Maleckova 2003; Abadie 2006; Feldman and Perala 2004; Stern 2003). In a survey of 
American terrorists, Smith (1994) noted considerable variability in socio-economic status 
across individuals in various types of groups, despite homogeneity within the different 
types of groups.  
However, it appears that strains are not a sufficient or necessary cause of 
terrorism (LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Many individuals experience collective strains, 
but only a small proportion engage in terrorism. The adoption of terrorism as a coping 
mechanism to a collective strain is influenced by additional factors including the 
anticipated costs and benefits of terrorism as well as the beliefs and affiliations of the 
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individual (Agnew 2010). Why a specific coping mechanism, such as terrorism, is chosen 
over others, however, is often beyond the scope of the theory.  
2.2.3 Rationality, Grievances, and International Terrorism  
The rational actor and strain perspectives primarily focus on terrorism as a 
product of national characteristics and processes. Most research does not directly address 
international terrorism in the form of foreign diffusion and recruitment, instead implicitly 
assuming all terrorist groups that develop emerge from the national socio-historical 
context. Rational actor approaches focus on institutional factors that influence the 
cost/benefit analysis of terrorism and the interactions between social movements and 
other groups, both of which are unique to each nation. Strain and grievance explanations 
are similarly rooted in socio-economic and demographic characteristics that are unique to 
each nation. These theories do not address the diffusion of groups internationally or the 
recruitment of foreign nationals. The major historical waves of terrorism have illustrated 
that a group or ideology established in one nation can spread globally and in nations with 
fundamentally different social and political conditions (Rapaport 2004). Foreign recruits 
and supporters are embedded in societies with their own unique social and institutional 
conditions distinct from those that produced the original group. An explanation finding 
the root of terrorism in the social structure cannot readily explain its transplantation. 
Furthermore, among the most supported determinants of international terrorism have 
been contagion factors, such as geographic proximity to a country with a terrorist group 
or a history of terrorism internally (Krieger and Meierricks 2011).  
Applying subculture theory to terrorism addresses the theoretical gaps that exist in 
these explanations of terrorism. Subcultures are theorized to be coping mechanisms to 
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collectively experienced strain (Cohen 1955; Miller, Schreck, and Tewksbury 2006; 
Einstadter and Henry 2006). Deviant behavior is the product of socialization into a 
subculture, including beliefs, values, and ideologies. The theory is easily integrated into 
the current approaches by providing a mediating link between strains and a coping 
behavior as well as an explanation for the beliefs, values, and ideologies that condition 
decisions. Furthermore, international diffusion and foreign recruitment of terrorism can 
be explained by subculture theory by approaching terrorism as a cultural ‘tool’ that 
provides a solution to the grievances of groups and individuals.  
2.3 SUBCULTURE THEORY REFORMULATED  
Ferracuti (1982) has perhaps been the first theorist to propose a subcultural 
explanation of terrorism, but Hamm (1993) presents the first study specifically involving 
terrorism and subcultures. In his study on neo-Nazis, Hamm (1993, 2004) found that the 
neo-Nazi subculture was a major influence on individuals’ participation in terrorism, and 
further demonstrated that the degree to which the individual was integrated into the neo-
Nazi subculture was positively associated with terrorist actions (Hamm 1995). Further 
research on hate crimes and their connection to terrorism has drawn attention to the 
importance of group identities and normative behaviors (Mills, Freilich, and Chermak 
2017). Although there is scant research particularly focused on a subcultural explanation 
of terrorism, the concept has been frequently invoked in discussion on the topic as a 
mediating factor.  
Although subculture theory provides a theoretical answer to the gaps in the 
current theoretical explanations, the theory has developed unevenly throughout its history 
(Blackman 2014). This section reviews subculture theory and augments it with current 
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research and theoretical perspectives. First, the history of the theory and its general 
explanation for deviant behavior is reviewed. This is followed by examining the relevant 
mechanisms of the theory at the individual, group, national, and historical levels.  
2.3.1 Introducing Subculture Theory  
Subculture theory argues that interacting individuals develop cultural adaptations 
to address the strain that they collectively experience due to their position in the social 
system (Cohen 1955; Miller, Schreck, and Tewksbury 2006; Einstadter and Henry 2006). 
The consequent deviant behavior is a product of socialization into a subculture containing 
norms, values, and beliefs that are considered deviant (Einstadter and Henry 2006). In 
order to apply subculture theory to terrorism, a cohesive framework must first be 
established, since its theoretical development has been uneven (Blackman 2014). This 
dissertation integrates the current research and knowledge from the perspective of social 
network analysis to organize the relevant research on subcultures and their relationship to 
terrorism, provide a basis to understand the micro-, meso-, macro-, and historical level 
links within the theory, and to elaborate on the theory’s relationship with the strain and 
rational actor perspectives on terrorism.  
Subcultures are defined as cultural systems, containing norms, roles, values, 
beliefs, knowledge, and artifacts, that deviate from the parent culture and are distributed 
through social networks, to which membership is claimed. According to Fine and 
Kleinman (1979) the distinguishing characteristics of subcultures are: 1) the peculiar 
cultural components; and 2) the social network as the referent for a subculture’s 
boundaries. Although values are often the dominant focus of subculture studies, cultural 
components may also refer to norms (Fine and Kleinman 1979), roles (Hunt 2008), 
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specialized knowledge (Downing 2010), language (Holt 2009), style of dress and 
mannerisms, beliefs, and artifacts (Williams 2007). Subcultures exist as these cultural 
elements distributed and shared across social networks. Finally, the membership 
component distinguishes individuals that know of the subculture from those that are a 
part of it and distinguishes subcultures from other localized cultures.  
Taking social networks as the basis of the theoretical framework provides 
conception and understanding of society that the ideas of subculture theory can build 
upon. Society is viewed as the totality of all the relationships between people. A group 
exists as the relationships between its members. The nation-state exists as the 
relationships and interactions between these groups, and the logic can extend further to 
the global setting. A final element to add to this foundation of a framework is the 
recognition of time and space in which the above relationships exist. Partially this 
approach builds off of the work of Simmel (as described by Janowitz [1975]) and Mead 
(1925) in its focus on group memberships and interactions as the basis of society and 
subcultures (Fine and Kleinman 1979). Building off of this theory of society provides the 
advantage of avoiding the tendency to reify subcultures and the mainstream, serving as a 
means to organize the disparate works relevant to subculture theory, and modeling how 
the levels of analysis are linked.  
2.3.2 Individuals in Subcultures and Society  
At the individual level, four elements determine participation in subcultures and 
the consequent deviant behavior: 1) the social position in society, 2) the social position in 
subculture, 3) degree of socialization into the subculture, and 4) behavior as a result of 
that socialization. In this context, social position is referring to the socio-economic and 
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demographic status of individuals, as well as their position within social networks. The 
connection of individuals to larger societal factors of subcultures and the social structure 
is therefore the product of their location within these larger entities.  
Drawing a direct connection to strain theory, the motivating force in participation 
in subcultures are problems or issues that the individual is facing. Subcultures are 
theorized to provide a solution, or coping mechanism, to these problems. Furthermore, it 
is specifically collectively experienced strains that produce subcultures, since collective 
strains by definition produce problems that are shared by individuals occupying a similar 
position within society. Alienation, desire to avoid gender and sexuality norms, and 
technological fascination contributed to the attractiveness of the rave scene to individuals 
(Anderson 2009). Similarly, Schafer, et al. (2013) describe four initial sources of impetus 
in the pathways to becoming White supremacists: personal victimization, political 
grievances, incremental involvement, and personal attachment to a member. Shared 
experiences and collective problems are the initial basis of the individual motivation to 
participate in a subculture, since they (sometimes ostensibly) provide a solution or a 
means to cope with problems (Cohen 1955). This is consistent with the role of the 
internet in theories of radicalization, which note the internet can provide ideological 
support for isolated individuals, serve as an area where they can consume and contribute 
to a discourse, provide networking opportunities to find and interact with others, and that 
the internet is a ready source for informational and educational materials (King and 
Taylor 2011). 
Second, the individual’s position within social networks is a defining factor in 
exposure to, and participation in, subcultures. Previous contacts have been noted as 
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potential pathways into a subculture, such as the workplace, events (raves, concerts, gun 
shows), family (Schafer, Mullins and Box 2013), and other relationships prior to 
involvement. This illustrates the importance of social influence on entering a subculture, 
which has support from the research on peers and delinquency that argue peers provide 
delinquent definitions of situations that influence others (Sutherland 1955, Haynie 2002; 
Haynie and Osgood 2005). Studies on subcultures around swinging, drug use and sexual 
practices illustrate how behaviors and identities that are rare, risky, or stigmatized thrive 
on the Internet, in part due to how it facilitates contact between isolated members 
(Griffiths and Frobish 2013; Frederick and Perrone 2014). While many factors can 
contribute to how individuals move across social networks or are influenced by their 
peers (Pearson and West 2003), the importance of identity should be recognized. White 
supremacists sometimes participate in several groups until they find one that best fits 
their perspective (Schafer, et al. 2013). Moral orientations have been found to be 
influential in the formation of the individual's' network of friends (Vaisey and Lizardo 
2010).  
In addition to the individual's social position, social influences, and identity, the 
position in relation to the group must also be understood. Membership is not uniform, and 
varies in regards to roles or statuses within the subculture as well as commitment and 
involvement. Anderson (2009) finds several forms of membership, or status, in the rave 
scene differentiated by the relation to the means of production, involvement in the scene, 
and appreciation for the music. A study of a militia group uncovered similar diversity in 
the roles and statuses within the group, ranging from “true believers” to “fellow 
travelers” (Melder 2014). This should emphasize that all members are not involved or 
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committed to the group to the same degree, and even within the group there may be 
distinctions amongst members, and that influence within a subculture is connected to 
these social positions. In noting understudied areas on terrorism, Waldman (2008) 
specifically discusses the importance of “the radical milieu”, or the segment of the 
population that sympathizes and supports terrorist groups morally and logistically. 
Deviant behavior is argued to be a product of the degree to which deviant norms, 
beliefs, and values have been internalized by the individual. Previous research has 
demonstrated the influence of subcultural involvement on violence and delinquency 
particularly, and deviant behavior more generally (Stewart and Simons 2010; Hunt 2008; 
Bernburg and Thorlindsson 2005; Kennedy and Baron 1993; Heimer 1997; Hartnagel 
1980; Austin 1980). This is mediated by an individual’s level of involvement with a 
subculture (Hamm 1995; Smith 1979; Hunt 2008; Bernburg and Thorlindsson 2005). 
This provides a basis of integration with the rational actor models, since culture and 
social networks have been argued to be mediating factors in explaining the behavior of 
rational actors (Pescolido 1992; Spickard 1998). This socialization aspect has been 
observed in terrorism research before. In his work on the Red Brigades (BR), Orsini 
(2011) discusses the ideology of the Italian terrorists as exhibiting a religious mindset, 
and that the process of becoming a terrorist involved the learning how to dehumanize the 
enemy, the evilness of the world, and the value of violence. 
2.3.3 Scenes, Subcultures, and Social Networks  
There are two distinct, interrelated levels that are important at the meso-level of 
analysis. Subcultures are larger entities comprised of connections between local level 
groupings, including friend groups, scenes, and idiocultures. The most important units of 
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analysis here are the local groupings and scenes, their relationship to each other, and how 
this comprises an overarching subculture, and how the relationships and overlapping 
group memberships influence the spread of subcultures. With reference to international 
terrorism, it is at this level that the internet and older forms of mass media become major 
elements of analysis as the connecting links between various groups.  
Fine and Kleinman (1979) argued to root the concept of subculture in 
interactionist analysis, by recognizing its existence across a social network and the 
conditions that enabled its spread or cohesion across geographical space. They first 
recognize that people have multiple group memberships, and that these memberships 
often overlap. From this point, they discuss “communication interlocks”, the mechanisms 
of cultural diffusion that enable a subculture to spread beyond its locality. They list 
multiple group memberships, weak ties, structural roles, and media diffusion as types of 
communication interlocks, mechanisms that condition cultural transmission (Fine and 
Kleinman 1979). The Internet represents a new form of mass media communication 
interlock, distinct in that everyone has the means of mass communication and it allows 
for greater interaction across geographical distances. 
Anderson (2009) observed consistency and unity across rave scenes from 
Philadelphia to London and Spain, as well as among participants coming from many 
other nations. Schafer, et al. (2013) observed that White supremacists were frequently 
exposed to racist ideologies through networks or through the Internet, and that members 
often passed through several groups. Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk (2006) as well as 
Anderson (2009) have noted that local scenes of interaction are complemented with 
online participation and attending large scale events uniting local groups from around a 
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region can serve as a means to maintain unity across a diaspora of local groups. In 
explaining the persistence of White Power activist in the US, Futrell and Simi (2004) find 
the same form in the relationships between the local, virtual, and global, arguing that the 
Internet is critical as a free space, an area where racial ideologies can be shared without 
stigmatization, and that these free spaces contribute to the maintenance of a collective 
identity.  
2.3.4 The Macro-Level and Beyond  
There are three distinct levels of analysis at the macro-level. The national level is 
comprised of the relationships of organizations and subcultures, the distribution of 
problems according to social class, racial and ethnic status, and other characteristics, and 
the institutional environment, such as the form of government. The international level is 
composed of the relationships and interactions between nations, including war, 
colonization, trade, and migration. Within this dissertation, these macro-level factors are 
important for their relationship to structuring the distribution of strains and grievances 
within a society, and for placing the competing hypotheses of strain and rational actor 
theories within the context of the current analysis.  
The historical dimension is included as the history of interactions along the above 
levels of analysis (i.e. a history of colonization, or a history of a social movement). With 
reference to terrorism and social movements more generally, historical context has been 
found to be a influential factor. For rational actor theories, the historical dimension is 
important in understanding decisions that take into 19 account the previous actions by 
governments and counter-movements. In social movements, historical events have taken 
an important symbolic importance (Armstrong and Crage 2006). In addition to a 
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symbolic importance of events, several terrorist groups have had long histories marked 
by periodic revivals. The most known examples would be the Ku Klux Klan [KKK] and 
the Irish Republican Army [IRA], both of which have had multiple incarnations in the 
last century and can trace their histories to earlier social movements (Hart 2005; Coogan 
2002; Trelease 1995).  
The KKK and the IRA represent examples of how older movements can be 
revived to deal with (at the time) modern problems. Within this cultural framework, this 
is argued to be an example of a cultural tool, a strategy or technique that exists in the 
collective consciousness that can be applied to a given situation (DiMaggio 1997). There 
is considerable support for approaching culture not as a monolithic and coherent entity, 
but as a collection of elements, such as techniques, strategies, and practices, that 
individuals have a knowledge of and can apply to a given situation (DiMaggio 1997). 
Integrating this concept with subculture theory, it is expected that individuals aware of 
cultural elements represented in texts and examples that inspire terrorism can and will be 
applied by individuals and groups to collective problems. Although the examples of the 
KKK and IRA reflect the ideology and tactics as cultural tools adapted across generations 
within a society (Hart 2005; Coogan 2002; Trelease 1995), this dissertation argues that 
terrorism, in general, can be understood as a set of cultural tools that have been adapted 
and transformed by various groups and movements over the course of the last two 
centuries. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
ISIS is the latest incarnation of the international diffusion of terrorism, and the 
group’s proficient use of the internet to spread their message highlights the importance of 
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understanding the unique role of the internet on terrorism. ISIS, however, is only a new 
manifestation of a long running aspect of international terrorism, its spread beyond its 
geographic and temporal origins. To fully understand the unique dimensions of ISIS and 
the internet’s relationship to terrorism, this dissertation focuses on the development of a 
virtual ethnography to understand the online environment in which radicalization occurs. 
This ethnography requires the historical context of the international diffusion of terrorism 
in order to accurately clarify the unique aspects of ISIS and its internet use, as well as the 
degree to which this ethnography’s findings may be considered relevant to other groups. 
In the next chapter, the methodology of this study is described.  
This study examines the international diffusion of terrorism, both historical and 
modern, using the framework of subculture theory to structure data collection and the 
analysis. Subculture theory is uniquely suited to explaining the international diffusion of 
terrorism given its focus on the mechanisms through which culture spreads, is adopted, 
and adapted to local circumstances. As such, the international diffusion of terrorism 
perfectly illustrates the unique contribution of the theory to the study of terrorism, in 





This dissertation proposes to use multiple methods to determine the support for 
subculture theory in its application to terrorism. Mixed methods approaches provide 
stronger empirical evidence by complementing research methods, studying a relationship 
along multiple methods or contexts, or using different methods better inform another 
methodological approach (Small 2011). The first part of this research will focus on a 
virtual ethnography of ISIS, describing the virtual environment through which the group 
allegedly attracts foreign members as well as examining the culture of the group as 
presented through the internet to western audiences. In the second part of this study, a 
comparative-historical methodology is used to examine the larger phenomenon of the 
international diffusion of terrorism. This research provides an overview of how terrorism 
has spread internationally historically by examining three major waves of terrorism. By 
studying the present spread of terrorism through the internet in conjunction with the 
historical approach, the current issue of terrorism and its spread through the internet is 
placed in the context of other major terrorist epidemics. Conversely, the study of the 
historical waves of terrorism benefits from the study of ISIS online by providing an 
examination of how the spread of terrorism has changed with the advent of terrorism.  
3.0.1 The Advantages of Mixed Methods 
In addition to directly addressing the theoretical expectations at multiple levels of 
analysis, examining evidence across multiple studies provides a more holistic overall 
33 
analysis. The online presence of ISIS can be contrasted with the previous spread of other 
terrorist groups through older forms of the mass media. This would provide necessary 
context for understanding the unique aspects of terrorism in the internet age. 
Additionally, comparing ISIS’s cultural and mass media aspects to those of previous 
movements would demonstrate a pattern of cultural factors in the spread of terrorism 
across these mediums.  
The historical-comparative analysis can inform on the role of culture and mass 
media on the spread of terrorism, but these findings are potentially invalid with the 
development of the internet age. The continued validity of historical research on 
terrorism can therefore be examined by comparing the historical experience with 
terrorism to the present conditions. Similarly, historical observations on terrorism can 
provide a point of comparison to provide a degree of generalizability to the present 
research focused on ISIS.  
Furthermore, comparing the evolution of terrorist groups’ historical use of the 
mass media in the past to the internet age can illuminate how the present differs from the 
past. ISIS has distinguished itself as the major terrorist innovator in the use of the internet 
(Frenkel 2016; Koerner 2016). By comparing the observations of their online presence to 
the mass media use of previous international terrorist movements the unique aspects of 
the medium can be demonstrated, as well as how ISIS online parallels earlier forms of the 
mass media. Overall, the comparative-historical analysis establishes the trend of terrorist 
groups spreading internationally and provides context to examining contemporary 
terrorism through the ethnography of ISIS.  
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3.1 A VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY OF ISIS  
The first part of this dissertation is a virtual ethnography of ISIS’s online 
presence. The central focus of this dissertation has been the influence of culture on the 
adoption of terrorism, and the mass media mechanisms through which this culture is 
transmitted. While the comparative-historical research can shed light on the historical 
trends in the international diffusion of terrorism, the contemporary era has been defined 
largely by ubiquity of the internet and the ramifications of this development in the mass 
media (Aiken 2016). Although the increasing reach of terrorist groups to gain direct 
exposure to possible recruits poses a significant issue, it also represents a unique 
opportunity to study the radicalization process in its own environment. Therefore, a 
virtual ethnography of ISIS was conducted to investigate its online presence, specifically 
focused on describing the online environment in which individuals allegedly become 
radicalized and the messages communicated within this environment. To accomplish an 
ethnography on an amorphous entity like the virtual caliphate, several entry points to the 
research field site are utilized. This ethnography provides the most direct and holistic 
insights into the messages and texts that are consumed by those radicalized online, and, 
when used in conjunction with the research from the comparative-historical study, can 
give new insights into the role of the mass media in international terrorism.  
The extant literature on ISIS’s online presence has focused narrowly on specific 
aspects of the group’s ideology or its presence on specific platforms (Andersen and 
Sandberg 2018; Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and Shay 2016; Klausen 
2015). This research has examined the unique interpretation of hijrah (emigration) by 
ISIS, its presence on Twitter, Arabic language Youtube, or one of the group’s propaganda 
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magazines. These studies have provided invaluable insights on ISIS’s use of the internet, 
but the focus on a single dimension or platform inhibits a holistic understanding of how 
ISIS operates across virtual spaces. Prior research on online communities and virtual 
worlds has demonstrated that participants rarely limit themselves to a single platform, 
whether it is a video game, community forum, or content sharing platform (Boellstorff et. 
al. 2012; Boellstorff 2008). Often, participants whose community is centered on one 
platform or topic also engage with other community members across a series of 
platforms, including but not limited to blogs, social media sites, forums, and other related 
websites. An understanding of online communities therefore also necessitates an 
understanding of how these communities exist across multiple virtual spaces. 
Ethnographic methods are especially suited to establishing such an understanding, due to 
their usefulness in collecting and analyzing unstructured data and focus on a holistic 
understanding of specific social settings and locations (Reeves, Kuper, and Hodges 2008; 
Boellstorff et. al. 2012). 
The central aim of ethnographic research is to produce detailed, holistic insights 
of the views and actions of individuals acting within particular social contexts 
(Hammersly 2006; Reeves, Kuper, and Hodges 2008; Boellstorff et. al. 2012). This is 
accomplished through first-hand observation of what participants say and do within these 
natural settings by collecting detailed observations, typically through natural observation, 
participant and non-participant observation, interviews, and the study of related 
documents. Ethnographic methods are therefore the best suited to developing a holistic 
understanding of ISIS Online and the worldview portrayed within it.  
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However, the nature of this internet community precludes the use of interviews 
and participant observation for the majority of actions involved. This does not invalidate 
the ethnographic approach however, since the social context being studied is the virtual 
environment presented by ISIS itself and this can be achieved primarily through non-
participant observation used in other online ethnographies (Hammersly 2006; Reeves, 
Kuper, and Hodges 2008; Williams 2008; Boellstorff et. al. 2012). Since the goal of this 
study is to describe this virtual environment, non-participant observation approaches are 
sufficient to chronicle the virtual caliphate. In addition to this, the researcher was also 
engaged in participant observation to a limited degree, describing the process of 
navigating, recognizing, and becoming immersed in the virtual caliphate. Describing ISIS 
Online necessitates this degree of participating in the process of becoming radicalized 
through ISIS’s virtual environment, even though it does not include complete 
participation through interpersonal interaction with other participants or the production 
and dissemination of content supportive of ISIS.  
3.1.1 A Case Study of the Virtual Caliphate  
This dissertation argues that individuals participate in ISIS as a result of 
socialization into a subculture that is spread primarily through a single communication 
interlock--the internet. ISIS’s online presence is argued to be a representation of a unique 
subculture, and therefore it is expected that this ethnography will demonstrate that ISIS 
online reflects a cohesive set of norms, beliefs, values, symbols, knowledge, and claim to 
an identity. In addition to these core elements, subcultures frequently also involve a 
unique social structure defined by participants commitment to the subcultural lifestyle 
(Anderson 2009; Melder 2014).  
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Within the literature studying the impact of the internet on society, the connection 
between virtual engagement and offline behavior is subject of considerable debate (Aiken 
2016). A growing literature is establishing the internet as not only a ubiquitous aspect of 
modern life, but also impactful in offline behavior and the development of new social 
problems involving crimes defined by the internet (Aiken 2016). For this dissertation, the 
connection between behaviors supporting ISIS and online engagement has been a 
defining feature. Foreign ISIS participants often have no direct contact to the 
organization, and the direct contacts that do occur appear to happen primarily through the 
use of the internet. Foreign recruitment through the internet is therefore an interesting 
case study in the impact of the internet, since geographic distance, the clandestine nature 
of the group, and the rarity of the behavior precludes the influence of offline contact.  
ISIS presents an excellent case for this research, since it is a specific 
manifestation of the religious wave of terrorism, connecting it to the proposed historical 
research, as well as being the dominant example of how terrorism spreads internationally 
through the internet. The previous historical waves of terrorism are argued here to have 
spread, in part, through the mass media of the time, particularly in the form of texts and 
pamphlets. The internet reflects a fundamental change in the characteristics of the mass 
media and its dissemination, since the technology has enabled anyone to broadcast a 
message to a wide audience (Jenkins 2008; Burgess and Green 2009). Major international 
terrorist groups with a large internet presence are limited. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and 
Anonymous have been the most prevalent on the internet (Koerner 2016; Coleman 2015; 
Mueller 2006). Al-Qaeda had a significant online presence, producing an online 
magazine named Inspire in 2010 and utilizing the dark web (Larabee 2015). ISIS, 
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however, has distinguished itself through its sophisticated use and understanding of social 
media (Farwell 2014).  
Anonymous, although defined by governments as a terrorist group, may be better 
characterized as a social movement due to its methods revolving around hacking 
primarily as well as legitimate social protests (Coleman 2015), Furthermore, the group 
did not spread internationally in the traditional sense, but instead evolved directly out of 
interactions and communities online (Coleman 2015). The focus of this research is on 
how groups spread beyond their originating nation, so a group that emerged directly from 
interactions online is distinct from the focus of this research, but also a further extension 
of it.  
The central question of why individuals from fundamentally different social 
backgrounds adopt shared causes originating in different societies is highlighted in the 
case of ISIS. The group has its ideological roots in a small, fundamentalist sect of Islam 
that is largely maligned by the dominant sects of the religion (Warrick 2015; McCants 
2015). In addition, ISIS has been extremely hostile to other Islamic sects within its 
territories (Warrick 2015; McCants 2015), and has put effort into appearing as brutal as 
possible, drawing criticisms from even al-Qaeda for its brutality and treatment of other 
Muslims (Warrick 2015; McCants 2015). With ISIS, the question is not only why 
individuals join foreign causes, but why do individuals join foreign causes that they likely 
do not share a religion with and are largely depicted as brutal and inhumane (Warrick 
2015; McCants 2015). Furthermore, ISIS has become known for its innovation in 
attracting members online through a massive social media campaign comparable to 
Western corporations (Koerner 2016).  
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3.1.2 Field Site  
The field site for this virtual ethnography is ISIS online, also referred to as the 
virtual caliphate—the collection of accounts, communications (public posts, tweets, etc.), 
images and memes, texts, and videos that are officially and unofficially supporting ISIS 
and facilitating communications amongst its supporters across various internet platforms. 
Taking a holistic approach to understanding ISIS online complements prior research 
examining the group’s presence on specific platforms by examining how the group exists 
across multiple platforms and virtual environments (Andersen and Sandberg 2018; 
Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2017; Uberman and Shay 2016; Klausen 2015). Although this 
ethnography takes a more holistic approach to studying the virtual caliphate, this study is 
limited to the virtual caliphate across the traditional internet, websites that are navigated 
using a traditional internet browser. This excludes other, related platforms such as the 
deep web and communication apps available on phones. The scope of this ethnography is 
limited to the English language content and platforms of the virtual caliphate, and it is 
unclear what differences exist between ISIS’s virtual environments across different 
languages. Notably, the content and its translations used for this research are produced 
officially by ISIS or unofficially by its supporters, and therefore this ethnography is based 
on how the group itself presents itself to an English-speaking audience. Since the chaotic 
nature of the internet and clandestine nature of the group contribute to ISIS online’s 
amorphous nature, several entry points are utilized to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the entity.  
The first point of entry was the official materials posted by ISIS. The most 
infamous of these materials are their propaganda videos, but the group has also produced 
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online magazines and other official materials. Official representations of ISIS provide the 
characteristics, strategies, and position of the formal organization, prior to the creation 
and dissemination of unofficial texts and materials in support of the organization. From 
this initial point, additional platforms and materials referenced by the group will be 
investigated, expanding the coverage of ISIS online.  
The second point of entry was the discourse on ISIS online, based on news 
coverage as well as statements and investigations by government organizations, private 
companies, and research institutions. This entry point has three benefits. First, it provides 
new search terms, platforms, and materials to investigate and increase the overall 
coverage of ISIS online. Second, it provides an overview of ISIS online, its relationship 
with platforms, materials that are no longer available, investigator experiences interacting 
with ISIS online, and the efforts to combat it. Finally, examining the coverage of ISIS 
online provides information on the history of the entity and how it has changed over time. 
This is necessary since there have been significant efforts to disrupt ISIS online, and 
consequently the field that is observed in the course of this research is not the one 
engaged in by earlier participants.  
Based on these points of entry, an initial understanding of the group, its symbols, 
and the platforms through which it uses to communicate was established. This knowledge 
was then used to find further content related to ISIS across the internet. Prior research has 
shown that terrorist groups have used symbols and shared meanings in order to recognize 
other adherents to their cause (Hegghammer 2013). Successful communication through 
symbols or other marks are essential in recruitment for a clandestine organization and 
also to prevent infiltration (Hegghammer 2013). In reference to ISIS, undercover 
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documentarians were able to find and contact ISIS supporters through shared 
understandings that indicated their support for the group (Potts 2015). In the same way, 
ISIS online can be explored through the initial understanding established through the 
primary and secondary sources on its online presence.  
3.1.3 Data Collection  
The goal of this ethnography is to describe the culture and environment of ISIS 
online, and to understand it from the point of view of foreign recruits and supporters 
(Berg 2007). Specifically, this ethnography is targeted at understanding why ISIS, despite 
its brutality, niche religious beliefs, and embeddedness in foreign conflict, appeals to 
Western audiences. Since the ISIS online as an entity is too large and amorphous to study 
comprehensively, this ethnography takes a tiered approach to attempt to get the most 
holistic understanding of the entity as possible.  
The primary data to understand the worldview presented by ISIS online includes 
the official materials published by the group and the unofficial content produced by 
supporters and sympathizers. The official materials used in this analysis include two 
books, four instructional manuals, three newsletters, twenty-five magazine issues across 
two titles, a hour-long documentary, two music videos, several songs and videos, and 
countless images valorizing the ISIS and it’s fighters. Unofficial materials primarily 
included images promoting ISIS, republishing official ISIS content in different formats, 
and occasionally unofficial statements on how to act in accordance with ISIS doctrine. In 
addition to the content analyzed in this research, the data collected here include notes and 
observations from over 100 hours of non-participant observation of ISIS online and the 
process of finding ISIS content online over the course of a year. To understand the scale, 
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history, and context of ISIS online, the secondary sources were used to construct a broad 
understanding of the group, as well as find additional primary official and unofficial 
sources and content.  
The virtual caliphate exists on multiple platforms across the internet, from Twitter 
and Youtube to dating websites (Koerner 2016). The non-participant observation 
component of this ethnography focused on a examining the presence of ISIS across 
different internet platforms, websites on which users can create accounts and post content 
in different forms, and the process of finding, understanding, and navigating this content. 
This was accomplished through by gaining the skills and knowledge of the group 
necessary to follow the community, without engaging in any behavior or interaction 
beyond observing the community in cyberspace. This immersion was conducted over the 
course of a year, from March of 2018 until March of 2019, amounting to over 100 hours 
of non-participant observation of the virtual caliphate. The present ethnography does not 
include materials unique to communications apps, such as Telegram, or material from the 
dark web, an area of the internet that is not indexed by search engines, requires a 
specialized browser to navigate, and where various forms of illicit behavior is engaged in.  
The collection of the two primary sources of data, ISIS content and the 
observation of the virtual caliphate, was accomplished first by extracting keywords, 
symbols, phrases, hashtags, and article, video, or document titles from the initial official 
and secondary sources. The initial set of sources included the official magazines 
produced by ISIS and publicly available through The Clarion Project’s website as well as 
secondary sources including news and research reports on ISIS’s online presence. These 
key terms were used in a series of internet searches to find further information and 
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content related to ISIS. Notably, this required the use of multiple search engines (Google, 
Bing, and DuckDuckGo), since the controversial nature of the content impacted the 
likelihood that this material would appear on different search engines. This search based 
on the initial keywords from primary and secondary sources provided a new set of 
official and unofficial ISIS content. Additional key terms were extracted from these 
sources, and additional searches were accomplished to gain access to more ISIS produced 
and related content. Furthermore, this search highlighted the importance of examining 
ISIS’s presence within specific internet platforms.  
The second phase of exploring the virtual caliphate moved from the use of search 
engines to searches within content sharing and social media platforms. Initially, this 
research focused on the platforms containing content from the above search engine 
process, and the key terms were searched for specifically within the platforms. 
Independent of the previous set of search engine queries, various social media and 
content sharing platforms were examined using the key terms derived from the primary 
and secondary sources. A partial list of platforms examined in the course of this research 
include Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Instagram, Tumblr, MySpace, 
JustPaste.it, Pastebin.com, Scribd, 4chan, LiveLeak, Soundcloud, and Slideshare. To 
examine the presence of ISIS within forums and message boards, the search engine 
BoardReader was used (Johnson et. al. 2016). 
In many instances, there was a question as to the content’s relationship to ISIS. 
Islamic religious and activist sites, as well as other jihadist groups, often produced 
content that shared some aspects with ISIS content. To address this, research on Islamic 
practices, beliefs, and sects was undertaken to distinguish the unique ISIS content. The 
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best means to differentiate ISIS content from related Islamic and jihadist content were 
statements related to hijrah (emigration) and takfir (the process of denouncing Muslims 
and non-believers), since ISIS is unique in their interpretation of these concepts. In 
instances where the connection between content and ISIS was unclear, the content was 
not used in the final analysis except with reference to the virtual caliphate’s amorphous 
online boundaries. 
The largest and smallest platforms generally had the smallest ISIS presence, and 
often content sharing platforms more frequently produced ISIS related material compared 
to social media accounts. These observations may be the result of the policing of ISIS 
across the internet, but this research can not definitively demonstrate this. Additional 
platforms were also used, however these platforms are effectively unpoliced and include 
a great deal of ISIS content that is difficult to find on other platforms. This content 
includes sensitive information that can be used to carry out terror attacks, such as bomb 
making, and are therefore treated within this study as confidential sources. As a result, 
when referenced within this study, these sources do not include identifying information 
that could be used to find them online. Instead they are described based on the type of 
content within them, and their source generically described based on the type of platform 
– social media platform, content sharing platform, website, or blog.  
3.1.4 Analysis  
The objective of this virtual ethnography was to describe the digital presence of 
ISIS that is viewed as the catalyst for the self-radicalization of individuals around the 
world. This description began with five major types of data collected. The first was the 
navigation of ISIS online, since it is not limited to a single site, but exists as a set of 
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websites, texts, images, and accounts that are connected through an overarching culture 
that requires a degree of subterfuge. Navigating this content is therefore dependent on 
understanding how members can find each other and avoid authorities (Hegghammer 
2013). Second, the content of the group represents the information and worldview it is 
trying to communicate, and is the core exposure to the culture of the group that 
individuals without interpersonal contact have. Third, conversations, posts, and similar 
interactional functions on websites present an opportunity to record direct observations 
among participants. However, it is unclear to what extent these public interactions are 
connected to offline behavior, or to what degree those communicating are involved with 
ISIS. Furthermore, in practice this also involved groups and individuals antagonistic 
towards the group. Fourth, the experience of pursuing and consuming ISIS content 
online, as an interested but non-participating observer, will articulate the process of 
searching for the group’s content, finding “like-minded” others, and consuming the 
content of ISIS online. The last major component has been a historical and contextual 
overview of the group, in order to provide a broader understanding of ISIS online than is 
possible for a single, non-participant observer. This includes details on the scope of ISIS 
online as well as its history as it developed and authorities responded to it. 
 This data was coded using sensitizing concepts and codes developed in the course 
of this ethnography, subculture theory, and the comparative-historical component to this 
study. Sensitizing concepts provide a set of general guidelines to organize relevant and 
irrelevant information for analysis, connecting empirical instances to concepts that can be 
tied to theoretical explanations (Elliot 2018; Bowen 2006; Blumer 1954). Two major 
categories exist within this data; observations related to the process of navigating the 
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virtual caliphate and the messages presented by the virtual caliphate. The process of 
navigating the virtual caliphate included observations regarding the distribution of ISIS 
online across different platforms, how to find ISIS content, and this content’s relationship 
to related, but separate, communities.  
 The second, larger category of observations focused on the messages conveyed by 
ISIS and its online supporters. The first category of concepts focus on the cultural 
elements presented in ISIS content. The norms of the group were coded based on those 
behaviors described as obligatory or expected of followers and descriptions of the ideal 
ways of acting by the group. Related to this are the roles that the group describes, 
specifically the behaviors, expectations, and descriptions of the mujahidin (fighters), 
virtual mujahidin (online supporters), women, and leaders. The values of the group were 
also coded according to those related to individual actions and characteristics or societal 
goals. Symbols and language used by the group were also coded when they were unique 
to ISIS and conveyed some meaning.  
The most emphasized beliefs of ISIS are primarily religious and shared with other 
Islamic communities, however two major categories of observations are related to the 
group’s unique belief system. The first category is ISIS’s understanding of history, 
observations of which were coded for those historical events viewed as important and 
those related to the group’s conception of the apocalypse. The second category focuses 
on the group’s beliefs about the contemporary world, with codes focused on the group’s 
conception of the West, its goals and actions, the situation of Muslims globally, 
perceptions of Middle Eastern governments and nations, and the perception of other 
jihadist groups.  
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In addition to these cultural concepts, observations were coded regarding ISIS’s 
framing of their movement and their strategies for success. Based on the data, framing by 
ISIS primarily involved the group’s justifications for violence, including codes for 
religious, historical, and grievance-based justifications. The strategies of ISIS included 
several separate codes for strategies of attrition, propaganda by deed, and triggering the 
apocalypse. Once the initial codes and concepts were established, the data was reviewed 
for a second time with the established set of concepts and codes.  
3.2 A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS  
The second part of this dissertation is a comparative-historical analysis of the 
previous historical waves of terrorism. This analysis provides the necessary context to 
understand the unique aspects of ISIS and its global spread through the internet, by 
establishing how prior groups similarly spread around the world. Furthermore, it also 
addresses the existence of terrorism as a set cultural ‘tools’ that are adopted to cope with 
the unique issues of groups within their respective nations. This was accomplished by 
establishing a sample of terrorist groups from the major historical waves of terrorism, 
examining the connections between them and their texts, and examining how this 
influenced the adoption of terrorism. In addition to looking at the connections between 
groups as a causal factor in the adoption of terrorism as a coping mechanism to societal 
strain, this analysis also focuses explicitly on the unique role the mass media, particularly 
books and pamphlets in this context, which are hypothesized to be influential in the 
adoption of terrorism as a cultural tool.  
According to DiMaggio (1997), culture can be studied as a collection of cultural 
elements, including values, norms, beliefs, symbols, strategies, identities and narratives, 
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that are inconsistently distributed and applied across a population. Furthermore, 
individuals can apply the cultural elements, or tools, that they have knowledge of to new 
situations. To demonstrate that terrorism is a cultural tool transmitted through 
communication interlocks and adopted to cope with national social problems, this study 
must demonstrate 1) that terrorist groups possess cultural elements, 2) that these cultural 
elements are transmitted through communication interlocks, and 3) these cultural 
elements are adapted to the local environment. The existence of cultural elements 
possessed by terrorist groups, and their application of international elements to their local 
situation will be demonstrated through a broad collection of data on groups from the 
major waves of terrorism, and how the ideology of these major waves was applied in 
different nations. The transmission of these cultural elements is illustrated through the 
use of a social network including these groups and their relationships to each other, as 
well as their relationships to various terrorist texts and manuals. Shared cultural elements 
between groups only connected through foundational texts will further demonstrate the 
importance of the mass media in the international diffusion of terrorism, and serve as a 
precursor to the internet radicalization of the 21st century.  
3.2.1 Theory and Hypotheses   
At the historical and macro-level of analysis, several hypotheses can be 
established based on the proposed theory. The first and most basic is that terrorism is 
adopted as a result of the internalization of cultural elements that support its use. Second, 
this dissertation argues that terrorism exists as a set of cultural ‘tools’ that can be 
employed to different causes. Building upon this, it is expected that the waves of 
terrorism will exhibit the characteristics of subcultures particularly, which establish 
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terrorism as an appropriate coping mechanism to a collective problem. It is argued here 
that whether or not terrorism is adopted as a coping strategy to a collective problem will 
depend on a group’s relation to cultural interlocks, positions within a social network that 
allow for the dissemination of information, including other terrorist groups or ideologies.  
In describing the four international waves of terrorism, Rapoport (2004) observes 
that the ideology proposing and legitimizing terrorism established by anarchist writers 
was among two core factors in the creation of modern terrorism. The other, intimately 
connected to the ideology, was the advancements in transportation and communications 
technologies (Rapoport 2004). Contagion factors, such as histories of terrorism within a 
nation or geographic proximity to a nation experiencing terrorism, are among the most 
supported determinants of international terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). The 
anarchists therefore created the cultural innovation of terrorism, and at the same time 
technology existed that allowed the spread of this innovation through migration and the 
mass media. Therefore, terrorism is expected to be used as a cultural tool, adopted by 
groups to address their own unique problems with local modifications. To demonstrate 
this, it is expected to observe explicit and implicit connections between groups in their 
strategies and justifications for the use of terrorism in their writings and statements. This 
is expected to be observed historically and geographically, and can spread through two 
primary means, immigration and the mass media.  
If terrorism is a cultural tool, then there must be some explanation for why it is 
chosen over other options. Here, it is proposed that terrorist groups reflect subcultures 
that have adopted it as a coping strategy to address a local collective problem. Therefore, 
it is expected that the ideology within waves will display local variations as the global 
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ideology is applied to the local situation, that there will be a collective problem that 
motivates the formation of national groups, and that these local groups will be connected 
to each other through communication interlocks and ‘scenes’. The larger subculture of a 
wave of terrorism may further be linked not just through a communication interlock, such 
as a leader, author, or book, but also through meeting points, such as training camps.  
Within subculture theory, local groups are connected to a subculture through 
scenes and spaces, locations where many local groups gather and interact on a national or 
international level (Anderson 2009; Melder 2014; Futrell and Simi 2004). These areas 
can be geographic, such as music festivals or training camps, or virtual, such as internet 
websites but including print media. Each wave of terrorism is therefore expected to have 
these cultural interlocks that unify local groups and spread the ideology of the group, 
including migration and diasporas, mass media, and training camps. Although they 
occupy a theoretically equivalent position, there are significant differences between 
interpersonal interaction and mass media consumption. Therefore, attention will be given 
to discerning any significant patterns or themes related to these different forms of cultural 
interlocks.  
3.2.2 Sample  
To determine the applicability of subculture theory and the conception of 
terrorism as a cultural tool, this analysis examines groups that existed during the 
historical waves of terrorism. This includes anarchist groups between 1880 and 1920, the 
anticolonial groups between 1920 and 1960, and the New Left groups between 1960 and 
2000 (Rapoport 2004). The religious wave is excluded, since the dominant focus of the 
rest of this dissertation is focused on ISIS, a group that is a part of the current, religious 
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wave. The waves of terrorism focus on periods of time that a particular form of ideology 
spread globally, but it is important to note that this is not a comprehensive list of terrorist 
groups, since many occur outside the timeframes of particular waves. This universe of 
groups is large, but not comprehensive (Park and Sitter 2016; Sedgwick 2007). They are 
selected specifically because they are a part of global movements of terrorism which are 
the focus of the present research. There are groups that have spread internationally 
outside of these timeframes and causes, but not to the degree as the movements within 
these time frames.  
There are several distinct categories of subjects included in this analysis. The 
primary subjects of this analysis were the terrorist entities themselves, however these 
were variable in their nature and the data available for them. Terrorist entities include 
individual terrorists (so-called lone wolfs), groups, organizations, support organizations, 
and overarching movements which include a combination of individuals, groups, 
organizations, supporters, and sympathizers. The second category of subjects are the 
authors and texts cited by terrorist groups, but were not always, or even often, involved in 
terrorism themselves. In addition to terrorist entities and influences, information was 
gathered on related groups, organizations, and social movements that terrorist groups 
emerged from. This data was collected primarily to understand the context from which 
terrorist entities emerged from, as well as gathering information related to organizational 
and social movement-based explanations of terrorism (Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; 
Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004).  
To construct a sample of these entities, several sources were utilized. At present, 
there is no comprehensive database of terrorist groups that is publicly available. This is a 
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product of different political and organizational definitions, the age of the phenomenon, 
and the focus on current groups in research. In order to construct an accurate sample, 
multiple independent sources will be consulted. The initial sample of terrorist groups, 
influential authors/texts, and origin groups or movements was constructed using sources 
that covered the international history of terrorism since the anarchist wave. These sources 
include the Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Vol. 1, Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of 
Terrorism, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, The Infernal Machine: 
A History of Terrorism, A History of Terrorism, The Wrong Hands: Popular Weapons 
Manuals and their Historic Challenges to a Democratic Society, and Globalization & 
Terrorism: The Migration of Dreams and Nightmares.  
These sources provide a broad overview of terrorism globally across the 
international waves. The second set of sources for composing the sample were on the 
specific international waves of terrorism, including Secessionism and Terrorism: Bombs, 
Blood, and Independence in Europe and Eurasia, Bombs, Bullets, and Bread: The 
Politics of Anarchist Terrorism Worldwide, 1866-1926, and “Terrorism and the 
International Anarchist Movement of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries”. Finally, a snowball sampling approach will be adopted in the course of 
researching the specific groups, incorporating any other groups not discussed in the 
above sources that are included in group-specific sources. Based on this list, terrorist 
entity-specific secondary and primary sources were collected, as well as the influential 
texts cited within these sources. The snowball sampling step based on specific sources on 
terrorist entities was reiterated until no new entities were referenced. 
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There remains the issue of missing groups, and specifically what types of groups 
would be absent from this sample. The major set of groups not within this sample are 
those that do not conform to the ideological waves, and this is by design, as they are not 
relevant to this analysis. Small groups, failed groups, short-lived groups, and unimpactful 
groups are likely to be missed in this sampling, since there is unlikely to be much 
discussion around them. Since the success or size of groups are not the focus of 
explanation here, it is unlikely that this would skew the results of this research. In 
practice, some accounts of these smaller groups were found, however these were often 
limited to a group name, ideological inclination, and often their relationships to larger 
groups or movements.  
Missing groups as a product of bias in historical research represents a larger 
concern. If these data sources possess a Western bias there is a chance of excluding or 
missing important groups from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This issue is greatest 
regarding the anticolonial wave, where terrorist groups have sometimes become 
inextricably intertwined with the larger social movements for independence, and they are 
largely not discussed in the context of terrorism any longer. A similar issue exists for 
groups that survived their initial conception in an international wave of terrorism, and 
have changed significantly since their origins. This is frequently the case for larger South 
American groups. For these groups, the existing information is largely contemporary, 
rather than historical. This may reflect the degree to which these groups have come to be 
considered by English speaking researchers, as several detailed sources were found in the 
native languages of the groups. However, the final sample incorporates groups from 
across the world, including Kenya, Japan, India, South America, Europe, and the Middle 
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East, providing a significant degree of coverage for the areas where terrorism has been 
most prevalent or influential to other nations.   
3.2.3 Data Collection  
Once a sample of groups was established primary and secondary data will be 
collected for each group, in addition to the information on groups provided by the 
overarching sources used to establish the sample. The primary data sources will be the 
writings, manifestos, communiques, and guidebooks produced and/or cited by the groups. 
Secondary sources provided contextual information and secondary analysis of the 
terrorist entities. These include books, book chapters, and journal articles about specific 
terrorist movements, groups, organizations, and individuals within this sample.  
The units of data collected from these sources to be coded were broken up into 
descriptions of characteristics of terrorist entities and/or statements from terrorists or 
influential texts (Elliot 2008). These descriptions were recoded as observations of 
indicator codes of the major categories of observations that were theorized to be 
important based on the subcultural explanation of terrorism, fundamental characteristics 
of the terrorist entities, alternative explanations, categories that emerged in the course of 
the data collection process, and linkages between terrorist entities and their influences. 
These codes represented specific examples of the larger sensitizing concepts derived 
from the major theoretical explanations of terrorism and inferred in the course of the 
research. Sensitizing concepts are general guidelines of relevant characteristics of a 
phenomenon that serve to connect empirical instances to more abstract theoretical 
explanations (Elliot 2008; Blumer 1954).  
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The initial set of codes for each terrorist entity focused on their fundamental 
characteristics. This includes the name of the entity, country of origin, the size of the 
group, and the wave it participated in. Some groups separated from the primary entities 
used in this analysis and were established outside of the wave years and were included as 
wave outliers. The ideological inclination of the groups (anarchist, Marxist-Leninist, 
anticolonial, separatist, nationalist) were also recorded. Several groups included a 
combination several ideological influences, most commonly a mixture of anticolonialism 
and Marxist-Leninism. The type of entity was also recorded, including classifications of 
individuals, groups, formal organizations, support groups, movements, influential 
authors, texts, and related non-terrorist organizations and social movements.  
The primary sensitizing concepts for analysis were derived from subculture 
theory. This includes the components of subcultures: 1) cultural elements; 2) the social 
network as the referent for a subculture’s boundaries; and 3) an identity component that 
includes a membership claim (Fine and Kleinman 1979). Cultural elements refer to 
values, beliefs, norms, knowledge, symbols, and language unique to the terrorist entities. 
Greater attention was paid to descriptions of cultural elements when these concepts were 
not utilitarian or consistent with objective consensus on the circumstances of a society. 
Codes for social networks included the pathways to joining terrorist entities, the extent to 
which sympathetic communities shared the same cultural ideas as terrorist entities, and/or 
multiple terrorist entities within a national movement. Finally, identity and membership 
claims were coded when terrorist entities included a specific term to identify themselves, 
a set of behaviors or expectations associated with that definition, and observations on 
how terrorist entities differentiate themselves from larger, non-violent social movements.  
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To address terrorism as a cultural tool, this research also examined the adaptation 
of texts and influences to local contexts. The first part of this concept is discussed below 
with reference to the influential linkages between groups. The major sensitizing concept 
for data collection was the adaptation of the content cited from these influential linkages. 
This includes coding all descriptions of how groups modified ideologies, synthesized 
them with local ideologies, applied them to local sociohistorical circumstances, or 
selectively applied ideological influences.  
To understand the spread of international terrorism, data was also connected on 
the influential connections between groups. Descriptions of terrorist entities and group’s 
statements were examined for references to other groups, ideologies, texts, or authors. In 
addition to this, descriptions of terrorist entities that included reference to terrorist 
specific media sources were recorded. The connections between groups included codes 
for interpersonal connections between groups, inspirational examples set by other 
terrorist groups, influential texts and authors, and organizational connections through 
splits, mergers, and shared memberships between groups. These observations relate to the 
influence of cultural interlocks and their connection to the development of terrorist 
groups.  
In addition to these factors, observations for the current explanations of terrorism 
were also collected. This is done in order to consider the support for a subcultural 
explanation of terrorism relative to the dominant explanations, and to minimize the risk 
of confirmation bias within the results. For the strain theory explanations this includes 
observations regarding socio-economic status, demographic characteristics, and 
education of members. In addition to these raw variables, perceptions of group members 
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on strains and grievances within society, and how the group addresses those issues, were 
collected. To contextualize the perceptions of grievances, historical accounts were 
consulted as to the accuracy of those perceptions.  
The rational actor theory expects that all terrorist groups emerge from earlier 
social movements that were unable to achieve change, or due to a perception that 
terrorism is the best means to achieve the desired change. This conceptual category 
included explicit statements, descriptions of violence as necessary, and terrorist groups 
splintering from social movement organizations over the use of violence. Terrorist 
entities relationships to non-violent social movements were also recorded. An additional 
factor that emerged as a major factor in the adoption of terrorism was the role of 
repression of social movements. Instances where violence was used to repress a social 
movement, terrorist groups defined actions by the state as repressive, or social 
movements were subjected to nongovernmental violence were coded to examine this 
factor. In relation to the overarching theory, these findings will also elaborate on the role 
of collective grievances in motivating group membership, as well as role of perceptions 
in the decision to adopt terrorism.  
In addition to the theoretically expected concepts and categories, several emergent 
themes developed in the course of this research. These were primarily major categories 
within the cultural elements being examined in the context of subculture theory. 
Specifically, the involve observations related to the terrorist identity, discussed here as 
the Role of the Revolutionist, and its characteristics. This involved coding for the 
characterizations of the role, what it was called, and how it was viewed. A set of beliefs 
and values constituted a morality of terrorism, and included the coding of terrorist 
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entities’ justifications for violence. Another emergent theme involved terrorists’ 
perception of violence, and this included coding for its necessity, benefits, and value 
attributed to it. Finally, observations related to the perception and pursuit of the truth by 
terrorist groups included coding for their statements on the acquisition of knowledge, 
their statements on the accuracy of their views, and dogmatic characteristics of this 
belief.  
3.2.4 Caveats and Considerations 
 There is a great deal of diversity particularly within the anarchist wave, and in 
part this illustrates the historical limitations of this research. Anarchism was conflated 
with terrorism, as well as other distinct movements such as socialism, nihilism, 
nationalism, and Russian populism (Kemp 2018). In practice, this conflation has resulted 
in many groups being included in the anarchist wave that are not anarchists, however 
many of these groups would have been included regardless as a result of their influential 
ties and connections to the anarchists. The Irish Republicans, Russian Populists and 
Nihilists, nationalists of various nations, Marxists, and the anarchists of the late 19th and 
early 20th century are inextricably connected to each other, and many of the movements 
to follow.  
 An additional issue arises connected to the reliance of this study on the histories 
of groups and movements. A significant portion of the data collected here come from 
secondary sources, and as a result the observations of groups are in part the result of the 
historical narratives about terrorist entities, rather than objective accounts. The historical 
record is not evenly researched across groups and nations, nor is it comprehensive. 
Furthermore, the historical record and the available primary documents included in this 
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analysis are limited to those that are available in the English language, and therefore 
groups that are related to English speaking nations, or are of interest to those nations are 
overrepresented in the observations that this analysis is based on. As a result, there is a 
wealth of knowledge of some groups that have inspired the imaginations of researchers, 
such as the IRA and RAF, but far less on other groups. To a degree, this is a result of the 
size and scope of some groups, with small unnamed groups that carry out few actions 
going relatively undetected. However, the amount of information available for groups is 
not directly connected to their size and influence. RAF was relatively small and 
ineffective, but a good story and the focus of a great deal of scholarly discussion. In 
contrast, nationalist and socialist movements in South America, Africa, the Middle East, 
and Eastern Europe have been much larger and influential but have less written about 
them, at least in English.  
 As a result, there are two limitations to the data presented here. First, it is not 
uniform across groups and it is unlikely that such a comprehensive account of terrorist 
groups is possible. However, much of what has been observed from the incomplete 
records and descriptions of the groups observed here is largely consistent with the 
patterns seen in other groups and substantiated in prior research. Second, the construction 
of the social network of terrorism is incomplete on three counts. Since this research is 
focused on the adoption of terrorism, collaborative relationships between established 
groups were not included in the final analysis. The influence terrorist groups have on 
each other’s development after initially forming is an intriguing question but is beyond 
the scope of the current investigation. Additionally, vague actors and connections were 
excluded. Random, unidentified Americans that first exposed anarchism to Japanese and 
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Australian individuals are excluded, although the influence of the authors or larger 
ideology that the Japanese and Australian actors adopted is preserved in the final 
network. Similarly, hypothesized connections or statements of similarities between 
groups were not included as influential connections. This contributes to the final reason 
that the presented social network is incomplete, specifically that there are likely 
influential or personal connections between groups that were unobserved either through a 
limitation of this research’s sources or the historical record. As a result, the social 
network presented here is an underestimation of the relationships that connect terrorism 
across time and space, but is unlikely to inaccurately present connections where there are 
none.  
3.2.5 Analysis  
To examine terrorism as a cultural tool, the first part of this analysis will be to 
examine the presence and influence of cultural factors on the adoption of terrorism. This 
initial analysis will examine the role of strain, rationality, and cultural factors in the 
adoption of terrorism to determine the overall support for subculture theory and the 
alternative hypotheses. For the second part of the analysis, a social network visualizing 
the relationships between groups in terms of their inspirational and interpersonal 
connections is constructed. If terrorism is influential as a cultural tool, the resulting social 
network of groups should be highly connected, within and between waves of terrorism. 
Furthermore, by clarifying the types of connections, the role of interpersonal 
relationships and the mass media can be compared and elaborated upon. Furthermore, the 
relationships between groups operating within the same historical waves can be observed.  
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The third part of the analysis will be to describe the historical use of terrorism as a 
cultural tool. Specifically, the connections between groups and their historical 
counterparts will be examined. If terrorism exists as a cultural tool, then it is expected 
that there will be some relationship between each wave of terrorism and the preceding 
wave. Furthermore, it is expected that the aspects adopted from former movements will 
extend beyond terrorism as a tool in the course of social change. The lack of observable 
relationships between groups and their historical predecessors would suggest that 
terrorism is not a cultural tool, but a strategy arrived at independently by various groups.  
Using multiple historical waves not only enables a historical analysis of terrorism 
as a cultural tool, but also provides three case studies of global waves of terrorism, with 
group cases nested within those waves. As a result, a parallel case history methodology 
can be used to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed theoretical framework. 
Parallel case history methodology is a strategy for examining multiple cases to highlight 
a similar underlying process against diverse socio-historical circumstances (Skocpol and 
Somers 1980). The three waves of terrorism examined here represent three unique cases 
of international terrorist movements, and demonstrating the applicability of subculture 
theory across multiple contexts.  
This allows for a comparison of the influence of cultural interlocks, ideology, and 
collective problems on the international diffusion of terrorism. First, the collective 
problems that motivate terrorism can be compared to determine if there is a common 
strain or grievance, across waves or within them across nations, that motivate terroristic 
behavior. Second, the role of cultural interlocks in the spread of international terrorism 
can be examined, whether it is a product of migration, mass media, or other factors. 
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Finally, the role of ideology can be examined, particularly how it spreads and is (or isn’t) 
adapted to local circumstances. Each of the major waves of terrorism represent an 
overarching ideology, but the defining question of international terrorism here is how it 
spreads internationally. As a cultural tool, the different ideologies within each wave can 
be adapted to national circumstances, and consequently local variations of each ideology 
would be expected. In contrast, if the spread of terrorism reflects the adoption of an 
ideology, than the national groups would reflect that overarching ideology.  
This part of the study is focused specifically on the connections between groups 
to demonstrate the classification of terrorism as a cultural tool. As a counterpoint to the 
proposed theory, a null hypothesis can be introduced to compare the findings too. Within 
the literature, there are two positions on the understanding of the causes of terrorism. The 
first is that terrorism is a class of behavior that can be explained, despite the diverse 
forms of the phenomenon (Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2006). The other is that each 
instance of terrorism is a unique product of particular socio-historical circumstances, and 
as a result there can be no overarching theory that explains terrorism (Tilly 2004; 
Laqueur 2001; Post 2007). In analyzing the data collected, this null hypothesis will also 
be included in order to contrast the expected findings against. Based on the 
commonalities across groups and international waves of terrorism, it is likely that 
terrorism does represent a distinct class of behavior, and its international spread a 
recurring and significant aspect to also be explained. It is against this survey of terrorism 
in the past that the current international wave of terrorism can be fully understood, not as 
a fundamentally new aspect of a digital world, but the evolution of a century old problem.  
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3.3 CONCLUSION  
 By taking the mixed methods approach, this dissertation is able to examine the 
contemporary spread of terrorism through ISIS in detail and complement these findings 
with the broader analysis of prior waves of international terrorism. The first benefit of 
this approach is that it places the current spread of ISIS in historical context, which 
enables an analysis of the unique aspects of the group and its use of the internet. To the 
extent that ISIS reflects the larger patterns of behavior of other terrorist groups, the 
detailed study of ISIS online also provides invaluable insights by providing direct 
observations of a terrorist group’s propaganda campaign through a form of the mass 
media. In this way, the detailed examination of ISIS can provide insights into how prior 
terrorist organizations recruited and spread, to the degree that the observations of ISIS’s 
behavior and that of prior terrorist groups overlap in observable ways. Finally, the mixed 
methods approach also provides a multi-dimensional test of subculture theory’s relevance 
to terrorism. 
 The analysis of the data collected here first focuses on the independent findings of 
each part of this study. First, the findings from the virtual ethnography of ISIS are 
presented, including the process of finding and navigating the virtual caliphate, different 
actors involved with the virtual caliphate, and a detailed discussion of the group’s 
ideology and culture. Second, the historical-comparative study is presented with a focus 
on the overarching themes across groups and waves of terrorism. These include general 
observations, observations relevant to the alternative hypotheses, and the evidence that is 
consistent with a subcultural explanation of terrorism. These findings are then placed in 
the context of groups’ relationships to each other through a social network constructed 
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based on the influential and inspirational relationships between terrorists, groups, 
organizations, and several central actors. Generally, there is evidence that the consistent 
cultural aspects present across groups in this sample can be traced through several central 
influences. These independent findings are then analyzed together. This analysis 
examines ISIS and its internet use in the context of the spread of prior terrorist 
organizations, as well as examining how the detailed examination of ISIS can further 
inform the historical analysis through details that are lost to time for other groups. The 
concluding analysis examines the findings in their totality and their support for a 
subcultural explanation of terrorism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A VIRTUAL ETHNOGRAPHY OF ISIS ONLINE
In discussing the history of terrorism and state responses to it, Carr (2006) notes 
that terrorists are consistently depicted as evil or irrational individuals consumed by 
bloodlust. The external public image is rarely shared by those within the group or among 
their sympathizers. The second part of this dissertation is inspired partially by this 
observation. ISIS and the Islamic State are commonly depicted as a brutal and murderous 
group, instituting draconian punishments dictated by their interpretation of Sharī’ah, 
killing Muslims that do not accept their version of Islam, and encouraging indiscriminate 
terror attacks around the world. Given this coverage, the following the group has gained 
across the world, online and off, is confounding.  
 ISIS is also distinguished by its immense success in gaining recruits, supporters, 
and sympathizers online, pioneering a global social media campaign whose closest 
parallel in the history of terrorism are the lone wolf bombers of the anarchist era. To fully 
understand the group’s spread online and its success in online recruitment a virtual 
ethnography was conducted across the years of 2018 and 2019, examining the content, 
accounts, and dimensions of the virtual caliphate. This has produced a unique 
documentation of a caliphate in decline after the policing of the group’s content and 
accounts has pushed the group towards more unconventional, unpopular platforms. 
However, a great deal of the content that comprises the virtual caliphate remains, hidden 
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across various parts of the internet, and this gives a great deal of insight into the 
worldview of the Islamic State.  
 ISIS’s worldview partially overlaps with other groups addressing problems facing 
Muslims around the world. However, the group is unique in several significant ways, 
namely their conception of wala and bara, takfir, hijrah, jihad, and Sharī’ah. According to 
ISIS, the group is a continuation of a history of brave Muslim warriors, the mujahidin, 
protecting the Middle East from invaders. They are the greatest of this line, ushering in 
the apocalypse and ending the final crusade. These actions are for the establishment and 
success of the Khilafah, or caliphate, a land for Muslims to practice their religion fully, 
free from persecution. 
4.0.1 Language, Spelling, and ISIS in the Context of the Larger Islamic Community 
There are several issues that require clarification before describing the online ISIS 
community. First is the relationship between ISIS and the larger Islamic community, and 
second regards the differences in spelling and meaning of Islamic concepts and names 
used by ISIS. The first issue is essential to preventing an inaccurate and unfair conflation 
of the worldviews that ISIS presents and those of the wider Islamic community, 
particularly those non-violent activist communities that possess similar critiques of global 
society and goals for the Muslim community. Although ISIS shares some of these 
positions, they are secondary to the love of jihad, takfir, and murder that the group 
prioritizes in their own words. The similarities that do exist have not translated into 
widespread support for the group. Nations with large Muslim populations have 
overwhelmingly negative opinions of the group, and only a slim minority hold a positive 
opinion (Poushter 2015). In addition to this, those Muslims residing in the Middle East 
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are the greatest focus of ISIS’s violence. When similarities between ISIS and the Islamic 
community are discussed here, it is to understand the wider context of ideas that possibly 
contribute to ISIS recruitment, and, more importantly, to distinguish those cultural 
aspects unique to the group.  
The second issue regards the terms and their spelling, given the various 
transliterations of many Islamic terms and their additional connotations. Given ISIS’s 
practice of Islam is distinct from how it is practiced outside the Islamic State, I have 
chosen to maintain their transliteration of terms, and have tried to best convey the 
meaning that ISIS specifically attaches to these ideas, highlighting those concepts that 
differentiate ISIS from other Jihadist, activist, and Muslim groups. However, even ISIS 
uses different spelling conventions depending on the writer or source. For instance, 
mujāhidīn is initially used in the magazine Dabiq, but the group would later use 
mujahidin in Rumiyah despite both sources being official magazine publications of ISIS. 
The spellings used here, outside of direct quotations, are those most dominantly used by 
the group, usually in their official magazines. The discussion of Islamic concepts here 
should not be mistaken for an accurate description of their common use in Islam, but their 
meaning specifically related to ISIS, particularly the concepts of hijrah, jihad, Sharī’ah, 
wala and bara, and takfir.  
4.0.2 A Note on Propaganda 
 As a caveat before a deeper glimpse into the worldview of ISIS, none of the 
description presented here should be considered as excusatory or sympathetic. The goal 
of this study was to understand the mindset of ISIS, as it is presented online for English 
speaking users, and how that mindset could lead to identification with a group popularly 
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defined by its brutality. Additionally, this also means that the group’s propaganda is not 
thoroughly debunked and fact checked here, as the present goal is to focus on the image 
they portray that attracts supporters. There are several times in the course of this research 
that the use of propaganda, a misleading representation of reality to persuade and 
manipulate readers, was obvious, and many more times that I suspected that the facts, 
images, and/or accounts published by the group were fabricated.  
Outright examples of propaganda ranged from a photoshopped image of a 
Burmese Buddhist with a gun, supporting the group’s narrative on the persecution of 
Muslims in Burma, to the manipulative use of the plight of the Palestinians to rally 
support. This tactic is recommended by the group’s recruiting manual, suggesting that 
recruiters should take advantage of the Muslim consensus on the Palestinian issue as a 
tentative introduction towards jihadist ideas. Suspected propaganda ranged from the 
reports on the state of affairs within the caliphate to written statements by Western 
hostages that echoed and supported the group’s own narrative. The most extreme case 
was a recurring column by captured journalist John Cantlie, in which his treatment by the 
Islamic State is praised and the actions of Western governments are condemned. 
Although these positions could be easily debunked, the Islamic State is highly critical of 
the media, consistently portraying it as lying about the group, undermining the sources 
that contradict ISIS’s narrative.  
4.0.3 Ethical Conundrums 
 In addition to questions of the material’s accuracy, there is a significant ethical 
issue regarding the inclusion of information essential to accessing this content. Some 
content is easily accessible. The group’s official magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah, are 
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published online through the Clarion Project, a counter-extremist organization, for the 
purposes of understanding the group’s ideology in order to combat it. However, other 
materials related to the group have been effectively policed and reporting on these 
materials has avoided naming the documents or their locations to hinder their acquisition. 
In the course of this research I came across several platforms that were preferred by the 
group during the time period of the study, and within these specific platforms a great deal 
of the group’s materials is still accessible. A name and/or location is frequently sufficient 
to find the materials, regardless of how well the content has been policed.  
 This information is not solely focused on news and doctrine, but also the more 
sensitive information related to the group, such as recruitment strategies, security 
strategies, how to contact official members, how to travel to the caliphate, and the 
construction of bombs. This raises an ethical concern as to providing the name of the 
documents and locations where they are easily found. Providing these details effectively 
facilitates in the materials’ distribution. As a result, there is a trade-off between 
accurately describing the group’s online presence and not amplifying it by assisting in its 
discovery. This challenge has been present since the era of anarchist terror where 
scholarly research on terrorism and explosives was coopted for violent purposes. 
Therefore, this study will restrict its citations of ISIS materials to those widely publicized 
and accessible by the general population, the official magazines. The specific names of 
other documents and the platforms that they can be accessed on is largely irrelevant to the 
present study and they can be described in generic ways that minimizes the potential risk 
of facilitating the distribution of sensitive information and terrorist propaganda, while 
still preserving the relevant information, the worldview they present. 
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 In addition to this sensitive information, information on sympathizer’s accounts 
are kept confidential and aliases reflecting the sentiment of the original name or their 
writings are used instead. Despite the policing of social media for content, groups, and 
accounts related to ISIS, accounts that declare some support, share images, or otherwise 
indicate a positive image of the group persist across the plethora of social media 
platforms. This raises two problems. First, some of the observed accounts included 
possible identifying information and were not blatantly involved with ISIS. Effectively, 
these were fans of ISIS. As a result, including account information has the potential to 
harm the individuals observed, since these ‘fans’ do not take the same security 
precautions as other, more involved individuals. Also, although the internet is a public 
space, most people share a reasonable assumption of privacy regarding their accounts. 
The second issue regards accounts on platforms that can be used to distribute messages or 
files. Similar to the information regarding the name and locations of sensitive documents, 
account names can be used to find individuals that publish ISIS content, and are also kept 
confidential.  
4.1 A RESEARCHER’S PERSPECTIVE 
The goal of this ethnography is to describe the Virtual Caliphate or Isis online and 
what about it compels people to sympathize and join the group. Therefore, it is important 
to first account for my perspective as an observer, and how this may significantly 
influence my observations. The most relevant factors that provide context to this study 
are the limitations of being an English speaking, non-Muslim, white observer, my 




4.1.1 Linguistic, Racial, and Religiously Different 
Only speaking English, being a non-Muslim, and a white observer are likely the 
most limiting aspects of my perspective. In terms of language, my observations of ISIS 
content are limited to those in English. Although there is a great deal of material 
produced in English and my basic internet browser helpfully translated many minor pages 
that I would otherwise not be able to read, there was still a notable language barrier. 
There are significant efforts by the group to helpfully translate materials for English 
speakers, most often in the official magazines but also in manuals and guides. Most 
propaganda videos that I found were in Arabic as well as most of the hashtags the group 
advertised in their magazine. There is reason to suspect significant differences between 
the experience of navigating the virtual caliphate across the English dominant regions of 
the internet. My experience with the commentary around related videos on Youtube and 
similar platforms differed in significant ways from research on Arabic language Youtube 
discourse, likely as a result of the broader English-speaking audience (Al-Rawi 2018).  
My limited knowledge about Islam was not as significant of a limitation, since 
ISIS propaganda is thorough in communicating its interpretation of the religion. This 
ignorance was influential in my evolving understanding of ISIS, since I essentially first 
learned a great deal of Middle Eastern history, the tenets and virtues of Islam, and many 
of the narrower issues of the region from the group’s propaganda. However, this 
highlighted an intriguing aspect of the group’s propaganda for non-Muslim observers—it 
is extremely easy to mistake the virtues of Islam that ISIS describes as virtues of the 
group instead. This may be particularly relevant to understanding the recruitment of non-
Muslim’s, especially given reports that ISIS recruiters encourage their targets not to 
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associate with Muslim communities. Additionally, some converts report first researching 
the group before Islam due to interest raised by news coverage of ISIS, echoing the 
strategy of propaganda by deed. Although this limits the degree to which my observations 
may be relevant to the Muslim recruits, the appeals of ISIS to fellow Muslims are 
extremely direct and explicit, focusing on the inability of Muslims to truly practice their 
religion in the West, the deaths of Muslim civilians in the middle east caused by western 
forces, the discrimination and hostility facing Muslims worldwide, and religious 
arguments.  
4.1.2 Internet Experience and Temporal Limitations  
Since this project involves finding content online, an accounting of my general 
level of tech-savviness is required. Greater or lesser awareness of different platforms and 
sites, how the internet works, how people interact online, and different ways of sharing or 
access content directly impacts what type of content I would experience. A user unaware 
of torrents or other file-sharing services, the dark web, or popular new social media sites 
and apps does not experience content from those areas, and likewise a researcher unaware 
of these aspects similarly cannot cover them. I would not be considered a novice, nor an 
expert, but I am generally familiar and aware of the ephemera that comprise internet 
culture. The secondary sources reviewed and the official materials of ISIS provided 
further guidance on the best areas to search for the group.  
A much larger limitation is the time frame in which this research was conducted, 
over the course of 2018 and into 2019 after significant blows had been dealt to the 
Islamic State in the Middle East and online through an increased policing by the most 
popular platforms. Although accounts supportive of ISIS still existed across the most 
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popular platforms on the internet, such as Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, and 
Tumblr, these were rare. Those accounts that were found and likely to have a more direct 
involvement in the group did not publicly indicate their support. Rather, their relationship 
was suspected due to their inclusion in recruiting and travel manuals. The account names 
were not identical but involved variations used by the group in reposting documents. For 
example, a helpful account might be named Muhajir1, with the advice to check Muhajir2, 
Muhajir3, and so on in case the account was removed. Although this prevents an accurate 
depiction of the virtual caliphate at its height, it does give this study the unique 
perspective of how online communities persist after being policed.  
Official Twitter accounts, Jihadist blogs on Tumblr, and distribution of videos on 
Youtube are all aspects of the virtual caliphate that are largely absent today. Most 
notably, the direct reach of the group on the most popular platforms has drastically 
decreased. One activist organization, Average Mohamed, would describe kids receiving 
four to five ISIS or al-Qaeda Facebook posts a month when they first started to work with 
youth globally. By 2019, the organization reports the youth they are working with as 
receiving zero postings on Facebook.  The virtual caliphate still exists however, and, 
despite the efforts at policing this content by most platforms, it still has some degree of 
presence on most platforms. Although social media has been the focus of most efforts, 
the propaganda and materials of the group are still squirrelled away across many file 
sharing and publishing platforms. In part, this is a consequence of the group’s practice, 
and encouragement of followers, to upload these materials across multiple platforms, 
using different names, and in different formats so that it could not be taken down 
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completely. As a result, the virtual caliphate persists and is widely available to anyone 
determined to find it.  
4.2 NAVIGATING THE VIRTUAL CALIPHATE 
 The process of becoming immersed in the worldview of ISIS and the virtual 
caliphate occurred through three overlapping phases: the practical discovery of materials 
and communities; experiencing the appeal of (some of) the group’s stated goals; and the 
perceiving the injustices against the Muslim world and hypocritical attitudes of the West. 
The initial discovery of ISIS’s materials is disturbingly easy, and it echoes the challenges 
that previous waves of terrorism have faced between educational and informational 
materials and ‘dangerous information’. Beyond those materials that are easily available 
exist the accounts and policed content that is far more difficult to find as a result of the 
online policing of ISIS content. Further investigation of ISIS quickly results in the 
discovery of several distinct positions operating in relation to the virtual caliphate, from 
oppositional actors to the virtual mujahidin. In addition to the practical navigation of the 
virtual caliphate, there are distinct ideological entry points to the group. These include the 
positive representations of the group and their goals and the injustices that the group 
claims to confront.  
4.2.1 The Geography of the Virtual Caliphate 
My first step in this investigation was to obtain the official content produced by 
ISIS. I found the name of ISIS’s magazines through news coverage of online 
radicalization, and as I consumed more news coverage, investigative reports, and 
academic papers I found the primary platforms ISIS used, symbols they used and how 
they communicated, and the names of videos, publications, hashtags, and media centers 
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for the group.  Any curiosity about the group can be quickly rewarded by information that 
can be used to find the virtual caliphate by legitimate informational sources performing 
their duty to maintain an informed citizenry. With the exception of the official 
magazines, however, the majority of content related to ISIS is heavily policed and 
removed from most platforms.  
A major part of this ethnography involved specifically finding those indicators 
and symbols that signal to others support for ISIS. There are certain patterns to the 
naming of accounts related to ISIS, such as the titles Umm or Abu, names incorporating a 
national origin, variations of ISIS, Mujahid, and Muhajir (emigrant) (Klausen 2015). 
While this helps identify accounts that are more explicitly drawing a connection between 
themselves and ISIS, more important is the language, concepts, article and video titles 
used by the group. In part, the transliteration of the Arabic language used by ISIS would 
facilitate finding its materials, while simultaneously making it difficult to find 
background information from other sources. Concepts emphasized and uniquely 
interpreted by the group, such as hijrah, would similarly distinguish content related to 
ISIS from other Islamic communities. The most difficult materials to distinguish from 
ISIS content were those produced by other jihadist groups, since their ideological 
differences were often complex and nuanced. Complicating this is the fact that ISIS has 
coopted some of these materials, particularly those that provide practical, operational 
information.  
Similar to its real-world counterpart, the virtual caliphate was largely in ruins 
between 2018-2019, at least outside of communication apps that have become the 
dominant forms of communication for the group and its supporters abroad. The virtual 
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caliphate has a minor presence on most of the dominant platforms, such as Facebook, 
Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Instagram, and Tumblr. The accounts, communities, 
and content that still exist on these platforms, and have a clear relation to ISIS, are 
relatively small and inoffensive, primarily sharing images or music that glamorize the 
group. Other content has become more clandestine over time and is distributed across a 
plethora of social media or content sharing platforms, including MySpace, JustPaste.it, 
Pastebin.com, Scribd, 4chan, LiveLeak, Soundcloud, Slideshare, and more. Additionally, 
ISIS content was sometimes given innocuous names, such as “it’s the least you could do” 
and “how to make chocolate cake”, the officially suggested filename. As a result, the 
virtual caliphate as it exists today is distributed across the virtual landscape, hiding in 
plain sight among the sheer scope of the information the internet makes available, 
occasionally slightly concealed by a name.  
The influence of several structural conditions on my pursuit of the virtual 
caliphate became apparent over the course of searching for more content. The use of 
various platforms by ISIS and its sympathizers is well known, as well as the migrant 
nature of the virtual caliphate as a result of platforms taking action against ISIS users and 
content (Johnson et. al. 2016). Consequently, content on the known platforms is less 
prominent and relies on more obscure knowledge of the group, its language, and 
signifiers. As a result, observing the virtual caliphate through singular platforms provides 
a limited view of the larger entity, and in particular this highlights the role and influence 
of the search engine. If searching for the virtual caliphate outside of a specific platform, a 
user necessarily uses a search engine, but importantly the choice of search engine has a 
significant impact on the content that is found, and subsequent access and exposure to 
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ISIS content. To address this, multiple search engines were consistently used to find ISIS 
related content, specifically Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo, and BoardReader, a search 
engine specifically for internet forums. User knowledge of different platforms, apps, 
search engines, or other means of navigating the internet effectively limits the degree to 
which they can encounter the virtual caliphate now that the group has been policed from 
the dominant platforms.  
4.2.2 The Demography of the Virtual Caliphate 
The virtual caliphate exists structurally across the internet through its distribution 
across different platforms with varying degrees of direct access via search engines. In 
addition to this, the virtual caliphate exists in relation to various communities online and 
with varying degrees of participation from supporters and sympathizers. There are variety 
of actors producing content relevant to ISIS, including oppositional actors, related 
Islamic communities, sympathizers, related jihadist groups, supporters, virtual mujahidin, 
and official ISIS sources. Informational sources, such as research and news coverage, 
may be considered an additional, minor area related to this overall classificatory schema. 
The position of content or an account towards ISIS is not always clear, and the further 
one moves from the official content and ardent supporters the more blurred the line 
becomes between the virtual caliphate, other jihadist groups, and even non-violent 
Islamic activist groups. As a result, this research includes only content that can be 
confidently connected to ISIS, with the exception of this discussion on related 
communities.   
The core of the virtual caliphate are the official sources and accounts connected to 
the group and the media that the group has published. In the course of this research, I 
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reviewed two books, four manuals on recruitment, operational security, traveling to the 
Islamic State, and carrying out attacks, three newsletters on the Islamic State, twenty-five 
magazine issues across two titles, an hour-long documentary on the gold standard, two 
music videos, a handful of videos and songs (anasheeds), and countless images valorizing 
the mujahidin. Although this list includes a significant amount of the official materials 
produced by ISIS, there are likely further, more obscure, publications. However, there 
were few new concepts introduced towards the end of the analysis, indicating that 
saturation of the group’s themes had been achieved.   
Outside the central, official core of ISIS are their supporters, the virtual 
mujahidin, and those planning to travel to the Islamic State. The central group outside the 
official sources that are visibly active online are the virtual mujahidin, a unique status 
within ISIS and the frontline of the group’s digital campaign. The virtual mujahid are 
those individuals engaged in promoting ISIS online, reposting and maintaining ISIS 
media, managing ISIS’s public image, and recruiting (daw’ah). At times, the virtual 
mujahid would add to the official materials. One user, “I<3IslamicState”, would produce 
small text documents providing advice to the virtual mujahidin in operating online and 
supporting the group. Admittedly, these materials did not include particularly useful 
details beyond moral support and suggestions for websites and accounts to follow for 
new information from the Islamic State. However, I<3IslamicState would also repost 
official documents, including an operational security manual, information on the media 
war against ISIS, and a publication justifying beheadings. Along with these practical 




Related to the direct supporters and actors involved with ISIS are the materials of 
other jihadist groups that ISIS has coopted and are influential for terrorist groups and lone 
wolfs abroad. The official materials of ISIS focus on doctrinal questions and elaborating 
their arguments for legitimacy. As a result, they are not significant tactical resources 
(Clifford 2018). Instead of producing their own tactical manuals, ISIS has largely 
incorporated and distributed the materials produced by other jihadist groups, particularly 
al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s own official magazine is recommended as a source of practical 
information for carrying out attacks, from Molotov cocktails to car bombs, and are much 
easier to find. In addition to the use of their predecessor’s materials, virtual mujahidin 
also share and distribute content from other jihadist groups. In part, this may be due to the 
lack of discernment by English speaking lone wolf actors between the various jihadist 
groups (Clifford 2018). However, this has also occurred as a result of the incorporation of 
other jihadist groups under the umbrella of ISIS. A group based in the Philippines would 
use its own media division to develop small documents discussing the dangers of the 
media war against ISIS and justifying beheadings, a consequence of the many foreign 
groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS as an umbrella organization.  
The outermost rim of the virtual caliphate are its sympathizers. These individuals 
share images, music, and videos sympathetic or supportive of the group, but typically 
lack any significant ideological or operational information. Instead, they serve to valorize 
the group, often depicting the mujahidin in a heroic light. At most, these sympathizers 
may include a post or an account description that espouses support for the group, 
criticism of the West, or reference to the problems facing Muslims. Overall, they include 
little substance regarding the group’s wider goals and practices. It is unclear if the 
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group’s more maligned practices and positions are known to these users, or if their 
admiration is based on issues that overlap with ISIS’s worldview and the romanticizing 
of the mujahidin. 
Many aspects of ISIS’s worldview overlap with the larger Islamic community. 
However, the unique aspects of ISIS’s worldview are not similarly shared by the Muslim 
community. It is important to understand these aspects to distinguish how ISIS is unique 
and how its views relate to a larger community, from which it may attract supporters. The 
major points of overlap revolve around Islam, Sharī’ah, and the establishment of the 
Khilafah (caliphate), criticism of the West and the wars in the Middle East, and broader 
injustices facing Muslims around the world. For instance, a Facebook page that shares 
similar language to ISIS makes references to the kuffar (non-believers, specifically non-
Muslims) and addressing Muslim grievances, but makes no calls to violence or jihad. 
Instead, it congratulates the legal prosecution of Muslim terrorists in India, but questions 
why politicians responsible for greater violence against Muslims remain in power. The 
group criticizes the division of the Middle East into nation-states by European powers, 
but still lacks any of those unique elements particular to ISIS. This is illustrative of many 
communities and accounts that I came across that could be carelessly conflated with ISIS 
in much the same way that activists in the previous waves of terrorism would be equated 
to the few terrorists that shared their ideals. Some of these communities did not discuss 
the group in detail, focusing instead on other issues. However, those groups that did 
discuss ISIS would be the fiercest critics of the group online.  
 The online environment has eliminated the geographic limitations on 
communication between people around the world, enabling the growth of communities 
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around an array of interests and perspectives. An unintended consequence, and one that 
may be of some significance, is that it also facilitates greater interaction with those with 
antagonistic views. Despite the focus of this research being on presence of ISIS online, a 
great deal of content I came across was antagonistic of the group. In many ways, this is a 
natural consequence of the internet’s elimination of boundaries that would normally 
separate these discussions. This is best seen in the case of hashtags, keywords used relate 
content on social media indicated with a pound sign (#hashtag). In searching for content 
using ISIS hashtags the majority of content is aggressively anti-ISIS, and often takes a 
mocking tone. At times, these responses and other content can serve to reinforce ISIS’s 
message that Muslims are hated by the West, with individuals posting disparaging 
remarks about Islam, referring to it as savage or barbaric, or supportive of systematic 
violence against the Muslims and the Middle East. Although ISIS would make frequent 
references to the West’s hatred of Islam, none of their writings demonstrated this point as 
effectively as what was written by westerners. 
Individual antagonists are the largest group in the sphere of ISIS antagonists, but 
two other distinct collectives also exist. First, several internet social movements have 
acted against the group. Typically, these have revolved around coopting the group’s 
hashtags, attacking its image, or manipulating search engines to guide users away from 
ISIS related content. Sometimes, these have involved minor events that are not explicitly 
mobilized against the virtual caliphate such as the development of memes related to the 
Islamic State. A nasheed (Islamic poem/song) by the group, “Salil al-Sawarim”, would be 
remixed and shared widely, including a version in the style of 8-bit videogames, 
electronic dance music, and an anime influenced pop version (Know Your Meme 2015a). 
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Other forms of internet collective action would include the ISIS-Chan meme, a grass 
roots campaign to counter the ISIS propaganda by disrupting the results returned by 
search engines. Instead of propaganda, images of an anthropomorphized ISIS anime 
character with a taste for muskmelon would show up in the results for queries for ISIS 
content (Know Your Meme 2015b). More sophisticated actions against ISIS by internet 
collectives have also existed. Users of the internet platform 4chan would attempt to 
mobilize a campaign against ISIS (Menegus 2017). Anonymous, the hacktivist group, 
undertook a series of actions against ISIS and ISIS accounts, including Operation Charlie 
Hebdo (Brooking 2015). The most organized campaign against ISIS discovered in the 
course of this research was the counterpropaganda by the US State Department. This 
included a propaganda video that was just as graphic and violent as those produced by 
ISIS, only with ominous music and condescending text instead of the inspirational music 
and sense of righteousness that accompanies ISIS propaganda videos (Military.com 
2014). 
The most articulate group opposing ISIS online are the Islamic activist groups that 
I encountered in researching the concepts used by ISIS. There are many commonalities in 
the collective action frames of ISIS and these communities, but frequently those that 
address ISIS forcefully rebuke the group. Halim (2014) calls out the hatred of Muslims in 
the West and Western support for dictatorships that carry out massacres as the cause of 
the rise of ISIS. The hypocrisy of the US is also criticized, arguing that the US turned a 
blind eye to the mass murder of Muslims by ISIS until it attacked US allies. Although 
these are issues ISIS frequently evokes, the group is strongly condemned as Khawarij, a 
group from Islamic history characterized as viewing themselves as the only group with 
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true faith that condemned the rest of mankind as undesirables that to be killed. Even those 
supportive of other jihadist groups are critical of the group. A website of an Islamic 
scholar echoes similar sentiments and attitudes as those in ISIS’s propaganda, only to 
strongly condemn the group for the practice of takfir after praising Osama bin Laden. 
ISIS stands alone, almost universally maligned and ideologically opposed to cooperation 
with those outside the group. Despite its brutal acts and this opposition, the group has still 
been successful in attracting followers around the world, begging the question—why? 
4.2.3 The Appeal of ISIS 
 ISIS-produced content is disorienting to consume (Klausen 2015). Reading the 
materials of the Islamic State can result in a sensation of whiplash, where virtuous 
positions regarding justice, oppression, equality, and charity are followed by sentiments 
of hatred, enslavement, death, and genocide. Images of cats are followed by deceased 
mujahidin, racially diverse group photos that could be advertisements for a university are 
replaced by images of ISIS’s victims, civilian victims of drone strikes positioned next to 
smiling photos of young mujahidin, and inspirational videos cut between heroic fighters 
and horrific executions. The articles are no less of a rollercoaster ride, including 
comments on racial equality, how to be a virtuous leader, and discussions on the 
importance of taking care of those in the community before delving into calls to violence 
and religious justifications for pillaging, murder, genocide, and sex slavery. Most 
commentary describes the grotesque and disturbing parts of ISIS, and as a result the 
aspects of ISIS that may appear positive to its audience is largely ignored, reinforcing the 
image of the terrorist as a bloodthirsty lunatic. 
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 A complete understanding of the group, and how it appeals to people, necessitates 
an examination of how it, and others, depict it positively. The major themes in the 
positive depiction of ISIS that would contribute to a wider appeal are its image of 
professionalism, the humanization and valorization of the mujahidin, and its depiction of 
the caliphate. Within its depiction of the caliphate are the group’s claimed values, 
including advocacy for justice, the elimination of oppression, and charity. Supporting this 
are the many accounts of groups and individuals pledging allegiance (bay’ah) to the 
Islamic State, specifically due to the group’s achievement of these values through the 
implementation of Sharī’ah.  
 The professional image conveyed by ISIS’s official media cannot be understated, 
and it effectively conveys an air of legitimacy to the group. The images, magazines, 
music, and videos of the group are professionally produced, and are equitable in quality 
to major media companies and their content. Furthermore, the writing is of similar 
quality. Each magazine typically has an overarching theme, and most the articles within 
the issue speak to that overall theme. Articles include ample references to the Quran and 
Islamic historical sources, and at times include footnotes to clarify points in the articles. 
The result of this effort is an air of legitimacy and authority conveyed by its professional 
presentation. 
 In addition to this, ISIS effectively presents the mujahidin in ways that both 
humanizes and valorizes them. Pictures and videos of ISIS mujahidin depict smiling 
faces and hands joined together in unity. Videos depicting the mujahidin show them 
smiling, laughing, and singing. The descriptions of the lives of mujahidin in the memorial 
articles echo their humanity. They are described as always smiling, sensitive to injustice, 
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ready to help others, and as paragons of humility, sincerity, devotion, and commitment. 
These memorials include stories of mujahidin risking their lives for each other and testify 
that the fallen were beloved by their brothers. A guide to traveling to the Islamic State 
includes jokes about women’s love of clothes and sporks, and a plea for forgiveness if his 
travel advice was inaccurate, apologizing and admitting “I am only trying my best, and 
trying my best is the best I can do”.  In addition to these humanizing accounts, ISIS 
mujahidin are often depicted akin to action heroes in pictures, songs, and videos.  
 The utopian image of the Khilafah, or caliphate, further adds to the allure of the 
group. The image conveyed is one of a community overjoyed to be able to practice its 
religion freely and fully, including the abolishment of injustice, oppression, and 
suffering. According to the writer advising on travel to the Islamic State, “We are a 
gregarious Ummah [the Muslim community], we form societies, we live together, helping 
one another”. ISIS would also proclaim that “guarding against injustice and wrongdoing 
are significant, and they comprise the foundation of our religion”. A great deal of the 
Islamic State’s infrastructure, they claim, is dedicated to social justice and the elimination 
of oppression. They emphasize welfare programs, equal treatment for the wealthy and 
poor, and racial equality under Allah. To address these issues, the Islamic State has 
established a healthcare system, an Office for Consumer Protection, and a Central Office 
for Investigating Grievances to address injustices between its citizens. The programs they 
implement draw from the collectivism of Islam, and in describing these programs justice 
and the well-being of Muslims are often emphasized. In addition to these services, the 
Islamic State boasts of its charity, providing meat to the needy during Ramadan and 
caring for orphans and widows. At the core of these virtuous positions is ISIS’s claim of 
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implementing Sharī’ah, which is presented through interviews and articles as a central 
feature that attracted recruits. Notably, these virtuous positions are not a characteristic 
unique to ISIS but derived from Islamic beliefs and values (Grieve 2016).  
In addition to the materials boasting of the infrastructure and justice implemented 
by the Islamic State, there is a wealth of writings and videos justifying its more horrific 
practices. The taking of war booty, polygamy, slavery, executions and their methods, and 
massacres are extensively defended using the Quran and Islamic texts as the definitive 
basis for justifications. At times, the virtuous and atrocious are combined. Racial 
prejudice is described as having no place in the caliphate, and “[t]he reason for this is 
simple: A Muslim’s loyalty is determined, not by his skin color, his tribal affiliation, or 
his last name, but by his faith” (ISIS 2015: 19).  The article would go on to say that “[t]he 
fate of a kāfir [non-believer] waging war against the Muslims is one and the same across 
the entire racial spectrum – slaughter” (ISIS 2015: 19).  
4.2.4 Injustice and Hypocrisy  
 ISIS’s framing of the conflict between Islam and the West is particularly 
effective. It accomplishes this by pointing to injustices and relentlessly attacking 
hypocrisy in the actions of the West. This is reinforced by individual commentary online 
that aggressively attacks Islam online, as well as the realities of prejudice and 
discrimination. Gallup found that 43% of Americans harbored some degree of prejudice 
towards Muslims, the highest self-reported prejudice of any religious group tested. The 
majority of Americans also believe that the majority of the country is prejudiced against 
Muslims, and the majority of religious groups believe Muslims are sympathetic towards 
al-Qaeda (Younis 2015). ISIS asserts that the West is always hostile to Islam. Muslims in 
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the west are described as living in humiliation and disgrace, subject to intrusive policing 
and monitoring, and prevented from fully practicing their religion. The manuals they 
produce even account for the prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in the West.  
They advise concealing one’s actions, avoiding any appearance of ‘military training’ 
(such as paintball), and even going so far as suggesting a name change to gain 
employment more easily, stating that people with Islamic names are less likely to be 
hired. The manual for mujahidin in the West describes the struggles facing Muslims in 
the West and conditions leading to radicalization:  
Many Muslims are putting alot of effort into showing the world that we are 
peaceful citizens, we're spending thousands of Euros to do Da'wah (invitation to 
Islam) campaigns to show how good we are in society, but we're miserably 
failing. The leaders of disbelief repeatedly lie in the media and say that we 
Muslims are all terrorists, while we denied it and wanted to be peaceful citizens. 
But they have cornered us and forced us into becoming radicalised, and that will 
be the cause of their defeat and be the cause for the conquest of Rome…So if 
Muslims are portrayed as evil terrorists, then the mass killing which happens to us 
afterwards will not be a big deal, infact  it will be a sigh of relief for the fooled 
masses of people.  
In addition to the experience of Muslims in the West, ISIS often references the 
deaths of civilians that have occurred throughout the wars in the Middle East. Images of 
the women and children that are the victims of airstrikes frequently accompany 
condemnations of the West and calls to join the Islamic State. Official statements by the 
groups often reference these atrocities and add to them the state repression and violence 
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by Middle Eastern regimes supported by Western powers. In explaining their position, 
ISIS states:  
We hate you for your crimes against the Muslims; your drones and fighter jets 
bomb, kill, and maim our people around the world, and your puppets in the 
usurped lands of the Muslims oppress, torture, and wage war against anyone who 
calls to the truth. As such, we fight you to stop you from killing our men, women, 
and children, to liberate those of them whom you imprison and torture, and to take 
revenge for the countless Muslims who’ve suffered as a result of your deeds…We 
hate you for invading our lands and fight you to repel you and drive you out (ISIS 
2017, p. 32). 
 ISIS emphasizes the contradictory attitudes of Western observers towards the loss 
of innocent life to further justify its violence. In justifying beheadings, they would claim 
that Americans killed 1.5 million Iraqis, and that the majority of these were children. This 
is compared to the outrage over the executions of Americans by the Islamic State, and 
consistently this is pointed to as a hypocritical position. This sentiment is not isolated to 
ISIS, or even jihadist groups, but is shared by non-violent activist communities. One such 
group criticized the Western governments’ treatment of Muslims and the deaths from 
wars in the Middle East, while seemingly believing that “if anyone killed a Westerner it 
would be as if he killed all mankind” (Abdullah 2016). This accusation of hypocrisy 
extends to the treatment of white terrorists in Western nations that target Muslims. In a 
manual to be a mujahid in the West, instructions for a nail bomb are accompanied by an 
image of a British man in KKK garb in front of a confederate flag. The caption explains 
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that this man intended to use a nail bomb to kill people at a mosque. At the bottom of the 
image, written in red, are the consequences of this man’s actions, “Sentence: 2 years”. 
4.3 THE WORLDVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC STATE  
 The collection action frame of ISIS, indicting the West as the cause of injustices 
against Muslims around the world and deaths in the Middle East, largely overlaps with 
other Muslim communities. Similarly, there is some evidence to suggest that the group’s 
apocalypticism, although central to the group’s belief system, is not unique to the group 
within the Muslim world (Filiu 2011). The features that truly distinguish ISIS from other 
jihadist groups and the wider Muslim community are its specific interpretation of hijrah, 
jihad, Sharī’ah, and the practice of takfir. The central aspects of ISIS’s belief system can 
be divided into its conception of its place in history, its goals for the caliphate, and the 
obligations it places on all Muslims. 
 4.3.1 The Importance of History 
 To understand ISIS requires understanding its conception of the group’s place in 
history, its position in the global arena, and role in the future. ISIS idolizes the historic 
eras of Islam, uses Islamic history to justify and inform their behavior, and views their 
actions in the context of a longer, protracted struggle against the Western world. 
However, ISIS’s conception of history is not limited to the past. The group views its 
present struggle a part of foretold historical events ending in the Islamic apocalypse, the 
Final Hour. History is essential to understanding many of the group’s justifications of its 
actions and the importance it places on those actions. ISIS is explicit in the importance of 
history to its dogma, stating, “History repeats itself by Allah’s divine decree. This is the 
sunnah (established way) of Allah in His creation…There is no escape from this divine 
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decree. It must happen and it certainly will” (ISIS 2014, p. 32). Its official magazine 
includes a regular column, “From the Pages of History”, which uses historical events to 
justify its actions, reinforce the obligations it imposes on Muslims, and condemn its 
enemies. Its actions similarly demonstrate the importance it places on history, specifically 
in the destruction of monuments to Syria’s national legacy, since those monuments were 
testaments to the evils of nationalism. As is typical to the group’s announcements, this 
destruction would be compared to Islamic historical precedent: the destruction of false 
idols by Ibrahim (Abrahim), a story shared among the Abrahamic religions that possesses 
particular significance within Islam (Grieve 2016).  
 ISIS’s positions regarding governance, war, and life are primarily derived from 
the Quran, the hadiths describing the life of the Prophet Muhammed, or Islamic history. 
Often their historical analysis is also used to reinforce the obligations it imposes on all 
Muslims. ISIS would cite the battle of Uhud to emphasize listening and obeying leaders, 
explaining that when the Muslim army at Uhud suffered calamity and setbacks when they 
disobeyed the Prophet (ISIS 2016). Similarly, examples of Prophet Muhammed killing 
apostates would be given to justify the Islamic State’s ruling against the Murtaddin 
(people that have stopped practicing Islam). Pillaging, slavery, beheadings, genocide, and 
many other practices of the group are similarly justified and religiously mandated by ISIS 
using historical and religious precedent. 
4.3.2 Historical Turning Points 
 ISIS has positioned itself in the larger context of history by drawing parallels 
between the history of Islam and the recent histories of the Middle East, global politics, 
and the competing jihadist groups. The group draws explicit parallels between Islamic 
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and modern history through its connection of Jahiliyyah (time before Islam) with the 
Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Middle East into nation-states. Similarly, it 
follows this by connecting the Islamic State to the first caliphate and the Golden Age of 
Islam as the new Islamic empire. Although every position of the group is steeped in 
historical justification, it is particularly important to recognize the historical turning 
points emphasized by the group to understand how it places itself in the course of history.  
 Before there was Islam, there was Jahiliyyah. This is referred to as the period of 
ignorance before Islam, characterized by tribal conflict that would be alleviated as the 
region came underneath Muslim rule beginning with Muhammed (ISIS 2015b, Grieve 
2016). ISIS does not address Jahiliyyah in great detail, instead relying on a shared 
understanding of Islam to convey its importance and consequences. The group warns that 
those that do not pledge allegiance to the group will die the ‘death of Jahiliyyah’ and 
condemns Muslims with nationalist inclinations as belonging to this barbaric period. 
Alone, the concept and time period of Jahiliyyah represents a time of division and the 
absence of Islam. This historical precedent is most important for its comparison to the 
modern historical era’s Sykes-Picot agreement.  
 Prior to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Middle East was not strictly divided into 
nation-states, and the Muslim world generally viewed the region as united under Islam 
(Greive 2016). This concept of the unity of Muslims across all other divisive boundaries, 
such as nationality, tribalism, and race, is one that is heavily emphasized by ISIS in its 
writings. The division of the Middle East into separate competing nations by foreign 
powers is therefore perceived as a fundamental attack on Islam and a violation of the true 
law as established by Allah. As a result, the Sykes-Picot agreement features greatly in 
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ISIS’s understanding of the history of the modern world and its problems. The central 
issue is that the Sykes-Picot Agreement is viewed as a Western attempt to return the 
Middle East to Jahiliyyah (ISIS 2015B). According to ISIS, the agreement illustrates the 
strategy of the crusaders to divide and conquer the Muslim World, and their willingness 
to permit Islamic symbolism only if it is tainted by nationalism. In turn, this reinforces 
ISIS’s emphasis on unity in the Muslim world, so long as it is under the black flag of the 
Islamic State. 
 The second historical event emphasized by the group occurs in the course of the 
history of Islam and changes in its religious practices. This event regards the Murji’ah, 
irja, the Khawarij, and takfir, and is essential to understanding ISIS given the group’s 
unique emphasis on takfir. The Murji’ah guided Islam away from the practice of takfir, or 
declaring self-identified Muslims to be non-Muslims due to perceived inadequacies in 
their practice of Islam. This development rests on the concept of irja, that only Allah can 
judge if a Muslim’s practice of the faith is flawed. Therefore, Muslims cannot judge other 
Muslims regarding their religious practice. This is diametrically opposed to the Khawarij, 
“who made the performance of all obligations and abandonment of all sins essential for 
one to be Muslim” (ISIS 2015c: 42). The Khawarij are remembered as a group that 
terrorized other Muslims that did not practice Islam according to the beliefs of the 
Khawarij. Although ISIS is quick to critically draw the parallels between present day 
Muslims and the Murji’ah, they also strongly deny the frequent accusations of being 
Khawarij themselves. However, the Islamic State’s emphasis on takfir and their violence 
against Muslims makes this comparison to the Khawarij particularly fitting, ironically 
proving their thesis that history repeats itself. 
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 Other major events of special importance to ISIS revolve around the tradition of 
jihad, the examples set by the mujahidin of previous conflicts, and the condemnation of 
the group’s enemies. Videos produced by the Islamic state cut quickly between the 
modern mujahidin and depictions of their historical counterparts, drawing a direct parallel 
between the two. ISIS would draw a direct comparison between themselves and Muslims 
facing the Mongol invasion, an example used to illustrate that jihad should never be 
abandoned (ISIS 2016b). They use this example to indict Muslims oppose, criticize, or 
undermine the mujahidin as blasphemous for their hindrance of jihad, and hypocrites for 
abandoning Islam in the face of invaders. This history lesson not only reinforces the 
emphasis on jihad as obligatory, but also in undermining the critics of the group (ISIS 
2016c). ISIS draws lessons from the Battle of Fallujah on the usefulness of confronting 
humiliation with battle and aspirational examples of might, honor, and resistance.  
History would also be used as further evidence of the dangerousness of Shiism as 
well as the tawaghit, the tyrannical rulers in the Middle East (ISIS 2016d). Historical 
critiques also focus on the specific instances of competing jihadist groups cooperating 
with Western nations or dictatorial regimes in the Middle East to discredit them (ISIS 
2015). Conflicts with the West are similarly historically situated, with ISIS noting that 
President Barack Obama’s acknowledgement that war against the Islamic State would 
take time echoed the similar statements by President George W. Bush regarding the War 
on Terror thirteen years prior, another affirmation for the group that history repeats itself. 
4.3.3 A Caliphate Surrounded by Enemies 
 Based on the historical narrative of ISIS, the group is heralding the revival of 
Islam by establishing the Khilafah, ending the divisions created by the Sykes-Picot 
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agreement, reinstating the true practice of Islam through Sharī’ah, and providing a refuge 
for Muslims from the prejudice and violence of the West. ISIS would declare the 
establishment of the caliphate, proclaiming that “[t]he time has come for those 
generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of 
humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people…the time has come for them to 
rise.” (ISIS 2014b:9). The caliphate is presented as the solution to the problems facing 
Muslims. It emphasizes the ability to fully practice Islam as the primary appeal, but also 
includes everything from discrimination and humiliation to economic security by 
protecting Muslims from the impending collapse of the corrupt global financial system. It 
also provides a safe haven from the enemies of Muslims, the West, Shiism, the tawaghit, 
the ‘sorcerous media’, and misleading scholars. 
 Invoking a history of conflict between Islam and the West, the US and its allies 
are consistently referenced throughout ISIS’s writings as crusaders. This has the dual 
effect of placing the current conflict into the larger historical narrative, as well as 
implicitly framing the current conflict as a defensive war against Western aggressors. 
According to ISIS, it is presently engaged in a defense against the final crusade, one 
which will end in the coming of the Final Hour (ISIS 2014). In addition to conflicts and 
their collateral damage, the West is attacked for its interference and exploitation of the 
Middle East, from the Sykes-Picot agreement to the manipulation of Arabic leaders, the 
tawaghit. These rulers prevent the worship of Islam as a result of Western influence, 




In addition to the West and Arabic rulers, Shia Muslims are also specifically 
discussed as the most dangerous group that ISIS faces. Referred to as the Rafidi, a 
pejorative term which translates as rejectors, Shia Muslims are described as the greatest 
enemy ISIS faces. ISIS references a letter written to Osama bin Laden that summarizes 
their views: “The Rāfidah [Shia Muslims] are the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking 
snake, the scorpion of deception and malice, the prowling enemy, the deadly 
poison…The second war is a difficult and fierce one with a scheming enemy [Shia 
Muslims] who dresses like a friend, shows approval, and calls to unity, while he conceals 
evil and plots day and night” (ISIS 2016d: 41). ISIS continues on to describe the crimes 
of Shia Muslims against the Sunni, criticize their practice of Islam as a form of Judaism, 
and argue that a Shia savior figure is likely the Dajjal, an Islamic equivalent of the 
Antichrist.  
The last of category of enemies in physical conflict with ISIS are other jihadist or 
armed groups in the region. Some armed groups, such as the Peshmerga, the PKK, and 
the FSA, are condemned and discredited as US proxy groups comprised of criminals and 
drug dealers. More time is dedicated to addressing competing jihadist groups that have 
come into conflict with ISIS. The group clarifies the different types of antagonistic 
groups it faces: “1) Islamic factions with an international agenda. 2) “Islamic” factions 
with a nationalist agenda. 3) Nationalist factions with an “Islamic” agenda. 4) Secularist 
factions with a democratic agenda.” (ISIS 2015c: 52). Groups with nationalist and 
democratic dispositions are de facto enemies, since both qualify as kufr, or disbelief. 
Islamic factions with international agendas are criticized for not fully implementing 
Sharī’ah in their practice of jihad and not practicing takfir, essentially accusing them of 
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not fully practicing Islam. This has led to a coalition of odd bedfellows combating ISIS, 
where even al-Qaeda is viewed as an ally against the group by some US officials and 
denounced as an enemy by ISIS using these comments as evidence.  
 The last enemies aligned against ISIS are the sorcerous media and the misleading 
scholars that wage a psychological campaign to undermine the group. ISIS dedicates a 
great deal of time challenging and attempting to refute the interpretation of Islam by 
scholars. According to ISIS, scholars are intermediaries that dilute the religion and 
mislead the Muslim community, and that they are unnecessary since the Quran is explicit 
in its instructions (ISIS 2015). ISIS is especially critical of the claim by scholars that 
Islam is a religion of peace. A group that pledged allegiance to ISIS published an article 
justifying beheadings and reiterating the Islamic State’s claims against ‘misleading 
scholars’. They argue:  
The reality is that the ones who are distorting the image of Islam are not those 
who behead the disbelieves [sic] and terrorize them, but it is only the ones who 
want it to be Mandela-ism and Ghandism which doesn’t have any killing in it nor 
fighting nor violence nor spilling blood nor striking at the throats nor striking of 
the necks.  
This conflict against Islamic scholars is a part of ISIS’s larger battle for legitimacy as the 
true practitioners of Islam. In contrast, their criticism of the media has been a battle for 
establishing the truth about the caliphate.  
 ISIS emphasizes that the media war is one of its most important battlefronts, since 
the propaganda of its enemies is meant to discourage would-be mujahidin and undermine 
support for the group. According to ISIS, the West bans users from internet platforms in 
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order to prevent people from having access to accurate information. They cast doubt on 
the strength of the mujahidin while overstating the strength of their militaries and 
attributes the Islamic State’s victories to everything but the mujahidin. In addition to 
these direct attacks on the character of the Islamic State, the media also undermines the 
group by falsely blaming them for attacks as well as disavowing credit for other acts. 
Similarly, people that are not central to ISIS and hypocrites are promoted in the Western 
media in order to further undermine the group. According to the analysis, the media is 
“the psychological weapon able to destroy the will to resist, it is just as lethal, they are 
trying to shake the confidence of al-Mujahedeen, the Muslims and the supporters of al-
Mujahedeen, to make them feel as though they are not capable of handling the situation 
or that they are wasting their time, to mislead the masses and dissuade them from 
supporting them”. ISIS’s writings reassure Western mujahid not to concern themselves 
with how the media will depict them, and often accuse the media of misrepresenting 
those that carry out attacks in their home countries. ISIS argues that the media distorts the 
character of the Islamic State, presenting the group as loving murder and slaughter (ISIS 
2015b). To combat this, they include stories of Muslims that are initially fearful of the 
group eventually praising its virtues. ISIS even addresses Americans and Europeans 
regarding the media, stating that the governments and media are lying about the Islamic 
State initiating a war against the West (ISIS 2017b).  
4.3.4 Apocalypse Now 
 Although ISIS usually frames the conflict with the West as a defensive conflict, 
the group espouses several decidedly offensive goals in their worldview. This includes 
the group’s claim to be central to the impending Islamic apocalypse, the Final Hour. This 
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is a part of ISIS’s worldview that is emphasized more than any other aspect, introducing 
every issue of its first magazine, Dabiq, with the same quote: “The spark has been lit here 
in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s per- mission – until it burns the 
crusader armies in Dābiq”. This quote is an explicit reference to the final conflict in the 
Islamic apocalypse. The Final Hour looms throughout the writings of ISIS, from this 
featured quote to the frequent use of phrases such as ‘as the hour approaches’ and ‘until 
the final hour’ as common beginnings and conclusions to their statements and articles. 
 This is due to ISIS’s belief that it is central to the Final Hour, and the foretold 
victory that will end in global conquest. According to ISIS, the Hour will be established 
when Romans land near Halab (Aleppo, Syria), where they will be confronted by an army 
from Madinah (Saudi Arabia) made up of the best people on earth. A third will flee, a 
third will die as the best martyrs, and a third will conquer the Romans, and never be 
afflicted by fitnah, which translates as trials or tribulations. After this final great battle the 
era of Roman Christians will end, and Muslims will conquer Constantinople (Ishtanbul, 
Turkey) and Rome. Romans and Rome feature heavily in the narrative of ISIS but refer to 
all Christians of Europe and their colonies by ISIS. This connection to Romans and the 
crusades connects the historical conflicts to the present day as the final crusade that ends 
in the Final Hour. This apocalypse narrative establishes great rewards for ISIS mujahidin 
as the greatest martyrs or an end to suffering and assures a victory over the West that is 
mandated by Allah. Furthermore, claiming the Islamic State to be the prophesized final 
caliphate is additional proof of the group’s legitimacy. To this end ISIS discusses many 
signs that indicate the Hour is near and has taken an active role in fulfilling prophesy.  
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 ISIS describes its leaders as certain of the approaching of the Hour. This 
conviction is used as an additional sign that the Hour approaches, by drawing a historical 
comparison to Ibn Taymiyyah, a religious leader whose prophesies were supposedly 
fulfilled. This precedent is used to confirm the legitimacy of prophesy, and that 
legitimacy is used to support the leadership’s claims that the Hour draws near. ISIS even 
acknowledges the outlandishness of claims of prophesy, but they defend the accuracy of 
their leadership’s statements. In a footnote, they argue “If one were to make such 
statements of certainty [like those of Ibn Taymiyyah] regarding Allah’s promise in our 
times, the ignorant claimants of knowledge would accuse him with severe deviance and 
heresy!” (ISIS 2014: 36). Effectively, Ibn Taymiyyah would be accused of being a false 
prophet today, just as the leadership of ISIS is, so these criticisms do not undermine their 
statements on the upcoming apocalypse.  
The specific signs that they point to are not compelling on their own, and ISIS is 
responsible for fulfilling the most discussed signs. They write: “The battle between the 
Muslims and the Jews, between the Muslims and the Romans, and the revival of the 
Caliphate, were all from among the signs foretold by the Prophet through revelation. And 
yet, the disbeliever doubts” (ISIS 2017: 13). In addition to war and the caliphate, the 
adoption of the gold dinar in the caliphate is seen as fulfilling the prophesy that the hour 
would come with the discovery of gold (ISIS 2016). Similarly, the reinstitution of slavery 
is taken as another sign (ISIS 2014). These signs of the Final Hour are important because 
they support the belief of impending and certain victory in addition to substantiating the 




4.4 THE KHILAFAH, SHARĪ’AH, AND TAKFIR 
 At the core of ISIS’s beliefs is the establishment of the Khilafah, or caliphate. 
This is primarily due to their motivation to live their lives Islamically, by the tenets of 
Sharī’ah. However, there are several distinct ideological implications of ISIS’s 
conception of Islam that dictate the nature of the Khilafah and Sharī’ah. Specifically, the 
group’s fundamentalist, or literalist, interpretation of Islam and practice of takfir dictate a 
caliphate ruled by conformity and obedience. 
4.4.1 The Khilafah, Unity, and Obedience  
“The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. 
O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the 
Islamic State, then let him do so” (ISIS 2014b: 11). According to ISIS, the Khilafah is 
defined by its adherence to Sharī’ah, espousing ideas of justice, charity, and opposing 
oppression. It is a land without the artificial divisions of tribalism or nationalism, where 
Muslims can live free from the corrupting influence of the West and freely practice their 
religion. The Khilafah is effective, according to ISIS, in providing those services 
necessary to meeting the needs of Muslims, including offices responsible for healthcare, 
law enforcement, consumer protection, public relations, zakah (a welfare equivalent), 
religious education, and addressing injustices. ISIS boasts of bringing stability to the 
area, caring for widows and orphans, and ensuring the availability of food and 
commodities to those under its authority (ISIS 2014b). The defining features of the 
Islamic State are not its governance, but its implementation of ISIS’s interpretation of 




The Khilafah is of central importance to the Islamic State, and its completion is 
the ultimate goal of the group. The Khilafah is described by ISIS as a source of fear for 
the kuffar, the disbelievers. Along with jihad, the Khilafah is presented as a source of 
salvation from fitnah (trials/tribulations) facing Muslims. According to ISIS, the 
problems facing Muslims can be resolved by avoiding the deviant Muslims that do not 
truly practice Islam, Western influences, and sticking to the jama’ah, the Muslim 
congregation, and the Imam, used by ISIS to refer to the leader of Muslims: “This new 
condition [the establishment of the Khilafah] opens the path for the complete unification 
of all Muslim peoples and lands under the single authority of the Khalifah” (ISIS 2014b: 
40). These ideas, the unity of Muslims and obedience to a single leader, are second only 
to Sharī’ah in their importance to ISIS’s conception of the Khilafah.  
ISIS argues that all Muslims should unite underneath the banner of the Islamic 
State, disregarding the artificial divisions of nationalism, tribalism, and patriotism. This is 
consistent with ISIS’s historical narrative emphasizing the Sykes-Picot treaty as 
reinstating Jahiliyyah. According to ISIS, “[t]he Muslim, however, does not accept the 
Ummah remaining divided in the name of petty concepts, for he recognizes that the only 
acceptable line of division is that which separates between a Muslim and a kāfir, whereas 
any other course of division would only be a source of weakness.” (ISIS 2015: 20). The 
establishment of the Khilafah, according to ISIS, obligates all Muslims to unite 
underneath its banner and not to divide their strength. The importance of the Khilafah is 
also directly connected to the historical narrative of ISIS regarding Jahiliyyah. They ask 
Muslims to “reject these calls to disunity and come together. Live the life of Islam, for 
which you have already left the path of falsehood, and do not die the death of Jahiliyyah, 
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a time in which there was no united Muslim nation having pledged allegiance to a single 
imam and thus having no obedience to a rightful authority.” (ISIS 2017: 27). This would 
lead to a frequent citation, “Whoever comes to you wanting to break your strength or 
divide your unity while your matter is altogether under a single man, then kill him…This 
is the punishment for one who merely attempts to divide the Muslim Jamā’ah – the 
Khilāfah – through propaganda and arms” (ISIS 2016d: 8).  
In part, this can be seen in the emphasis on the unity of Muslims under the 
Khilafah, but this concept is formally discussed in ISIS’s interpretation of the Islamic 
concepts of wala and bara: “the strongest bond of Islam is...love for the sake of Allah and 
hate for the sake of Allah” (ISIS 2015: 19). Wala and bara are among the defining 
features of ISIS. Those that do not observe these concepts are criticized, such as the al-
Qaeda alliance with the Taliban, since the latter’s nationalism is contradictory to these 
concepts (ISIS 2015). The unity of Muslims, specifically their love for each other (wala), 
emphasized by ISIS is intimately connected to the hatred of all those outside of the group 
(bara): “people around the world [are] gathering based on hatred of cross worshippers, 
apostates, crosses borders and ballot boxes” (ISIS 2014c). A consequence of this 
emphasis on conformity under the banner of the Islamic State is the harsh punishment 
dictated for those that refuse to comply with it, criminalizing their disobedience to the 
caliphate. Disunity, such as Islamic scholars criticizing ISIS, is presented as a danger to 
the Islamic State by undermining the solidarity of Muslims and enabling their oppression 
by the West (ISIS 2016c). 
In addition to unity through love of each other and hatred of everyone else, ISIS 
emphasizes the importance of the ruler of the caliphate, referred to by ISIS as the imam 
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(religious leader) and Khalifah (ruler of the Khilafah/caliphate). Obedience to the imam 
is a core component of the Khilafah according to ISIS: “Whoever pledges allegiance to 
an imam, giving him his hand in sincerity, should obey him as much as he is able to. And 
if another man comes forward disputing his legitimacy, then strike that other man’s 
neck.” (ISIS 2014b: 40). The responsibility of Muslims to ‘strike the necks’ of the 
disobedient is reiterated throughout the ISIS’s discussions on the importance of 
obedience to the ruler of the caliphate. This obedience would be further emphasized by 
ISIS in their description of the consequences of not pledging allegiance, or giving bay’ah, 
to an Islamic leader. Those that die without pledging bay’ah die a death of Jahiliyyah 
(ISIS 2016). 
Unity, in ISIS’s conception, does not only imply obedience and hatred of others, 
but global conquest. An ISIS recruiter acknowledged that ISIS aspires to kill all those 
that try to stop Islam around the world, including everyone that does not agree with the 
caliphate (Erelle 2015). According to ISIS, “[t]he shade of this blessed flag [of the 
Islamic State] will expand until it covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, 
filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood 
and tyranny of jāhiliyyah, even if America and its coalition despise such…” (ISIS 2015c: 
3). The final goals of ISIS are not limited to Muslim state ruled by Sharī’ah, but require 
global unity under Islam. This is dictated primarily by ISIS’s conception of wala and 
bara, which demands the annihilation of those that do not practice Islam according to 
ISIS. It is also demanded by their interpretation of Islam: 
[E]ven if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, 
and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary 
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reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam…What’s 
equally if not more important to understand is that we fight you, not simply to 
punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom in this life and salvation in 
the Hereafter... recognize that we will never stop hating you until you embrace 
Islam, and will never stop fighting you until you’re ready to leave the swamp of 
warfare and terrorism through the exits we provide, the very exits put forth by our 
Lord for the People of the Scripture: Islam, jizyah [a tax or tribute], or – as a last 
means of fleeting respite – a temporary truce…If you refuse, then we offer you 
the option to pay jizyah and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation (ISIS 
2017: 33).  
ISIS refers to these three options, annihilation, Islam, or jizyah, consistently as the only 
acceptable outcomes for the Islamic State.  
4.4.2 Sharī’ah 
 According to ISIS, all of this is divinely mandated through Sharī’ah. Despite its 
practice within the Islamic State and the common misconceptions of it in the West, 
Sharī’ah is not a collection of draconian laws with extreme punishments, but a set of 
complex, wide ranging, evolving set of principles to help Muslims come closer to Allah 
including freedom of speech, expression, and thought (Kuruvilla 2017; Quraishi-Landes 
2016; Bristol 2018; Grieve 2016). ISIS has implemented a fundamentalist, or literalist, 
interpretation of Sharī’ah that is not shared by the wider Muslim community. ISIS is 
highly critical of the broader interpretation of Sharī’ah and Islamic scholars that advance 
more modern conceptions of Islam. According to ISIS, scholars advance these 
interpretations “for the purpose of advancing an agenda that attempts to “Islamize” more 
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“liberal” concepts that the kuffār apply across the board for achieving evil, such as 
political pluralism, freedom of religion, and acceptance of sodomites.” (ISIS 2015: 19).  
 Although Sharī’ah is discussed primarily in reference to its implementation as the 
law of the land, it is important to note that, as principles, Sharī’ah informs almost every 
aspect of jihad as practiced by ISIS. An analysis of the media war on ISIS incorporates 
Quranic verses for support. A manual on operational security explicitly discusses it from 
a Sharī’ah point of view, incorporating Islamic beliefs and history. Across the 
testimonials of converts to the group and interviews with leaders of organizations that 
have pledged allegiance to ISIS the thorough adherence to Sharī’ah in governance and 
the practice of jihad is the major appeal of the group. Often, older jihadist organizations 
and groups are criticized for not fully adhering to Sharī’ah in their operations (ISIS 
2015d). 
This is consistent with ISIS’s position that no aspect of life should be ungoverned 
by Islam, arguing that others were “treating the Qur’an as a book of chanting and 
recitation rather than a book of governance, legislation, and enforcement” (ISIS 2014b: 
24). According to ISIS, it is the implementation of Sharī’ah that attracts people to the 
group, and a collection of testimonials are presented to attest to this fact (ISIS 2015d). 
Similarly, Islamic states are also criticized for sacrificing Islamic principles and not fully 
implementing Sharī’ah law. This is especially true for those Arabic states with 
democratic institutions, since democracy relies are artificial, man-made law rather than 
divine mandate.  
At the core of ISIS’s argument against modern democracy is their position that 
man-made laws are by inherently inferior to those established by Allah and implemented 
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through Sharī’ah. According to ISIS, legislation is the right of Allah alone (ISIS 2015d). 
These man-made laws are viewed as fabrications that ignore divinely dictated rule, a 
legislation according to man’s whims and desires, and as a result democracy is viewed as 
a form of blasphemy (ISIS 2015d; ISIS 2016c). Typically, ISIS is even more explicit in 
their attack upon democracy, referring to it as a false idol or religion, along with 
nationalism and capitalism (ISIS 2014b; ISIS 2015c; ISIS 2016c). 
4.4.3 Takfir 
The strict interpretation and enforcement of Sharī’ah by ISIS is central to the 
group’s defining characteristic—the practice of takfir. As discussed above, the discussion 
of takfir is strongly rooted in a history involving the Murji’ah, irja, and the Khawarij. 
ISIS focuses their discussion on the Murji’ah and the concept of irja, and how this results 
in Muslims not practicing their faith. According to ISIS, the Murji’ah and modern 
Muslims sharing the concept of irja claim “that the abandonment of all obligations and 
the performance of all sins does not affect one’s Īmān [belief/faith] even if one were to 
completely abandon the pillars of Islam!”. Essentially, ISIS argues that one cannot have 
faith without fully practicing the duties it demands. As a result, ISIS labels all Muslims 
that do not practice Islam according to the Islamic State’s interpretation as apostates or 
non-believers, and apostasy carries a death sentence in the eyes of the group. ISIS has 
further elaborated on the practice of takfir, arguing against the use of ignorance as an 
excuse against the penalty for apostasy. The official magazines of ISIS include long, 
thorough argumentative essays to justify declarations of takfir against groups. 
Conversely, articles on proper behavior advise against frivolous claims of takfir (ISIS 
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2014d). However, in practice ISIS has developed a framework for easily declaring 
antagonistic Muslims as apostates. 
According to the Islamic State, a range of modern concepts are forms of apostasy, 
including nationalism, patriotism, communism, democracy, tolerance, and the protection 
of minorities. Involvement with these concepts, such as political participation, is 
therefore cause to be declared an apostate. Extending from this logic, ISIS decries all 
Muslims that fight against it as apostates, since combating them is tantamount to fighting 
against Sharī’ah to replace it with the blasphemous (kufr) rule of man. Even other jihadist 
groups are subject to this judgment when they do not rule by Sharī’ah or oppose the 
Islamic State (ISIS 2016). The judgment of takfir carries a heavy penalty, since according 
to ISIS it is Sharī’ah, or obligatory, to kill apostates (ISIS 2016c). Notably, ISIS claims to 
offer full amnesty to those Muslims that stand against it, so long as they repent and 
surrender themselves to the Islamic State (ISIS 2016c). They do not, however, offer the 
choice of disagreement. ISIS would draw parallels to Islamic version of the Great Flood 
myth as an example that, when people were given a choice in how to practice, they chose 
wrong and perished as an example to future generations: “Then, when a group within the 
Ummah woke up and rejected this twisted methodology of giving people the choice 
between absolute truth and complete falsehood, the members of this group were stained 
by this polluted ideology, except those whom Allah had mercy upon.” (ISIS 2014e: 5). 
Referred to as murtaddin or apostates, former Muslims that convert to different 
religions are particularly demonized by ISIS. “[I]t is also known that the kufr of apostasy 
is worse, by consensus, than original kufr. As such, fighting the apostates takes priority 
over fighting the original kāfir” (ISIS 2016c). The group also extends their definition of 
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the murtaddin to include those that openly commit kufr (disbelief) unapologetically. As a 
result, all the actions deemed by the Islamic State to be a violation of Islam, including 
fighting against the Islamic State and participating in the democratic process, are 
sufficient to condemn other Muslims to death. Not only are Muslims outside of the 
Islamic State condemned by ISIS, but their belief system dictates a purge of the 
disobedient: “Moreover, had the imam left them alone after having been appointed to his 
position and let them continue their rebellion and division, he would be sinful and would 
not be acting sincerely towards his Muslim citizens” (ISIS 2014b: 24). 
ISIS explicitly describes takfir is one of the most important principles of Islam 
(ISIS 2017c). However, ISIS is largely alone in this interpretation of the Quran. The 
importance placed on the practice of takfir can also be seen in the effort devoted to its 
justification and practice. Their first newsletter would primarily feature a column on 
seminar training the group had provided to train new Imams to handle the central 
dilemmas of the times; rejecting taghut, making takfir of a kafir, takfir of specific 
individual, and not accepting excuses of ignorance to rules when it related to major shirk. 
ISIS argues that those that do not embrace takfir are not fully practicing Islam and are, 
themselves, comparable to the non-believers (ISIS 2014d; ISIS 2015c). This is because of 
ISIS’s position that faith must be expressed in deeds, and not only words and feelings, 
and takfir is used to effectively disqualify their opponents as ‘true’ Muslims. Once this 
disqualification is applied, death or conformity to ISIS’s Islam are the only options 





4.5 HIJRAH, JIHAD, AND THE MUJAHIDIN 
 ISIS is motivated by the value imbued upon the caliphate and their interrelated 
beliefs and norms derived from their version of Sharī’ah. What follows are the behaviors 
and obligations the group demands not only from its followers, but all Muslims. 
Specifically, ISIS calls upon Muslims to travel to the Islamic State in order to wage jihad. 
This is core to the central status within the group, the mujahidin, the Islamic warriors of 
ISIS.  
4.5.1 Hijrah to the Islamic State 
 There are several behaviors that ISIS declares to be obligatory upon all Muslims. 
According to ISIS, a Muslim’s first obligation is to perform hijrah, or emigrate, to the 
Islamic State. If extraordinary reasons prevent one from making hijrah, one should 
organize bay’at (pledges of allegiance) to the Islamic State and publicize them in order to 
demonstrate Muslims’ loyalty to each other and agonize the kuffar (non-believers). If 
extreme circumstances beyond one’s control prevents even this, a Muslim’s belief in the 
Islamic State as the true Khilafah is sufficient to avoid the death of Jahiliyyah (ISIS 
2014e). According to ISIS, the concept of hijrah implies far more than travel to the 
Islamic State and is described as an essential step to jihad. However, not all of those 
involved with the Islamic State are mujahidin in the traditional sense, fighting in the 
Middle East or carrying out terror attacks in their native countries. A new category of 
mujahidin has emerged within the virtual caliphate, the virtual mujahidin. The central 
roles of the virtual mujahidin are to pledge bay’ah (allegiance), make dawah (recruit), 
and to maintain the virtual caliphate.  
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 Traditionally, hijrah refers to the migration of the Prophet Muhammed from lands 
where persecution of Muslims made the practice of difficult. While it continues to refer 
to travel for the purposes of avoiding repression the prevents the practice of Islam, ISIS 
has incorporated it into its concept of jihad (Uberman and Shay 2016). ISIS describes the 
importance of hijrah: “We call upon you so that you leave the life of humiliation, 
disgrace, degradation, subordination, loss, emptiness, and poverty, to a life of honor, 
respect, leadership, richness, and another matter that you love”. Hijrah is declared to be 
obligatory upon all Muslims by ISIS, and the group has intrinsically connected it to jihad 
(ISIS 2014b). Hijrah is essential not only for a Muslim’s jihad, but also to protect them 
from the negative influence of the West:  
Hijrah for Allah’s cause has many purposes, amongst them being to escape 
tribulations, fearing that one may fall into them and that his religion may be 
affected by them. Also, getting used to seeing kufr and shirk without changing it 
could lead to death of the heart, to the point that the person does not recognize 
Islam and its people. Also, from amongst the purposes of hijrah is to join the sides 
of the Muslims, support them, strengthen their forces, and wage jihād against the 
enemies of Allah and their enemies” (ISIS 2015c: 32).  
If one cannot make hijrah, he is obligated to attack the enemies of the Islamic State. 
 Along with takfir, wala, and bara, hijrah is among the unique, defining features of 
ISIS. Across the content produced by ISIS hijrah is emphasized as the first duty of all 
Muslims. After first meeting an ISIS recruiter online, an undercover reporter would be 
propositioned to travel to the Islamic State almost immediately (Erelle 2015). Later, the 
recruiter would argue that the reporter’s ostensible religious beliefs demand hijrah. The 
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importance of hijrah is further invested with historical parallels, equating it to the 
historical hijrah of Prophet Muhammed (ISIS 2014b). This original hijrah of the Prophet 
is described by ISIS as the greatest event in the history of Islam (ISIS 2015c). Although 
less frequent than tales of the mujahidin, ISIS does tell tales of glamorizing hijrah. The 
guide to traveling to the Islamic State includes these adventurous and romantic stories of 
hijrah almost as much as it does practical information. 
Hijrah is praiseworthy and obligatory but is also important due to its relationship 
with jihad and the nature of the Western world. According to ISIS, “There is no life 
without Jihad, and there is no Jihad without Hijrah” (ISIS 2014c: 31). The importance of 
hijrah is derived in part from this connection to jihad, which ISIS holds to be the greatest 
act one can engage in. However, hijrah is also important as a means to escape the 
corrupting influence of the West:  
After almost twenty years of living under the persecution of the crusaders and the 
apostates, one could finally live an Islamic life with safety and security. He was 
able to practice his faith in jihād without worry of the kāfir intelligence agencies 
suddenly raiding his home. He could pronounce takfīr of the tawāghīt and the 
murtaddīn without fear of imprisonment. (ISIS 2016: 29).  
Hijrah to the Islamic State provides the first opportunity in a generation to fully practice 
Islam, an impossibility in the West. According to ISIS, Muslims in the West suffer from a 
Strangeness that is inescapable so long as one remains in Darul-Kufr, land of the 
crusaders and non-believers. This Strangeness comes from practicing one’s faith in a land 
where others are worshiping clergy, legislatures, the media, and their own desires. This 
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Strangeness compels the Muslim to search for a land to practice Islam more fully, a 
compulsion that can be satisfied only through hijrah (ISIS 2016). 
In part, this is due to the nature of the West. Living among the disbelievers, the 
kuffar, is corrupting and remaining in the West is described as dangerous to one’s faith or 
the purity of their spirit (ISIS 2014c). According to ISIS, those that live among the 
mushriken (sinners/idolators), frequently used interchangeably with kuffar when 
discussing democracy, nationalism, and tolerance which are viewed as false idols, are 
like them, which is why the Prophet advised leaving these lands (ISIS 2015c). They argue 
that the West is plunged into a spiral of sexual deviance and immorality and disease, one 
sign of its eradication of morals (ISIS 2015d). The harmful effects of the West can be 
seen in the Muslim youth entangled in a life of drugs, alcohol, gangs, promiscuity, and 
other vices (ISIS 2016). Young Muslims must also contend with a school system that 
indoctrinates them with ideas of tolerance and blasphemous holidays such as Christmas, 
Easter, and Halloween (ISIS 2016). These factors erode the purity of Muslim souls, their 
fitrah, that aids him/her in distinguishing the good in the world from the bad, and lead to 
questioning the existence of Allah. 
To escape the dangers posed by the West to a Muslim’s faith, they must make 
hijrah to Darul-Islam, the Islamic State where one can fully practice their religion. ISIS 
frequently touts hijrah to the Islamic State as an easy task, but strongly warns against 
immigrating out of the Islamic State as a dangerous task, both physically and spiritually. 
“[I]t should be known that voluntarily leaving Dārul-Islām for dārul-kufr is a dangerous 
major sin, as it is a passage towards kufr and a gate towards one’s children and 
grandchildren abandoning Islam for Christianity, atheism, or liberalism.” (ISIS 2015: 22). 
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In addition to this spiritual danger, ISIS emphasizes the deaths and injuries incurred by 
those that have attempted to leave the Islamic State, driving the point home with 
photographic evidence of tragically failed escapes from the caliphate. 
4.5.2 Jihad 
 Hijrah is not the only obligation of Muslims, but the first step toward participation 
in jihad and martyrdom: “jihad [is] based upon hijrah [emigration], bay’ah [allegiance], 
sam’ (listening), ta’ah (obedience), and i’dad (training), leading to ribat [patrolling 
outposts] and qital (fighting), then Khilafah or shahadah [martyrdom]”. ISIS conceives of 
jihad as the greatest religious obligation of Muslims, an instrument of change, an 
ameliorating action, a natural compulsion, and the greatest possible deed. Recruiters are 
encouraged to guide potential recruits to a final conclusion that affirms this—"That Jihad 
is the only salvation and solution”. Above all, ISIS emphasizes jihad as an obligation 
mandated by Allah. From an official statement, ISIS implores Muslims, “So where are 
you O Muslim in relation to the command of your Lord, who commanded you to fast in 
one verse, and commanded you with jihād and fighting in dozens of verses?”.  
 For ISIS, jihad is the only means to achieve change, specifically the creation of a 
global caliphate and elimination of non-believers: “The jama’ah [Muslim congregation, 
refers to the followers of ISIS] would use the absent obligation of jihad as its 
fundamental means for change, implementing Allah’s command, {And fight them until 
there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah}” (ISIS 2014b: 35). Jihad is 
not only an instrument of change but a means to alleviate the suffering of Muslims. 
“Jihād not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah [the entire Muslim 
community], it also grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual”, curing worry, 
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sorrow, humiliation and the effects of subjugation to the West (ISIS 2014c: 31). ISIS 
elaborates on the benefits of jihad, describing jihad as a solution to what they refer to as a 
“sentimental death”, a condition of sorrow characterized by a longing to commit jihad. 
This condition inevitably leads to death, either from sorrow at the abandonment of jihad 
or through martyrdom (ISIS 2014c). 
 ISIS valorizes jihad and the mujahidin that undertake it and condemns those that 
avoid or abandon it. Those that avoid jihad are frequently criticized as hypocrites 
(munafiqun). Those that abandon jihad are denounced as fornicators, sodomites, 
drunkards, or effeminate males (ISIS 2015). In contrast, jihad and the mujahidin that 
engage in it, are venerated in the videos and music of ISIS. A refrain from an ISIS 
nasheed, an Islamic sung poem, emphasizes the centrality of jihad: "Clashing of the 
swords: a nasheed of the defiant.\The path of fighting is the path of life.\So amidst an 
assault, tyranny is destroyed.\And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the 
echo”. Another nasheed would similarly emphasize the importance of jihad: “Oh, My 
Brothers, Jihad Is The Way\To Bring Back The Honor Of Our Glorious Days.\The 
Promise Of Allah Will Always Remain\That Fighting For His Sake Is The Ultimate 
Gain”. Jihad is the central behavior to ISIS, and consequently it, and those that engage in 
it, the mujahidin, are celebrated. 
 Although jihad is typically associated primarily with those that engage in 
violence, there are many ways to carry out jihad. Jihad includes contributing wealth, and 
according to ISIS there is no excuse for anyone that has been blessed with wealth not to 
contribute it to jihad, even before all other forms of charity (ISIS 2016e). For the virtual 
mujahidin, the preservation of the virtual caliphate and recruitment would be the paths of 
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jihad. ISIS even provides guidance to how women can support jihad. Although they state 
that women are excused from exercising jihad, the group emphasizes other activities for 
women to wage jihad, including financial support, emotional support for their mujahid 
husbands, facilitating attacks, reproducing, and raising the next generation of mujahidin 
(ISIS 2015). However, jihad is primarily carried out by the mujahidin, and their virtual 
counterparts.  
4.5.3 The Mujahidin and their Virtual Counterparts 
 The mujahidin are highly praised throughout the content related to ISIS. At the 
most basic level, this involves images, videos, and music valorizing the mujahidin that 
are widely shared by sympathizers. Often, this content would emphasize the image of the 
mujahidin as action heroes. Many mujahidin or ISIS supporters would post images of 
themselves dressed as soldiers in order to get noticed and feel important (Erelle 2015). 
An ISIS recruiter would explicitly reference the status conferred by the mujahidin status, 
specifically focusing on the mujahidin as the subject of women’s fantasies and warriors 
of Allah (Erelle 2015). A manual on being a mujahid in the West explicitly describes it as 
operating as a secret agent living a double life and suggests the spy film series The 
Bourne Identity as an educational source for spycraft. The manual proclaims in its 
conclusion, “You are now your own one man army!”. However, the veneration of the 
mujahidin extends beyond this heroic and adventurous image. 
 ISIS describes the mujahidin as paragons of virtue. They are sincere, humble, 
honest, patient, dedicated, generous, valiant, and possess unshakeable resolve. They are 
ultimate soldiers fulfilling the command of Allah. They are recognized and admired for 
these virtues and sacrifices and are memorialized throughout the ISIS content on the 
 
116 
internet. The ISIS magazines frequently feature interviews or memorials to commemorate 
the valor of the mujahidin and convey their adventures and heroic acts. These memorials 
emphasize dedication, generosity, humbleness, a thirst for knowledge, and a refusal to 
permit evil. The advice given to the mujahidin encourages them to live up to this image, 
with sincerity of action being a common piece of advice. According to ISIS, behaving as 
mujahidin should be done not to gain praise or to boast, but to praise Allah and practice 
Islam alone.  
The group would also emphasize the importance of sacrifice and martyrdom in its 
discussion of jihad and being mujahidin. From a manual on being a mujahid in the West:  
We ask Him to honor us with the reward of martyrdom for His sake…There is no 
doubt that martyrdom for the sake of Allah is a great honor, a blessed rank, a 
noble blessing from Allah…They had forgotten that the tree of this Ummah is not 
watered except by the blood of its martyrs (ISIS 2016: 38).  
Sacrifice would be praised by ISIS, as in the case of the San Bernardino shooters, who 
were valorized for their willingness to sacrifice everything for Allah, including a life with 
their child. 
 The fighters in Iraq and Syria, and the attackers in countries around the world, are 
not the only claimants of the mujahidin title within ISIS. The virtual mujahidin comprise 
the majority of efforts by ISIS online and encompass many more behaviors than 
physically fighting. The virtual mujahidin primarily serve a supportive function. One 
media center would state: 
It is about time that we realized that our brothers need our help. And that help is 
not always by money or bodies, sometimes it is by our tongues and words, 
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helping them, standing by them, praying for them and refuting the distortions 
against them.  
Virtual mujahidin are central to the spread of ISIS propaganda and its recruitment efforts, 
maintaining the presence of ISIS content online and forming a community to facilitate 
recruitment. I<3IslamicState would be supportive in her writing to fellow or aspiring 
supporters. From her guide: “how eat a elephant?! its easy step by step! dont get yourself 
too tired and always have rest and fun for yourself to be dont tired and enjoy your 
jihading!...and i pray for you to be in health and happy and i dream bests for islamic state 
and you... i will see you in janah! inshalla...”. 
 Among the virtual mujahid’s central roles is in organizing bay’at (pledges of 
allegiance) to the Islamic State and publicizing them in order to demonstrate Muslims’ 
loyalty to each other and agonize the kuffar (non-believers). A manual to guide in this 
effort further emphasizes the value of the act of recruitment, stating that dawah purifies 
the soul and is a requirement to spiritual success. In addition to this primary purpose, the 
virtual mujahid should spread ISIS publications and literature. I<3ISIS, a virtual mujahid, 
would explicitly describe the job of the virtual mujahid in a short, personal guide:  
ok if you dont want to go in islamic state you can help is from your location! if 
you just share islamic state propaganda videos you do a big help for islamic state! 
or make a your own weblog/website and then share your posts that may help 
islamic state!  
The various manuals produced by ISIS provide an array of ways to facilitate this, from 
advising how to find new accounts after the old accounts were blocked, or how content 
will be reposted after being taken down. ISIS encourages the virtual mujahid to take part 
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in this, instructing them on how to continually upload and share its materials, and the 
virtual mujahidin also produce their own content to augment the official materials. 
A virtual mujahid, RealDealISIL, would focus instead on perpetuating the values 
of the group by distinguishing between the real and fake mujahidin online. According to 
RealDealISIL, real mujahidin espouse enthusiasm, purpose, sincerity and sacrifice. He 
primarily criticizes users on online forums that are performatively vocal in their desire to 
fight for ISIS.  
A real mujahid doesnt ever disclose his intention to anyone even to his own 
family rather he maintains high level secrecy and keeps his intention between him 
and Allah swt until he insha allah gets to the battlefield or dies on the way getting 
there what he does not do is shout out loud his intention or tell anyone…A fake 
mujahid is one who is needlessly shouting his mouth off and saying he wants to 
join the mujahidin or he openly says to go and fight.  
In addition to producing their own content and sharing the original format of official ISIS 
documents, virtual mujahidin would also reproduce the official sources in different 
formats. An analysis of the media war against ISIS would be copied and posted as a 
webpage article on the now defunct ‘Islamic State Times’. Various articles from the 
official magazines would be copied into text sharing platforms or forums. Highlighting 
the use of diverse platforms, at least one document would be found in slideshow format 
on Slideshare, a knowledge sharing platform oriented around slide show presentations. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 This virtual ethnography has examined the online presence of ISIS online over the 
course of 2018 and 2019. ISIS’s magazines, manuals, videos, and followers are still 
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present across many platforms to varying degrees despite the group largely moving to 
mobile communication apps since its purge from the most popular platforms online. ISIS 
builds off of broad concerns about the injustices and violence against Muslims around the 
world and the religion of Islam but distinguishes itself through its conception of wala and 
bara, takfir, hijrah, and Sharī’ah. As a result of this unique interpretation of Islam, ISIS 
has placed itself at odds with the overwhelming majority of the Muslim community, 
including jihadists and their supporters, but the group has used religious justifications and 
the caliphate as manifest evidence of its legitimacy as the leader of the Muslim world. 
These justifications, the group’s attacks on its ideological competitors, and its online 
propagandists, the virtual mujahidin, allowed ISIS to thrive online.  
4.4.1 ISIS: An Islamic Aberration 
 ISIS overlaps with a much larger general social movement, involving many 
distinct variations including other jihadist groups and non-violent Islamic movements. 
The common aspects of these movements are the shared dimensions of their collective 
action frame, specifically the injustices facing Muslims and the responsible parties. These 
movements diverge in the details of their collective action frames, particularly in their 
call to action. This distinction is largest between the non-violent and jihadist groups 
regarding the role of violence in attaining social change. However, in addition to these 
differences in framing, ISIS distinguishes itself from other social movements in its 
peculiar interpretation of Islam. 
 Collective action frames focus on the construction of meanings that orient a social 
movement by diagnosing a problem in society, attributing blame for that negative 
condition, and providing solutions to that problem, calling on people to support the 
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collective action. Prior research on the Dabiq magazine has focused on its role in 
framing, also acknowledging that it includes a significant amount of content that is better 
understood through the lens of subculture theory (Andersen and Sandberg 2018). 
Andersen and Sandberg (2018) focus on the subcultural style presented in Dabiq, 
specifically focusing on the representations of the mujahidin, celebration of violence, and 
jihad as a solution to feelings of alienation among Muslims in the West. However, the 
collective action frame of ISIS is a derivation of prior jihadist and non-violent Islamic 
activists, and the unique aspects of ISIS’s collective action frame are based on subcultural 
beliefs, values, and norms that extend beyond the style of the group.  
 Many aspects of ISIS’s collective action frame overlaps with other jihadist groups 
and non-violent Islamic activists. Criticism of civilian deaths caused by the wars in the 
Middle East and problems of prejudice and discrimination in the West are widely 
discussed by non-violent Muslim communities. Furthermore, this includes a critique of 
the Western double-standard regarding human life, wherein the deaths of Westerners or 
victims of the Islamic State are prioritized over the far more numerous Muslim deaths 
through collateral damage from the War on Terror. Similarly, the US and Arabic 
governments are often blamed for these problems. A focus on the injustices against 
Muslims globally and holding US and Arabic governments responsible is not unique to 
ISIS and other jihadist groups. ISIS and other jihadist groups distinguish themselves in 
their solution to address these problems, arguing for violence as the means for social 
change.  
 ISIS’s conception of wala, bara, takfir, and hijrah further distinguish the group 
from other jihadist organizations. This is most clear in the near universal condemnation 
 
121 
of ISIS as khawarij because of the practice of takfir. Takfir, however, is derived partially 
from the group’s interpretation of wala and bara. ISIS has interpreted and formulated 
them into an extreme form of an us versus them mentality, proclaiming the deepest love 
for all those inside the group who practice Islam according to ISIS’s interpretation and 
demanding an equally deep hatred for everyone else. Takfir extends this hatred to other 
Muslims, by revoking their Muslim status and declaring them non-believers alongside the 
West. Hijrah is similarly embedded in ISIS’s bifurcated worldview of a pure Islamic 
State and the corrupting world outside of it. The result of this depiction of the world 
demands hijrah by necessity, in addition to its nature as a religious obligation, to escape 
from the damage life among non-believers causes to one’s faith and fitrah, one’s human 
nature that distinguishes good and evil, right from wrong. The establishment of the 
Khilafah, wala, bara, hijrah, and takfir are the aspects of ISIS that defines the group and 
sets it apart from other jihadist groups, and these are core cultural aspects unique to it.  
 ISIS believes in the dangers inherent in living in the West or Muslim nations 
where Sharī’ah is not implemented. The group believes that the Khilafah is the only place 
to truly worship Islam, that it is a central part of the coming apocalypse, and that modern 
concepts of nationality, democracy, capitalism, and legislation are blasphemous idols. 
The understanding of the world based on these beliefs is an affront to the values shared 
by ISIS members and supporters, values of Sharī’ah and the practice of Islam and the 
dream of a caliphate where Islam is practiced freely and fully. Valuing a religious life 
lived through Sharī’ah adds greater significance to the norms, or obligations in their 
terms, of the group—to pledge bay’ah, make hijrah, wage jihad, and declare takfir. The 
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normative aspect of ISIS is highlighted by the social control function of takfir, the strict 
observation of Islamic norms and absolute punishments for deviance.  
4.4.2 Legitimacy and Group Boundaries 
 While the doctrine of ISIS comprises the greatest portion of ISIS’s produced 
materials, a significant amount of effort is also dedicated to policing the boundaries of the 
group, defending its legitimacy, and undermining the legitimacy of its opposition. These 
materials have significant implications for both, the framing of ISIS and its subcultural 
aspects. The mujahidin are encouraged to be sincere in their actions, acting based on their 
religious principles rather than to attain status or praise. With this encouragement, the 
group also chastises those that loudly proclaim their intents, or brag about making hijrah 
or jihad. ISIS frequently emphasizes its claims of legitimacy as the true caliphate, using 
religious precedent to substantiate its position as the true purveyors of Islam. This is 
intimately connected to the group’s efforts to undermine those that attack its legitimacy, 
particularly the sorcerous media and misleading scholars. This is in addition to attacking 
the credibility of competing jihadist groups that may siphon followers from the group.  
Within the group, these boundaries are policed regarding participants behavior 
and sincerity, clarifying the true mujahidin from posers. Online, this distinction is 
emphasized regarding public displays of support or proclamations of intent to make 
hijrah or carry out terror attacks. It would similarly be policed by other virtual mujahidin 
and in the writings of ISIS. This revolves around the motivation ISIS values and 
demands, religious sincerity and humbleness. Followers of ISIS are implored to keep 
their intentions secret, between themselves and Allah, and emphasizing the deed as far 
more important than mere words. Even those that do accomplish the valued hijrah and 
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violence are encouraged not to become braggadocious, since these actions should be done 
as a part of a Muslim’s religious practice, and not for praise or status. This emphasis on 
sincerity in action through secrecy is characteristic of the value and normative nature of 
the obligations the group imposes but may also be a strategic decision. Those that 
actively discuss their plans online are more likely to be apprehended before they 
successfully travel to the Islamic State or carry out a terrorist attack.  
ISIS’s attacks on media coverage and dissenting Islamic scholars are essential to 
its claims of legitimacy. These claims primarily derive from the establishment of the 
caliphate, the implementation of Sharī’ah, the interpretation of religious texts, and the 
declarations of allegiance from individuals and groups. The establishment of the caliphate 
is supported with news about the programs and services provided by the Islamic State to 
substantiate its claim of implementing Sharī’ah. Further evidence of the implementation 
of Sharī’ah includes the declarations of takfir and accounts of the mujahidin and jihadist 
groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Frequently these accounts attest to the 
complete observance of Sharī’ah within the Islamic State as their reason for joining the 
group, sometimes leaving other jihadist groups. The declarations of allegiance that these 
individuals and groups make are often featured in the official magazines to support the 
ISIS’s demand that all Muslims unify under the Islamic State. The cornerstone of this 
support is the interpretation and implementation of Sharī’ah, necessitating the lengthy 
religious justifications for all of ISIS’s behaviors.  
The significance of Sharī’ah to the legitimacy of ISIS and the Islamic State makes 
religious criticisms the most dangerous threat to the group. This may be the reason for the 
extensive focus on attacking the Islamic scholars as unnecessary and disruptive to Islam. 
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Scholars are presented as unnecessary, since the Quran is an explicit and comprehensive 
guide to every aspect of life. They are also dangerous, since they can mislead Muslims 
away from their religion. This has resulted in an explicit call for the assassination of 
religious scholars and leaders in the West that present Islam as a religion of peace. More 
often, ISIS simply presents extensive arguments refuting interpretations of Islam counter 
to their own, interpretations that would undermine the Islamic State’s claim of leadership 
over the Muslim world. 
If scholars attack the basis of legitimacy for the Islamic State, the media attacks 
the proof the Islamic State is legitimate. ISIS focuses on the depictions of its strength 
relative to its opponents, arguing that the media presents the mujahidin as far weaker than 
they truly are and the West as far stronger. This directly contributes to perceptions of the 
possible success of the group. Similarly, the group claims the media is misleading in 
presenting the Islamic State as bloodthirsty murderers of Muslims, which the group 
counters with accounts of Muslims happily surprised by the group’s virtues. Oddly, this 
is a somewhat inconsistent position even within the ISIS materials, since the group is 
proud of the executions it has carried out in the practice of takfir. Discrediting the media 
and encouraging followers to only trust the virtual mujahidin and official ISIS releases 
inoculates followers from coverage that would question those manifest signs of the 
Islamic State’s legitimacy, such as the success of their governance and services, military 
might, and treatment of Muslims.  
Sharī’ah and takfir are also the basis for discrediting competing jihadist groups. 
At times, these are equated with opposing the Islamic State, or even not actively 
supporting it by pledging bay’ah to the group. This is accomplished by first establishing 
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the Islamic State’s implementation of Sharī’ah, then equating the Islamic State with 
Sharī’ah, and concludes with labeling ISIS’s opposition as opposing Sharī’ah. This is 
further substantiated by accounts and descriptions of competing jihadist groups and their 
leaders as not fully practicing Sharī’ah in their jihad or implementing Sharī’ah where 
they have territorial control. A thorough examination of other jihadist groups can 
establish the degree to which prior jihadist groups have policed these boundaries to 
determine the role of ISIS’s framing of opposition in the group’s success. Specifically, 
this strategy takes advantage of the increased potential for confirmation bias possible 
through the internet by preemptively interpreting the competing messages that one will be 
exposed to through online navigation. 
4.4.3 Virtual Communities, Geographies, and Demographies 
 Discrediting and undermining oppositional groups may have a significant role in 
the success of ISIS, and it should be understood in the context of how these efforts are 
facilitated by the ISIS’s virtual campaign. At its height, the virtual caliphate was unique 
in the broad net that it cast for supporters, with a large presence on the dominant social 
media platforms and even, reportedly, a presence on dating sites and gaming platforms. 
ISIS is a lesson on the abolishment of geographic and social limitations for recruitment to 
social movements and other collectivities. In its decline, the virtual caliphate illustrates a 
different lesson, the difficulty in fully eliminating an entrenched community online. 
Despite widespread policing, ISIS materials and accounts still exist across numerous 
diverse platforms, and the greatest current barrier to accessing these materials is merely 
the knowledge of what to look for and where to find it.  
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This is the consequence of the virtual mujahidin and their role in propagating the 
virtual caliphate. Although the virtual mujahidin are not as central to the group as the 
mujahidin that carry out terror attacks or travel to the Islamic State for combat, they are 
significant for their role in attracting followers that do engage in violence. This is 
accomplished through the continual maintenance of ISIS materials online in various 
forms, from the most sensitive materials involving bomb making to the images valorizing 
the mujahidin and jihad. Harnessing these supporters and providing them with materials 
to distribute is likely the greatest reason for ISIS’s success online, and this is likely to 
emerge as a growing role within social movements well into the future.  
Essential to understanding the role of the virtual mujahidin in the broad exposure 
to ISIS propaganda is an understanding of the internet as a virtual space, comprised of 
platforms akin to the scenes of prior subcultures and a geography dictated not by space, 
but by the conditions that modify navigation to internet content. Internet platforms, 
particularly social media and content sharing websites, provide areas for niches 
supportive of extremist groups like ISIS to grow and gain exposure to non-followers. 
Removal from these sites, or impeding their visibility, does not necessarily suffocate a 
movement, since the search functions available online allow people to quickly find others 
of similar mindsets using a shared terminology. As a result, understanding collectivities 
like ISIS online requires an understanding not only of the destination locations, the 
internet platforms, but the search engines that structure the discovery of those locations. 
Different search engines lead to different paths toward this content, and this becomes 
even more relevant when considering the suggested content that platforms automatically 
recommend, which can lead to exposure to extremist content independent of traditional 
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social ties. These mechanical ties, connections between individuals and content generated 
by computer algorithms, have a secondary consequence to this exposure to possible 
extremist content, namely a broader exposure to dissenting views.  
 It was impossible to search for ISIS related content without coming into contact 
with a range of other communities and their content online. This ranged from the 
unrelated discussions of the Dajjal on a website discussing Islamic mysticism to an 
independent, national jihadist group to the oppositional groups condemning takfir. The 
ubiquitous nature of competing viewpoints was best illustrated in searching platforms, 
such as Twitter, by ISIS related hashtags and the dominantly anti-ISIS results they 
produce. Above, the interconnectivity of individuals through these platforms was 
described as a means of exposure, but this same interconnectivity produces a situation 
wherein there are few areas completely insulated from competing related, neutral, or 
oppositional actors and content. This highlights the importance of ISIS’s efforts to 
discredit those opposing the group by preemptively undermining them, describing them 
as the sorcerous media, misleading scholars, or apostate Muslims. It also highlights how 
those oppositional sources can be harnessed for additional support, as illustrated by the 
extreme cases of prejudice and hatred against Muslims observed here that confirm ISIS’s 




HISTORY ECHOES:  
ANARCHIST, ANTICOLONIAL, AND NEW LEFT TERRORISM
The virtual ethnography of ISIS provides a contemporary account of the group’s 
online activities. However, it is unclear to what degree ISIS is similar to other terrorist 
groups, and, more importantly, how the group’s use of the internet differs role of the 
mass media in the spread of prior international waves of terrorism. In order to expand 
these findings from the virtual ethnography, a comparative-historical analysis is 
undertaken to examine prior terrorist groups. Establishing the similarities between ISIS 
and prior terrorist groups allows for an informed examination of the differences in the 
spread of terrorist groups through the mass media examined in greater detail in Chapter 
Six. 
This comparative-historical analysis has examined terrorist groups that were part 
of the first three historical waves of terrorism to determine the applicability of subculture 
theory to terrorism, and to provide necessary context to the virtual ethnography of ISIS. 
The first part of these results examines the dominant themes that emerged in this review 
of groups, as well as a focus on those aspects that have been previously theorized to be 
relevant to the development of terrorism. These findings have supported the relevance of 
the dominant perspectives on terrorism and provide insights into the process through 
which grievances and negative social conditions contribute to terrorism as well as how 
terrorists act as rational actors. However, the subculture theory explanation of terrorism is 
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particularly supported by these results, with groups across countries and waves exhibiting 
unique identities that promote violence, diffusion across a social network with varying 
levels of commitment, and the role of cultural values in mediating the dominant 
explanations of terrorism, grievances and rational choice.  
 There are several limitations to these observations. First and foremost, the data 
collected here is limited to the historical record and those records that are in English. As a 
result, the amount of information available is influenced by the interest and level of 
commentary that surrounds a group. Germany’s Red Army Faction [RAF], for instance, 
has provoked a significant body of literature, and as a result there are significantly more 
details available for this group than others. Secondarily, the older waves of terrorism 
consequently have fewer direct records and surviving accounts when compared to their 
more contemporaneous counterparts. Finally, there are significant political differences in 
the interpretation of different acts as terrorism. Anti-colonial struggles have tended to 
incorporate terrorist groups into their national narrative, and as a result there is less focus 
on these groups with the politically charged label of ‘terrorist’. This is a potential point of 
concern as there are fewer recorded anti-colonial and national-separatist groups observed 
here than in other waves. However, this is consistent with the work of Sedgwick (2007) 
on the foreign influence in the spread of terrorism, who noted relatively little terrorist 
activity between 1920 and 1960. 
 The findings of this research have been divided between the fundamental 
characteristics of the terrorist groups, observations related to the grievance and strain 
theories, observations related to the rational choice theories, and those related to a 
subcultural explanation of terrorism. Notably, themes and consistent observations from 
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these categories could be placed in other categories as well. Repression and political 
disenfranchisement are important to both, the grievance and rational choice explanations 
of terrorism. Similarly, tactics and strategy could be equally appropriate in the 
fundamental characteristics of terrorism as well as the rational choice observations. In the 
final analysis, these factors are examined in conjunction, but for the purposes of structure 
they are presented here with the categories for which they are most relevant.  
 This chapter first discusses the fundamental characteristics of terrorist groups; the 
demographic characteristics of terrorist groups, their origins in social movements and 
form, and their tactics and strategies. Second, the grievances and strains related to 
motivating the creation of terrorist groups are examined, particularly the difference 
between directly experienced and vicarious strains, the relevance of global strains to the 
terrorist wave phenomenon, and the importance of understanding the perception of strains 
and grievances. Third, the factors relevant to rational choice theories are discussed, 
examining groups’ perceptions of alternative options, the achievability of their goals, and 
the role of repression in the adoption of terrorism. Finally, the major themes relevant to a 
subcultural explanation of terrorism are discussed, specifically the identity component of 
terrorism, the construction of terrorists’ morality, and the normative and valued aspects of 
violence as a behavior, independent of tactical or strategic benefits. In the conclusion, 
these findings are evaluated as a whole and how their support adopting subculture theory 
as an explanation of terrorism.  
5.1 FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM 
 This study of groups across the international waves of terrorism has reaffirmed 
and further clarified many of the fundamental characteristics of terrorism. These include 
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the lack of a consistent profile of a terrorist, the origins of terrorism in social movements 
and their various forms, and the diversity of tactics and strategies used by terrorist 
groups. Consistent with prior research, this study found that terrorists come from various 
social classes, genders, religions, and nationalities (Smith 1994; Victoroff 2005). 
Reaffirming the basic assumption of the rational actor perspectives on terrorism, all 
terrorist groups studied here were found to develop out of larger social movements 
(Alimi 2011; Oberschall 2004; Beck 2008; Brents and Mshigeni 2004). In addition to 
this, the large variability in the structure and characteristics of terrorist groups and their 
frequent cooccurrence with other groups and organizations suggests that terrorism should 
be studied as movements comprised of individuals, groups, and organizations.  
5.1.1 Individuals and a profile 
 Consistent with previous research, this review of terrorist groups within the first 
three major waves of terrorism illustrates the lack of evidence for any terrorist profile 
(Victoroff 2005). The terrorist groups reviewed here tend to be largely homogenous in 
their memberships, but there is a great deal of diversity across groups. Specifically, 
groups tend to coalesce around a particular socioeconomic, religious, or other social 
demographic, but this demographic changes across groups. Groups studied here come 
from various socioeconomic classes, from the impoverished to the lesser nobility, various 
religions and nationalities, and include women to varying degrees.  
The Russian Populist and Nihilist groups drew heavily from students, the petit 
bourgeois, and minor nobility (Burleigh 2010; Carr 2006). The global anarchist 
movement was popular among the working class, and the individual terrorist attacks 
came from this demographic (Kemp 2018). Despite common descriptions otherwise, the 
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IRA was described by a British official as free of ruffians, made up of young men 
without criminal records acting under military orders (Carr 2006). Other nationalist 
groups would draw from universities and other classes in society. Groups apart of the 
New Left wave in the western democracies and Japan were comprised mainly of 
university students but had a larger working class membership in South America.  
 Although groups comprised of students and intellectuals are overrepresented 
within this sample, these groups draw from populations across the class hierarchy, with 
the exception of societal elites. Kikuyu peasants and farmers were among the Kenyan 
nationalist groups (Carr 2006). The Shining Path in Peru would be started and led by 
university intellectuals, but the majority of members were poor (Starn 2019). Educated 
middle classes were the leaders of Bengali nationalists (Silvestri 2000), Kenyan armed 
groups, and the Argentinian ERP (Carr 2006). Although there is a consistent presence of 
educated middle classes, and students or intellectuals specifically, among terrorist groups, 
they are not the exclusive proponents of terroristic violence.  
 No religion has a monopoly on terroristic violence. A small selection illustrates 
the religious diversity of terrorism, with Hinduism among Bengali revolutionaries (Heehs 
1994), Islam and Hindusim in the HRA (Gupta 1997), Catholics in the Shirtless 
Commando (Comando Descamisados) (Moyano 1995) and Montoneros (Carr 2006),  
Judaism in the Terrorist Fraction of the People’s Will, Zealots, and Irgun (Burleigh 
2010), and Islam among the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale [FLN] (Revere 
1973). The first-generation IRA would be comprised primarily of young, single Catholic 
males from urban backgrounds and educated by Christian brothers (Burleigh 2010). The 
role of religion on terrorism is perhaps best illustrated through the case of the Basque 
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Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA]. Members where introduced to politics through church run 
scout groups, religious pilgrimages or hiking trips, and other locations where the native 
but criminalized Basque language could be spoken freely (Carr 2006). Religion’s role in 
terrorism may be less directly inspirational than the role it serves as an institution in 
society that facilitates the development of communities of people sharing similar issues.  
 Although the majority of terrorists are male, the involvement of women in 
terrorism appears to be determined more by the gender norms of the society or group than 
women’s propensity for terrorism. Women have been involved in terrorism as active 
participants and support roles. Cumann na mBann was a women’s organization that 
provided vital intelligence, nursing, and material support to the IRA (Burleigh 2010). In 
the FLN, a female bomb squad would be made up of university graduates (Carr 2006). 
These women were strategically chosen for the squad on the basis of attractiveness and 
westernized appearance that would allow them to bypass checkpoints more easily (Carr 
2006). The RAF’s organizational structure involved a dual leadership structure, with a 
male and female co-leaders (Aust 2009). Although there is frequently a gendered division 
of labor across terrorist groups and their supporters, women proven to be just as capable 
of terroristic violence. The major factor in their participation appears to be primarily the 
groups’ gender norms.  
The impact of these demographic characteristics may be less directly influential 
on an individual’s adoption of terrorism than indirect, by structuring their experience of 
grievances and connections to other people that may adopt terrorism. This indirect link 
can lead to any grouping producing a terrorist group, including at least one organization 
emerging among mental patients in group therapy run by a psychiatrist that believed all 
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mental illness was caused by capitalism (Socialist Patients Collective [SPK]) (Carr 2006). 
This is further substantiated by the internal homogeneity of groups and diversity across 
national movements, such as the SPK above, or dominantly Jewish anarchist groups in 
Russia, Chernoye Znamya (The Black Flag) and the Terrorist Fraction of the People’s 
Will (Burleigh 2010; Chaliand and Blin 2007). These demographic factors may not be 
direct factors in the adoption of terrorism, but rather dimensions along which people 
congregate, associate, or experience strains or grievances.  
5.1.2 Social Movements and Terrorism 
 This review of terrorist groups substantiates the assumption of rational choice 
theories that terrorism is a behavior that occurs in the course of a social movement and 
extends this assumption by providing support for the analysis of terrorism as movements 
rather than individuals, groups, or organizations. Every individual, group and 
organization reviewed here emerged out of a larger social movement. Notably, the 
entirety of the parent movement does not adopt terrorism, and terrorists vary in their 
continued use of alternative means. In addition to emerging out of social movements, 
terrorism to be more appropriately classified as a form of social movement than a 
behavior of specific individuals, groups, or organizations. This is due to the frequent 
presence of sympathizers and support groups in addition to terrorist groups, as well as the 
consistent observation of multiple groups and organizations operating for similar causes 
and with overlapping or fluid memberships within national campaigns.  
 Not all terrorist groups emerge similarly from social movements. Terrorist groups 
emerge from three sources, the relationships that comprise the social network of the 
movement, social movement organizations, and prior terrorist groups or organizations. 
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RAF members would first become exposed to Marx and Lenin through their involvement 
in the larger New Left movement (Carr 2006; Colvin 2009). Lehi would secede from Ha-
Irgun Ha-Tzevai Ha-Leumi [IZL] due to the group’s belief that the British should be 
given no respite while fighting the Nazis (Getter 1980). In India, many members of 
Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh [RSS] were defectors from Gandhi’s nonviolent social 
movement (Chaliand and Blin 2007). Furthermore, this supports a modification to the 
explanations of terrorism that view it as a direct product of individual characteristics or 
strains/grievances. Without controlling for the involvement of individuals from these 
demographics in social movements it is impossible to determine if these demographics 
explain involvement in terrorism, or prior involvement in the social movements that give 
rise to terrorism. 
 Several groups developed as armed wings within traditional political parties and 
social movement organizations. The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries [SRs] in Russia 
would establish the SR Combat Organization (Burleigh 2010). Fatah would similarly 
form a specific military wing, al-Asifah, despite being widely regarded as a terrorist 
organization as a whole (Carr 2006). Groups that develop as formal armed wings within 
their political parties were relatively rare compared to those that developed through splits 
with political parties or social movement organizations or through the connections of 
people involved in those movements or organizations.  
 Many groups would begin through splitting with parent organizations and parties 
as a result of their advocacy for violence. Narodnya Volya would split from the second 
Zemlya I Volya over the decision to adopt violence. Subsequent organizations would 
follow this pattern set by their predecessors when the Union of Socialist Revolutionaries-
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Maximalists would break away from the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries when the 
latter renounced violence (Burleigh 2010). Other groups that originate as break away 
groups of larger political and social movement organizations include the Action for 
National Liberation [ALN] group in Brazil, Japanese United Red Army [URA], and 
ETA. The major implication of this observation is that terrorism does not emerge from a 
vacuum. The characteristics of the social movement, including its size, level of 
organization, and ideological frame, structure the qualities of the terrorist groups that 
emerge from it.  
 In addition to recognizing social movements as the origin point for terrorism, a 
variety of forms of terrorism as a behavior have been observed. Specifically, terrorism 
has existed as a behavior undertaken by an organization, groups, individuals, and as 
movements. This observation is significant because it addresses the assumptions of some 
theories that explain terrorism in the context of only one of these forms, particularly 
organizations. 
 It is common to study terrorism as a behavior or strategy of organizations (Park 
and Sitter 2016). In developing an overarching theory of collective violence, (Roche 
1996) argues that terrorism is characterized by a greater degree of organization that 
comes from long running grievances. Several cases within this study exhibit the high 
degree of organization that some terrorist entities possess. The IRA and Provisional IRA 
[pIRA] are perhaps the quintessential examples of terrorist organizations. Several 
terrorist groups develop out of organizations, either as a result of breakaway 
organizations or established military wings or organizations. Although the largest and 
 
137 
most dangerous terrorist entities are formal organizations, terrorism is not a behavior 
unique to organizations. 
Smaller but more numerous, there are also many terrorist groups that lack the 
formal organizational structure of their larger counterparts. The Black Liberation Army 
[BLA], Symbionese Liberation Army [SLA], and Weather Underground were all a part 
of the larger New Left movement in the US, and even within these groups there was no 
centralized organization or chain of command (Roseneau 2013). In Germany, the youth 
counterculture movement would produce the RAF, Tupamaros West Berlin, Roaming 
Hash Rebels, Mescaleros, SPK, Holgier Meins Commandos, and Black Front (Carr 
2006). The revolutionary left in Italy would similarly produce an array of groups with 
fluid and overlapping memberships, including the BR, Senza Tregua, Prima Linea, 
Autonomia, and Armed Proletarian Nuclei (Carr 2006). 
 The individual terrorist, or “lone wolf”, is much more rare in the history of 
terrorism. In a review of the first three waves of terrorism, individual terrorists are only 
represented during the anarchist period. However, it is misleading to view individual 
terrorists in isolation from their larger context. Although Ravachol, Valliant, and Henry 
would take a central place in the history of anarchist terrorism in France, they made up a 
small portion of a wave of anarchist bombings (Shaya 2010). All of these cases occurred 
within the context of the larger anarchist movement that these individuals were a part of, 
even though their terrorist acts were accomplished independently, albeit with the help of 
supporters at times. France was not unique, and despite drawing inspiration from 
Narodnya Volya most anarchist attacks were carried out by individuals (Carr 2006; Kemp 
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2018). To ascribe an individual level explanation of terrorism to them ignores this larger 
milieu that involved numerous other attackers, as well as groups that supported them.   
 The most appropriate way to explain terrorism is as a distinct form of social 
movement. This is because terrorist movements often distinguish themselves from the 
originating social movement, and because terrorist organizations, groups, and individuals 
rarely appear to occur in isolation. The anarchist and New Left waves were apart of 
international movements, and participants within these movements often explicitly 
referenced and supported each other. The anarchist wave was characterized by individual 
and group attacks, all attacking independently but within the context of the same 
movement. Within countries, there are often many more groups than are recorded or 
remembered that share membership, pursue similar agendas, or cooperate. This position 
is not without precedent, as the Mau Mau of Kenya have been described as lacking any 
formal grouping or organization, but as a fight among various groups (Carr 2006). 
Furthermore, this approach allows for the incorporation of the financial, tactical, and 
other support that groups often receive from the larger movement. For example, the Mau 
Mau had an extensive support network that facilitated the hiding of wanted members 
(Carr 2006). 
In addition to the internal lack of organization among some groups and the 
broader community that supports groups, there is are frequently many groups and 
organizations operating within nations pursuing similar goals. Between 1903-1907, the 
Russian Anarchist movement would involve many different groups, such as Borba 
(Struggle), Bezmotivniki (without motive) and Chernoye Znamya (The Black Flag) 
despite the frequent focus on Narodnya Volya as the major Russian anarchist group 
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(Chaliand and Blin 2007). France in the 1880s was home to many progressive and 
revolutionary groups that were poorly documented (Kemp 2018). The Young Bosnia 
movement included a collection of groups directly engaged in violence or providing 
support to those groups, including The Black Hand (aka Union or Death), Preporod 
(Rebirth), and Death or Life (Jackson 2006). The BLA was described as less of an 
organized group and more as a concept; any group that espoused its philosophy and 
engaged in guerilla warfare was a part of the BLA (Roseneau 2013). In Argentina, the 
Montoneros would be remembered as the dominant terrorist group but was one of nine 
other major groups that were interrelated through cooperation, mergers, and splinter 
groups (Moyano 1995). Many Palestinian organizations exist alongside Fatah and the 
PFLP (Carr 2006). The Italian and German groups discussed above similarly reflect this 
pattern of multiple groups and organizations using terrorism in pursuit of similar ends. 
Expanding on the Italian experience, a detailed study of Italian terrorism for the senate 
found roughly 250 communist groups or subversive formations between 1968 and 1982, 
and these are among many other anarchist, ecological, and right wing groups (Piscano 
1984). Despite this plethora of groups, the historical accounts of New Left terrorism in 
Italy is almost wholly focused on the Red Brigades (BR). Compounding the difficulties in 
studying terrorism in a group or organizational context is the fluid and overlapping 
memberships to these various groups (Carr 2006).  
5.2 GRIEVANCES AND STRAINS 
 Consistent with prior research, this study found that grievances were central to the 
development of terrorist campaigns, and that this effect was inconsistent across groups. 
Although all groups are related to some form of grievance or strain, these vary in degree 
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of severity and whether or not terrorists experience these strains directly. Of particular 
interest here are those strains that are global in nature, arising from international relations 
or historical developments, so as to distinguish their influence from the international 
diffusion of terrorism. There is reason to view each wave of terrorism in the context of a 
global or historical strain that impacted many societies around the world. These global 
and historical strains serve to highlight the inconsistency that is the varying magnitude of 
strains that produce terrorism worldwide and the importance of accounting for the 
perception or framing of those strains and grievances.   
5.2.1 Objective and Vicarious Strains 
 This study found that terrorist groups were consistently directly related to some 
form of grievance or strain. However, this characteristic is highly variable, encompassing 
different types of grievances of different magnitudes, as well as varying in relation to 
whether or not members of terrorist groups directly experienced it. Poverty, 
discrimination, political disenfranchisement, human rights abuses, and colonialization are 
all invoked as the cause of specific terrorist movements around the world throughout 
history. Who adopts terrorism as a result of these strains includes the populations 
experiencing them, university intellectuals in the same society, as well as people across 
the globe in different societies. More important than the specific strains and their 
magnitude appear to be the degree to which they are the focus of social movements and 
collective action frames.  
 Consistent with the strain and grievance explanations of terrorism, the largest 
terrorist groups and organizations emerge out of negative social conditions including 
poverty, discrimination, repression, and political disenfranchisement. The IRB would 
 
141 
take up arms in response to being required by Britain to export food while Ireland was 
experiencing a famine (Nasser 2005). The IRA would continue this armed struggle in 
trying to address discrimination in Ireland (Nasser 2005). The FLN would develop out of 
conditions of rapid modernization and an economic crisis (Revere 1973). The rapid 
decline of the country’s economy and human rights abuses motivated the Tupamaros 
(Paul et. al. 2013). The pauperization of the middle class has been connected to the rise of 
militant groups in Argentina (Carr 2006, Moyano 1995). In Italy, the BR and similar 
groups would develop in the context of a rapidly changing society due to modernization 
and industrialization (Orsini 2011). Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] would 
develop in the context of discrimination against the Tamil minority, including their 
exclusion in language and religion, limitations on university acceptance, and the denial of 
citizenship (Yasas 2014). 
 The Mau Mau in Kenya would be motivated by racial discrimination, 
colonization, and repression (Carr 2006). This struggle would be continued by the 
Kikuyu Central Association [KAU] and Land and Freedom Army years later in response 
to historical grievances and the political and economic domination of the colony (Carr 
2006). The ETA would form in response to the criminalization and repression of their 
Basque cultural identity (Carr 2006). Other groups emerging in response to occupation 
and colonization include the IRA, pIRA, al-Fatah and PFLP in Palestine, Algerian FLN, 
EOKA in Cyprus (Carr 2006). Breton nationalist groups would form in France out of 
concerns over prejudice, repression of ethnic identity, and a perceived loss of culture, as 
well as economic exploitation and internal colonization (Duerr 2015). 
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There is a sizable portion of the groups and movements reviewed here that are 
motivated primarily by strains experienced by others. This does not wholly characterize 
any wave, being present during the anarchist wave, the New Left, and in conjunction with 
objective strains. Identification with victims has been included among the risk factors for 
engaging in terrorism (Horgan 2008). As a result, terrorist groups are not always acting 
on behalf of populations that they are a part of. The Russian groups that developed out of 
the Populist movement were comprised of people from privileged backgrounds, whose 
parents’ wealth was built on the exploitation of peasants (Carr 2006). In the US, the 
Weather Underground would attempt to overcome their white skin privilege by aligning 
themselves with the Black Power movement and the Vietcong (Carr 2006). 
5.2.2 Global Strains 
 Despite the overall inconsistency of grievance-based explanations of national 
terrorism, there is support for the influence of global or historical based strains on the 
adoption of terrorism in distinct waves. The anarchist, national-separatist, and the New 
Left waves have all been closely connected to worldwide strains that were a product of 
changes in technology or international politics. Nasser (2005) points to the impact of 
globalization as a cause of national desperation that motivates terrorism, and also leads to 
a homogenization of peoples around the world through their shared experience with 
foreign powers. The consequences of industrialization for workers contributed to 
widespread support for the anarchist movement (Kemp 2018). The anticolonial wave was 
motivated by the impact of colonialization on native peoples and would become 
particularly prevalent as international relations changed in the wake of the collapse of the 
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Ottoman empire and the World Wars. Finally, the New Left terrorist groups shared 
common international grievances against Vietnam and US imperialism.  
 Although the general grievances of the national-separatist wave existed before the 
adoption of terrorism between the 1920s-1960s, the political consequences of the World 
Wars and collapse of the Ottoman empire underlies this wave of national-separatist 
terror. Irish armed groups were formed throughout history as a result of religious 
discrimination, land confiscation, and English occupation. This history of oppression 
would reach a high point when the Irish had to export food to Britain during a famine 
(Nasser 2005). The strains of colonialization would motivate groups in Palestine, India, 
Bosnia, Algeria, and Cyprus. These conflicts would be motivated by long running 
grievances, and in many cases the violence observed during the anticolonial wave was a 
continuation prior violence. The changes to the international environment as a result of 
the World Wars and fall of the Ottoman Empire would provide an opportunity for those 
experiencing these long running strains.  
The fall of the Ottoman Empire and broken promises by the Western powers led 
to the development of the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine, laying the basis for the 
Palestinian terror groups of the future (Nasser 2005). The fall of the Ottoman Empire 
would similarly contribute to nationalist movements and terrorist groups forming across 
the Balkans, including the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization [IMRO] and 
related groups in Croatia (Chaliand and Blin 2007). The World Wars would similarly 
contribute to the development of nationalist movements across the world (Chaliand and 
Blin 2007). The Irish Republicans, Bengali nationalists, and Irgun would view the World 
Wars as opportunities to exploit (Carr 2006). The anticolonial wave is partially a product 
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of the opportunities afforded by the international environment for those experiencing the 
long running strains associated with colonial rule.  
The international New Left wave grievances primarily focus on Vietnam and the 
Cold War. Cold War conflicts were influential in the formation of terrorist organizations 
and is a possible explanation for the widespread adoption of terrorism in the 1960s 
(Danzell 2011). Many groups during this era received support from the Soviet Union and 
Cuba depending on the groups’ relevance to these nations’ interests (Laqueur 2002). The 
common banner for Vietnam and against US imperialism contributed to a collectivism 
among the New Left terrorist groups that existed to a smaller degree during the 
anticolonial wave and not fully realized in the anarchist wave. 
5.2.3 Perception of Strain 
The strains and grievances that produce terrorism within this sample are diverse 
and vary widely in magnitude and whether or not they were directly experienced. What 
these grievances have in common is their embeddedness in the collective action frame of 
a social movement. As discussed above, all terrorist groups observed here emerged from 
larger social movements. One essential characteristic of social movements is their 
development of a frame that identifies an injustice to be addressed. As a result, terrorist 
groups are inherently connected to strains and grievances in societies through their 
development out of social movements that define those social problems.  
Burleigh (2010) argues that the Russian populist movement was inspired by a 
sense of guilt among the upper class regarding the circumstances of the rural peasants. In 
discussing the factors that led young Italians to join the BR, Orsini (2011) described the 
perception of injustice as the primary motivation. The RAF would be motivated by the 
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perception that the West German government was secretly fascist (Aust 2009). However, 
there is support for the role of strains in the adoption of terrorism as evidenced by the size 
difference of groups directly experiencing significant strains, and those acting on the 
basis of vicarious strains alone. Additionally, the societal upheavals brought about by 
economic development for the anarchist wave, BR in Italy, and some South American 
groups, as well as the anticolonial groups in the wake of major international events, 
suggests that changes in the status quo may be related to the perception of strains and 
grievances.   
5.3 THE RATIONALITY OF TERRORISTS 
 In addition to the support for the rational actor approach’s assumption that 
terrorism primarily emerges from social movements, this study found that limitations on 
legitimate political opportunities and state repression of social movements were highly 
influential in the adoption of terrorism. However, there are significant questions 
regarding how terrorists evaluate the effectiveness of other options relative to terrorism, 
and whether or not their goals are achievable. Frequently terrorist groups emerge from 
societies where legitimate political representation or change is restricted, and especially 
in those areas where there is some degree of state repression. In this context the adoption 
of terrorism is considered, but its effectiveness is frequently overestimated, and 
alternatives dismissed wholesale. Most problematic to rational actor theories of terrorism 
is the utopian nature of the goals of many terrorist groups, effectively precluding any 





5.3.1 No Other Choice—Perceptions of Alternative Options 
 The rational actor explanations of terrorism argue that terrorism is adopted when 
it is considered to be more beneficial to achieving a political goal relative to other 
methods. Consistent with this argument, terrorism develops in the course of a social 
movement as discussed above, and the likelihood of it being adopted is increased when 
alternative methods are inhibited through political disenfranchisement or repression. 
However, terrorist groups frequently dismiss nonviolent means entirely, despite evidence 
that a mixed approach is most effective. This is connected to commonly held belief 
among terrorist groups that social change is only possible ‘through the barrel of a gun’.  
 Social movements as the initial stage inherently confirms the use of alternative 
methods by terrorist groups, at least initially. However, the perception of these 
alternative, legitimate methods as too slow or ineffective has produced many terrorist 
groups. Among the most infamous of the anarchist bombers, Émile Henry would resort to 
terrorism in response to the refusal of a company to negotiate during a strike (Laqueur 
2002). The Terrorist Fraction of the People’s Will and the Zealots in Palestine would 
adopt terrorism out of frustration with the success of non-violent reform (Burleigh 2010). 
The Basque ETA would similarly form out of criticisms of the success of its nonviolent 
political party counterpart, and the absence of Western support (Duerr 2015). 
Organizational failures contributed to an increasing adoption of terrorism as a method by 
the first Zemlya I Volya (Burleigh 2010). This trend is seen with the use of other forms of 
political violence as well. Left wing terrorism in Venezuala emerged after the failure of 
rural guerilla campaigns (Laqueur 2002). The use of terrorism is frequently tied to the 
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perception that alternative means are not effective in achieving the political or social 
goals of groups.  
Political disenfranchisement is frequently a factor that contributes to the adoption 
of terrorism through the elimination of alternative, legitimate means to achieve social 
change. Muslim Algerians would be refused political rights, leading to the development 
of the FLN (Revere 1973). In Peru, the Shining Path would develop in response to 
political disenfranchisement and poverty (Starn 2019). Similarly, in Argentina a third of 
the electorate would be excluded from the political process (Moyano 1995). The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] would develop in an area where the minority 
group did not have any meaningful representation in the government (Yass 2014). 
Consistent with the rational actor explanation of terrorism, areas where alternative, 
legitimate political actions are limited contribute to the adoption of political violence.  
 The changing international landscape demonstrates how terrorism can be 
perceived to be an effective tool to achieve social change. Specifically, the anticolonial 
wave illustrates how the global structural conditions have impacted the adoption of 
terrorism worldwide. After World War II colonized nations found that there were new 
audiences to appeal to for support, such as the decolonized nations, the United Nations, 
and the communist bloc (Carr 2006). Furthermore, the Irish success in establishing an 
independent Ireland inspired revolutionary movements around the world (Carr 2006). As 
a result, anticolonial movements now perceived terrorism as a more effective strategy, 
through the success of the Irish, the impact of the World Wars on the colonial powers, 
and the emergence of an international audience to appeal to for support.  
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 Infrequently, some groups stopped using terrorism after it was found to be 
unsuccessful. The Proletarian Party in Poland would shift to strikes after finding them 
more effective (Laqueur 2002). In Russia, Zemlya I Volya would split on the continued 
use of terrorism in response to mass executions of activists (Laqueur 2002). SRs would 
similarly give up on terrorism as ineffective due to the effectiveness of police infiltration 
of the group to disrupt attacks. In the case of the ETA, combining violence with truces 
and negotiations was effective at increasing public support and mobilization, and as a 
result were more likely to achieve their demands (Criado 2011). This supports a rational 
actor explanation of terrorism, since these groups gave up on terrorism when it proved 
ineffective. However, one of the primary reasons for many splits among political parties 
and social movement organizations and terrorist groups is conflict over the use of 
terrorism, specifically the will of at least part of the group or organization to continue to 
use terrorism. Narodnya Volya and the Union of SR-Maximalists in Russia split from 
Zemlya I Volya and SRs after the groups stopped using terrorism (Burleigh 2010). The 
first IRA organization would split into two factions after the treaty splitting Ireland into 
two, with a new IRA (with the same name) forming in order to continue fighting for a 
united Ireland through force despite the increasing success of conventional political 
action (Duerr 2015). This provides mixed support for the rational choice explanation, 
since there is evidence of groups using terrorism based its perceived utility, but that 
consistently factions within these groups persist in the use of violence even when it is 
perceived as ineffective by those in the movement.  
 In part, the adoption of terrorism as a part of a rational decision calculus should 
also address the effectiveness of this approach. Harmon (2010) found that the majority of 
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terrorist groups are defeated or only achieve limited success. Other research has argued 
that terrorism is wholly ineffective at achieving group goals, that groups do not exhaust 
other options prior to adopting terrorism or accept concessions when they do achieve 
some success (Abrahms 2008). There is considerably more evidence to support that 
terrorism will make achieving these goals more difficult. To the extent to which terrorism 
is adopted from the example of other groups, examined in greater detail in the next 
chapter, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that terrorist groups in general 
are unaware of the ineffectiveness of the strategy. However, terrorist groups may 
overestimate their odds for success by comparing themselves to guerilla campaigns that 
are far more likely to be successful (Abrahms and Lula 2012). This is particularly 
relevant to the New Left wave given the self-identification of many groups as urban 
guerillas.  
 The perception of terrorism as an effective tool originates in the early adoption 
and glorification of dynamite by the Irish groups and anarchists. Irish Republican, 
O’Donovan Rossa, would claim in one newspaper that that dynamite “was the best way 
for oppressed peoples from all countries to get free from tyranny and oppression” and 
“[a] pound of the stuff contained more force than ' a million speeches'” (Burleigh 2010). 
The newspaper, United Irishman, would similarly proclaim dynamite as the best remedy 
for “old tyrant England” (Burleigh 2010). The wider anarchist movement often 
condemned the violent acts of individual terrorists as detrimental to their goals. In the 
aftermath of the Ravachol trial in France, an anarchist publication would note that these 
violent actors did “more harm than good to the evolution of anarchy” (Heehs 1994:546). 
Despite lacking any real success in their own movement, Narodnya Volya, a Russian 
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populist group, would inspire Armenian groups, the Hunchakian and the 
Dashnaktsouthian, to adopt violence (Sedgwick 2007). The rational actor explanation 
accurately reflects those groups who adopt terrorism due to the absence or ineffectiveness 
of alternative means and modify their use of violence depending on its success. However, 
there is a consistent theme among the terrorist groups examined here to be reluctant to 
give up on terrorism once it is adopted, often resulting in organizational splits over the 
continued use of violence.  
5.3.2 Achievable Goals and Utopian Fantasies 
 An implicit assumption of the rational actor explanations of terrorism is that the 
goal of a terrorist group is achievable. This study finds questionable support for this 
assumption, since many groups observed here are acting in the pursuit of a utopian 
society that is unachievable. There are exceptions to this, and many groups do have more 
specific goals in addition to their primary goal of utopia. Generally, even some of the 
more reasonable goals of terrorist groups incorporate some degree of belief that success 
means a new society free from the problems of the old one.  
 The primary goals of terrorists vary in the degree to which they are actually 
achievable. The most achievable or realistic goals of terrorist groups reviewed here are 
those of the anticolonial and nationalist struggles. Compared to the utopian goals of the 
anarchist and Marxist groups to radically change society, the anticolonial and nationalist 
groups tend to have discrete, achievable political goals—national independence. There is 
some evidence that even these more practical groups suffer from unreasonable 
expectations of what success will bring. The pIRA believed that ending British 
occupation would solve the problems of Northern Ireland, and former members 
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acknowledged that this was a short-sighted view of the situation and the sectarian conflict 
that would continue (English 2004). The HRA would go further, including in their 
founding document the explicit goal of a new international order, stating that “The 
revolutionary party is not national but international in the sense that its ultimate object is 
to bring harmony in the world by respecting and guaranteeing the diverse interests of the 
different nations” (HRA 1925). This type of utopian goal is not unique to the HRA and is 
particularly common among the anarchist and New Left groups.  
 Some groups’ goals were inherently unachievable, often through due to their 
explicitly utopian nature. This reflects a common theme across some groups in their 
misperception of their political environment and possibility of success. Kassel (2009) 
observed that anarchist movement generally lacked concrete political aims or noted that 
those aims were abstract and unachievable. In his study of the Italian BR, Orsini (2011) 
would describe their goal as utopian and only achievable through violence. Japanese New 
Left groups similarly aspired to precipitate a global revolution that would transform the 
world (Box and McCormack 2004). The utopian nature of the goals of terrorist groups 
undermines rational actor explanations of terrorism, since the impossibility of these goals 
prevents any legitimate, conventional political behavior from being perceived as 
successful.  
In addition to questionably achievable goals, several groups observed here 
exhibited a poor grasp of the reality of their situations. Some groups perceive themselves 
as representatives of the will of the people, not recognizing that the population largely 
disagrees or is indifferent to the movement. Narodnya Volya believed that they 
represented the will of the people despite the political indifference of the majority of the 
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population (Carr 2006). The independence movement of Corsica similarly failed to 
recognize that the rest of the population did not want independence (Chaliand and Blin 
2007). An unrealistic evaluation of the world and political situation is not limited to the 
perceived public support. The RAF perceived the world in a fantastical way detached 
from reality, believing the German democracy to be a fascist government in hiding (Carr 
2006). According to BR, the world was a sick and putrid place, and violence was the only 
way to purify it. Members that renounced violence would attribute the armed struggle to 
a superficial analysis of the political and social situation (Carr 2006). This tendency is 
seen across the waves of terrorism and illustrates the importance of understanding how 
terrorist groups construct the worldview that informs their actions.  
5.3.3 A Repression Reaction 
 Repression is the most consistent factor in the adoption of terrorism among the 
groups examined here. Within each movement there is some degree of state repression. 
The degree of repression experienced, however, varies widely. Furthermore, many 
movements are effectively destroyed through the use of repression. Based on this, 
repression appears to be a driving force in the adoption of terrorism, the absolute level of 
repression leading to terrorism is less important than the perception of repression, and 
terrorism exists primarily within a range of repressive action that enables terrorism and a 
level in which a terrorist movement is crushed. Although there is great variation in the 
magnitude of repression, symbolic events involving repression are consistently among 
the turning points of groups that adopt violence.  
 Writers and terrorist groups throughout history have consistently explained their 
violence in the context of the violence by the state. Heinzen, one of the first intellectual 
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justifiers of terrorism, argued that violence must be resorted to in order to fight the 
government, a system of violence and murder (Burleigh 2010). The anarchist intellectual 
Kropotkin would be a leading apologist for terrorism, arguing that it was justified due to 
structural violence (Burleigh 2010). These early ideological influences would be borne 
out in the history of terrorism, with repression being the most consistent characteristic of 
terrorist groups.  
 After a series of executions Fenians in England would increase their violent 
activities and gain greater support from activists and sympathizers (Burleigh 2010). 
Similarly, the brutal suppression of the Easter Rising would create martyrs for 
generations of Irish Republicans (as well as some Bengali nationalists) (Chaliand and 
Blin 2007). Years later, the pIRA would also adopt violence in response in response to 
the deployment of troops and violence occurring in the course of civil rights protests 
(Duerr 2015; Nasser 2005). The Russian revolutionary conspiracy, Zemlya i Volya (Land 
and Freedom, sometimes translated as Land and Liberty), would develop out of the 
repression of the Russian Populism movement which caused many activists to go 
underground. The simply named group, The Organization, would go underground after 
the repression of Zemlya I Volya, becoming further radicalized and establishing a 
dedicated terrorist unit, named Hell (Burleigh 2010). Zemlya I Volya would be the 
namesake of a new group a decade later, whose repression would provoke a renewed 
adoption of terrorism (Burleigh 2010). The anarchist movement, following in the 
footsteps of its Irish and Russian progenitors, would similarly reflect this relationship 
between repression and terrorism.  
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Like other French anarchists, Henry’s bombing would be in response to the 
government repression of anarchists (Laqueur 2002). A leading figure in the Italian 
anarchist movement, Luigi Galeani would advocate violence after the violent suppression 
of a strike (Larabee 2015). In Japan, the repression of anarchist, socialist, Christian, and 
feminist activists would provoke a bomb plot against the Japanese emperor (Kemp 2018). 
State repression of strike activities would similarly motivate a bombing by an Australian 
anarchist (Kemp 2018).  
The nationalist and anticolonial groups that occurred alongside the anarchist 
movement and the anticolonial wave similarly reflect this relationship between repression 
and terrorism. Hindu nationalists would adopt violence in response to the severity of 
British colonial rule generally but was specifically spurred on by a series of British 
atrocities that were carried out in retaliation for several killings (Gupta 1997). State terror 
and government clamp downs would inspire Palestinian violence as well as the Mau Mau 
and other Kenyan armed uprisings (Nasser 2005; Carr 2006). The New Left groups 
similarly emerge in national contexts of repression.  
Marxist-Leninist groups in Argentina developed in the context of long running 
political conflicts and government repression to prevent the politician supported by the 
New Left movement from being elected (Moyano 1995). This general trend culminated 
in The Night of the Long Batons, wherein the military brutally put down a protest 
(Moyano 1995). The Shining Path in Peru would develop in the context of police and 
military brutality (Starn 2019). In Japan, the URA would develop out of a history of 
conflict with the police, including the criminalization, mass arrests, and incarceration of 
protesters (Igarashi 2007). The ETA and related groups would similarly form and grow in 
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response to state terror (Duerr 2015). State repression is a consistent factor in the 
adoption of terrorism across the historical waves of terrorism, appearing as a factor in the 
adoption of terrorism for groups across nations and throughout the history of terrorism.  
 In addition to state repression, violence against populations by paramilitary or 
other civilian groups similarly contributes to the adoption of violence. In 1921 Palestine, 
Haganah would be created to protect remote Jewish settlements from anti-semitic 
violence, and riots would contribute to Irgun split from the group (Burleigh 2010). The 
BLA in the US would develop in response to anti-black violence by the KKK and other 
white supremacist groups, as well as police harassment (Roseneau 2013). This would be 
reaffirmed when the FBI’s COINTELPRO program was publicly exposed, as well as the 
killings of Fred Hampton and George Jackson by police (Roseneau 2013). The pIRA 
would similarly develop in response to violence by nonstate actors (O’Doherty 1993). 
Although a less factor in the development of terrorist groups, it is important to note that 
the violence that inspires terrorism is not always committed by the state.  
 Although repression is a common theme, there is a huge range in terms of 
magnitude. The Russian Populist and Nihilist movements were subject to extreme 
repression including massacres by the Russian government (Burleigh 2010). However, 
the accidental shooting of a single protestor in the course of the German student 
movement was sufficient to motivate the creation of the RAF (Carr 2006). Gudrun 
Ensslin, a central member of the RAF, would interpret this accidental shooting as proof 
that the police intended to kill all of the activists (Aust 2009; Smith and Moncourt 2009). 
The example of the RAF and the shooting of the protester is an example of the type of 
inciting repressive events that become symbolically important to the development of 
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terrorist groups. Similar to this, the Night of Long Batons in Argentina would incite the 
creation of New Left groups in the country, however this illustrates the symbolic 
importance of particular repressive events (Moyano 1995). The Argentinian New Left 
movement had a history of state repression prior to this event, but this event became 
specifically important to the movement.  
5.4 A SUBCULTURE OF TERROR 
 Subculture theory has been argued here to serve as a mediating factor between the 
traditional explanations of violence, grievances and rational choice. Many groups possess 
various unique cultural peculiarities, but the focus here is on those cultural aspects of 
groups that contribute to the adoption of terrorism. Three cultural elements were found 
here to be common to most terrorist groups and are directly relevant to the choice to 
engage in terrorism. First, terrorist groups and movements often include a unique identity 
to those that adopt violence, referred to here as the role of the revolutionist. Second, 
groups incorporate similar justifications and worldviews that promote terrorism as a 
moral act. Finally, terrorist groups attribute far greater value to violence than merely its 
use as a tactic or strategy in the pursuit of social change. These elements are well 
represented across the groups examined here, but are also present in the worldview of 
ISIS discussed in Chapter Four. This substantiates the relative comparability of ISIS with 
these prior international waves of terrorism, and provides the basis of comparing ISIS’s 
spread through the internet with the of prior terrorist groups internationally, elaborated on 





5.4.1 Role of the Revolutionist 
 The most defining and consistent characteristic across terrorist groups in this 
sample is the definition of, and aspiration to, an ideal role, the Revolutionist. This role 
has a different title depending on the group, its ideology, and time period, but it is 
consistent in its description of the terrorist as a romantic hero, a revolutionary virtuoso 
motivated to self-sacrifice by the suffering of others. The role of the Revolutionist may 
be referred to as terrorist, urban guerilla, revolutionary, or some title specific to the 
group, but it is extremely consistent in its core characteristics, romanticism and self-
sacrifice. Revolutionists are commemorated across the history of terrorism in poems and 
songs. Equally important to the characteristics of this role is how it is used to distinguish 
members of terrorist groups from those involved in the larger, non-violent social 
movement, and the conformity that the role demands.  
In his study on the Red Brigades (BR), Orsini (2011) described the process of 
becoming a revolutionary as the learning of the group’s worldview, and in defining the 
group as a sect he emphasizes on the importance of the identity gained through the group. 
This observation on the importance of the Revolutionist identity in the adoption of 
terrorism is largely substantiated by this research. The terrorist is consistently described 
as a heroic figure by groups and movements using violence. Some research has suggested 
that the idealization of revolutionaries is among the motivations to engage in terrorism. 
For instance, Carr (2006) described the motivations of pIRA members partially as a 
desire to pursue heroism and adventure to escape the mundanity of life. This motivation 
is understandable, given the portrayal of terrorists among their groups and communities. 
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Possibly the first treatise focused on the Revolutionist identity, Catechism for a 
Revolutionist, by Sergei Nachaev, would describe the revolutionary personality as one 
devoid of relationships, a tragic hero and martyr dedicated to revolution (Carr 2006). 
Russian anarchist Sergei 'Stepniak' Kravchinsky would describe the terrorist as “a new 
historical figure, noble, terrible, fascinating, the martyr and the hero” (Carr 2006). In 
describing the history of the Russian Revolution, Lenin (1973) described the hero 
worship of populist and nihilist terrorist among members of the movement. SRs would 
echo this role, seeing themselves as responding to a revolutionary calling (Carr 2006). 
They would believe that “the revolutionary was a hero driven by hate, inspired by honor 
and willingness to sacrifice himself” (Laqueur 2002:40). 
Among anticolonial groups, IMRO fighters, referring to themselves as the 
Comitadjis, were described as initially being romantic and picturesque fighters, not 
merely revolutionaries for sport (St. Christowe 2009). Bengali nationalists would honor 
Irish republican heroes, claiming an Irish memoir as a bible depicting the terrorist as a 
heroic and romantic figure to aspire to (Silvestri 2000). The groups associated with the 
Young Bosnia movement similarly identified themselves as archetypal heroes and praised 
the virtues of sacrifice (Jackson 2006). Songs and poems to commemorate Irish 
revolutionaries across generations of Irish struggles (Laqeuer 2009). The FLN would 
clarify three differing roles: the Moudjahid, who is defined and transformed by his ideals 
and idealism; the Fidayine, fighters solely dedicated to the revolution; and the 




Among the New Left groups, a shared identity would be claimed by groups 
around the world—the urban guerilla. Carlos Marighella (2009) described the urban 
guerilla as a man who fought dictatorships, a patriot, and a friend to the people and 
freedom, possessing bravery and decisiveness, and possessing a series of skills akin to the 
heroes of spy movies. The Weather Underground, RAF, Tupamaros, URA, JRA, among 
many others considered themselves to be urban guerillas. Among the BR, the Red 
Brigadist was described as a doomed man, with no personal interests or attachments, that 
dedicated his/her life to destruction in the name of the revolution (Orsini 2011). Despite 
different names, across the waves of international terrorism there exists a valued identity 
of the Revolutionist that sets terrorists apart from their peers as romantic heroes of the 
revolution, ones that would give their lives in the pursuit of social change.  
Speaking from the gallows, Kartar Singh of India would proclaim, “If I had to live 
more lives than one, I would sacrifice each of them for my country's sake.” (Gupta 
1997:14). This illustrates a core characteristic of the Revolutionist identity, the 
importance of self-sacrifice. Implicit in the strategy of propaganda by deed was the 
recognition that the individual anarchist must sacrifice themselves in order to reach the 
widest possible audience with their message (Carr 2006). In Ireland, the IRB would view 
themselves as an extension of a history of martyrs for Irish independence (Burleigh 
2010). Members of Narodnya Volya were reported to have accepted that they would die 
but had accepted this as the price to be paid for the liberation of humanity (Chaliand and 
Blin 2007). Sergei Kravchinsky (2009) would identify the terrorist as a fascinating 
character, existing as a hero and a martyr. Emma Goldman, despite speaking out against 
violence, would romanticize the terrorist as the only fighter willing to take on the evils of 
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society (Kassel 2009). Henry, the anarchist bomber, would state that "only anarchists 
were capable of self-sacrifice" (Laqueur 2002:129).  
Palestinian nationalists would refer to themselves as fedayeen, or those that 
sacrifice themselves, and held the belief that their violence could bring redemption to the 
humiliated Palestinian diaspora (Carr 2006; Nasser 2005). Indian nationalists would 
emphasize the importance of self-sacrifice and name one of their pamphlets O Martyrs 
(Gupta 1997). Similar to the IRA before it, the pIRA would view their struggle in terms 
of revolutionary sacrifice (Silvestri 2000; Carr 2006). Bengali nationalists would 
commemorate IRA martyrs as well as their own (Silvestri 2000). The FLN would make a 
conscious attempt to define a revolutionary personality, one that recognized their 
sacrifices and ability to achieve social change (Revere 1973) 
 Lenin (1963) described terrorists in terms of self-sacrifice, but largely criticized 
them as ineffective and disconnected from revolutionary theory. His perspective on the 
valorization of terrorism is particularly relevant however, given how influential his 
writings would become to the adoption of terrorism. Japanese New Left groups would 
also emphasize sacrifice (Box and McCormack 2004; Igarashi 2007). The Japanese Red 
Army Faction (Sekigun-ha) were described as nostalgic romantics detached from reality 
and influenced by a tradition of nationalist self-sacrifice peculiar to Japan, but reflective 
of terrorism generally (Box and McCormack 2004). The self-sacrifice aspect of the 
Revolutionist identity is among the defining features of terrorist groups studied here, with 
it being observed in groups across all of the waves of international terror.  
In addition to the construction of this revolutionary identity, some groups have 
been observed to rigidly enforce behaviors appropriate for a revolutionary and dedicate 
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themselves to demonstrating their authenticity as revolutionaries. The Japanese Red 
Army Faction, and the groups that would emerge from it, would emphasize ideological 
purity and conformity to the group’s ideals (Box and McCormack 2004). The most 
extreme expression were the deaths of group members in the course of self- and group-
criticism sessions by the URA (Box and McCormack 2004; Igarashi 2007). However, 
other groups would similarly engage in these criticism sessions, including the BR, RAF, 
Weather Underground. The Malayan Races Liberation Army [MRLA] would brutally 
punish members perceived to be disloyal or insufficiently committed (Carr 2006). In 
addition to the criticism sessions of some groups, many other groups had extraordinarily 
rigid rules governing their behavior. The BR manuals included rules encompassing the 
lifestyles of members, including a specified bedtime (Carr 2006). However, groups in this 
study exhibiting this emphasis on demonstrating authenticity and punishing violations of 
the revolutionary identity are limited to the New Left groups. It is therefore unclear if this 
is a unique aspect of these groups, or simply unobserved in the other groups.  
The concept of the Revolutionist identity can be seen in the qualities attributed to 
those that hold the status, the expectation of self-sacrifice and fighting for the cause, and 
the degree to which this identity is subject to social control, exemplified in the criticism 
sessions of the New Left groups. The final importance characteristic of this identity is 
how it is used by groups to distinguish themselves from the larger social movements they 
formed in. The best-known anarchist writers often criticized terrorists for their actions 
(Shaya 2010). The use of violence was often divisive in the anarchist movements 
generally as well (Kemp 2018). Despite these criticisms, there remained a great deal of 
idealization of those that engaged in terrorism in the writings of the most influential 
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anarchist intellectuals, elevating these individuals within the movement. Like other 
groups discussed here, the URA would distinguish itself from the larger New Left 
movement by incorporating the willingness to use violence as the litmus test of 
revolutionary dedication, and members’ preoccupation with proving their revolutionary 
credentials (Carr 2006, Igarashi 2007). This behavior would be seen in the US as well, 
where the Weather Underground and other student groups were fixated on the notion that 
revolutionary violence was proof of political commitment and moral coherence and 
obsessed with demonstrating their authenticity. RAF would criticize the rest of the 
movement, describing them as prattlers, insincere comrades, and so-called revolutionaries 
(RAF 2009). The RAF would dedicate a significant amount of time in their writings to 
attacking the West German Left as nonrevolutionary, ineffective, and lacking action 
(Colvin 2009). The emphasis on protecting this identity and using it to distinguish 
terrorist groups from the larger, non-violent movements they are related to illustrates the 
importance of this role to terrorist groups. Violence is a function of this role that 
distinguishes the terrorist, and often this violence is believed to be justified or necessary. 
5.4.2 The Morality of Terror 
 One of the crucial risk factors in the adoption of terrorism is the belief that those 
actions are not inherently immoral (Horgan 2008). Terrorist groups often justify their 
actions as not only not inherently immoral, but morally required. This emphasis is seen in 
the pIRA’s Green Book, which instructs the recruit that the ‘campaign of resistance’ is 
morally justified (IRA 2016). The importance of this justification is recognized by the 
group, who notes, “It is not an easy thing to take up a gun and go out to kill some person 
without strong convictions or justification” (IRA 2016:2). Across groups and waves this 
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moral justification for terrorism is extremely consistent, expanding on Carr’s (2006) 
observation that extremely similar language was used to justify violence among 
anticolonial movements. The terrorist morality perceives the state or other actors as the 
aggressors, whose violence far outweighs that of the terrorist, whose actions are done in 
self-defense or retaliation. Violence, unfortunately, is the only means to attain a desirable 
change in society or right some injustice. In addition to these core principles, supporting 
aspects of the terrorist’s moral worldview involve the bifurcation of society, 
dehumanization of their enemies, and altruistic nature of their violence.  
The RAF would define their actions as altruistic actions similar to the 
contemporaries in Italy, the BR, who viewed their violence as a means to save mankind 
(Orsini 2011; Colvin 2009). This attitude in the New Left wave of terrorism can be traced 
back to the Narodnya Volya but is shared by all terrorist groups that perceive themselves 
as acting on the behalf of a population (Carr 2006). This is the belief that terrorism is 
inherently an act on behalf of, and to benefit, others. This theme of terrorists’ definitions 
of their actions as altruistic is discussed further below, but it is a part of the justification 
given for their violence. 
 The central aspect of the morality of terror is in the comparison it draws between 
its own violence and that of the state. Terrorists argue that their violence is minor, or even 
purely symbolic, when compared to the violence of the state. State violence not only 
diminishes the scope of terroristic violence but justifies its use. Terrorism is a lesser 
violence used to fight the greater violence of the state. Among the earliest intellectual 
proponents of terrorism, Heinzen (2009:67) succinctly stated “Murder is their [the state’s] 
motto, so let murder be their answer”. Anarchist intellectual Bakunin (2009) argued that 
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terrorist violence was less costly than state violence. Goldman (2009), despite criticizing 
the use of violence by anarchists, would similarly draw the comparison to state violence, 
acknowledging that it was the far greater evil. Fanon (1963) focused on violence as an 
inherent characteristic of colonial powers, arguing that the colonial world was ruled 
through violence. This position was similarly shared by Narodnya Volya’s propagandist 
Sergei Kravchinsky (2009), who considered brute force to be the basis of the state.  
These attitudes were not held only by the intellectuals that impacted these 
movements. Anarchist Henry would argue that his indiscriminate bombing was justified, 
since the state indiscriminately repressed the people (Laqueur 2002). In The 
Revolutionary, the Hindustan Republican Association [HRA] would state, “[The British] 
have no justification to rule over India except the justification of sword and therefore the 
revolutionary party had taken to the sword. But the sword of the revolutionary party bears 
ideas at its edge.” (HRA 1925). The leader of an unnamed group in Rhodesia would state 
that he saw no difference between terrorist attacks and airstrikes or napalm bombings 
(Carr 2006). In justifying their bombings and executions, Irgun would claim that their 
actions were no worse than those carried out by the British (Carr 2006). One member of 
EOKA would go further, arguing that terrorism was more selective than a bomber and 
that the ends justified the means (Carr 2006). This sentiment is echoed in the New Left 
movements, with the Weather Underground arguing that their violence was purely 
symbolic compared to the violence of the state (Larabee 2015). The moral beliefs of 
terrorists reflect the consistent role of state repression in the development of terror 
groups. The terrorist morality is therefore initially based on the belief of the altruism of 
the act and the belief that terrorist violence is minor compared to the state violence it 
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seeks to address. However, repression is not only relevant to the terrorist morality as a 
justification for violence, but also in framing their attacks as defensive or retributive acts.  
 In addition to the relativity of violence, terrorist groups often position their 
violence as defensive in nature, a response to an attacker, or as a form of vengeance for 
attacks. This is consistent with Taylor and Quayle (1994), who found that terrorists 
viewed their violence as a response to an attacking enemy. Narodnya Volya’s Tarnovski 
(2009) argued that terrorism was a form public defense, comparing it to self-defense. 
Indian nationalist Harkabi (2009) would argue for revenge, stating that there was no 
crime that Britain had not committed against the Indian people. Fanon (1963) would 
similarly frame terrorism as a response to an aggressor, arguing that the colonizers 
brought violence into every aspect of the lives of the colonized subject.  
In the anarchist era, SRs would describe their terror as defensive response to 
repression (Burleigh 2010). The anarchists would exemplify the vengeful aspect of 
terrorism. The deaths of French protesters would inspire Ravachol and his group to use 
violence, and his death would make him a martyr that provoked a series of bombings 
emulating his behavior. Among these is Valliant, who would receive support from 
anarchist burglar groups to carry out his own attack. This, and Valliant’s subsequent 
execution, inspired Emile Henry to carry out his own bombing (Kemp 2018). In London, 
Martial Bourdin would repeat this pattern, carrying out bombings in response to the 
excessive sentences of fellow anarchists (Kemp 2018).  
This justification would similarly be widely observed among the New Left 
groups. The BLA would frame their violence as self-defense or retaliation against police 
brutality and what was seen as the occupation of Black communities (Roseneau 2013). In 
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Argentina, election rallies would be accompanied by chants praising Revolutionary 
Armed Forces [FAR] commandos for a killing in retaliation for the extrajudicial murders 
of sixteen prisoners and calling for further vengeance (Moyano 1995). The Weather 
Underground (2009) would explicitly describe their attacks as retaliations for criminal 
attacks on minorities, while the RAF (2009) would act in response to indiscriminate 
police violence. The state and other enemies of terrorist groups are not only defined as 
aggressors, but often perceived by terrorist groups to be an absolute evil that they combat 
against. 
Terrorist groups tend to frame their struggles as battles between good and evil. 
According to Orsini (2011), the Italian BR possessed a binary code mentality, wherein 
the world was in danger and there were only two sides, the oppressors and the avengers. 
Orsini (2011) describes the ideology of the Italian BR as viewing the world as corrupt 
and evil. Violence, in the group’s view, was the only way to purify the world and, 
through a dramatic revolution, achieve a perfect world. Although this work on BR is the 
most thorough examination of this aspect of terrorist groups, it is a common theme across 
terrorists of the different nations, movements, and eras. Emile Henry condemned all the 
bourgeois, arguing that none were innocent since all of them lived by exploiting the 
unfortunate (Laqueur 2002). Furthermore, Emile Henry would describe French society as 
rotted to the core (Shaya 2010). Bakunin (2004:70) would write “So may all healthy 
young minds forthwith set themselves to the sacred cause of rooting out evil, purifying 
and clearing Russia’s soil by fire and sword…”. Other groups would view themselves as 
engaged in similar Manichean wars, such as the Shining Path (Starn 2019) and the Young 
Bosnia movement (Jackson 2006). The groups involved in the Young Bosnia movement 
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saw the world in terms of cultural degeneration that must be transcended by action 
leading to societal rebirth (Jackson 2006). The RAF would also adopt the us versus them 
mentality advocated by Eldridge Cleaver, a leader in the Black Panthers and later the 
BLA (Colvin 2009). This pattern supports the morality of terrorists, who are acting to 
defend the people from the violence of the state and perceive this conflict in terms of a 
battle between good and evil to save a troubled world.  
This brings this discussion full circle to the violence of terrorists, specifically that 
it is a necessary action in order to bring this salvation to the world. Elevating the conflict 
to a battle between good and evil that can lead to a utopian revolution justifies any means 
to attain that goal, and at this point violence becomes a moral imperative. Heinzen (2009) 
would argue for the necessity of murder to stop the violence of the state. Kropotkin 
(2009) would similarly argue that a revolution was necessary. Fanon (1963) and Harkabi 
(2009) were more specific, both arguing that violence was the only way to end colonial 
rule. In part, this belief in the necessity of violence extends beyond the morality of 
terrorism and involves the larger beliefs and values that terrorist groups tie to the use of 
violence.  
5.4.3 The Value of Violence 
 The dominant interpretation of terrorism is that it is merely a tool or strategy used 
in the pursuit of a political, social, or religious goal. However, this is not how violence is 
viewed by terrorists themselves. This study has observed a widespread pattern of 
attributing an inherent value to acts of violence, for society and the individual. This 
supports the conception of terrorist violence as not only a strategy, but as a cultural or 
ritual behavior. The most extreme case of this theme is the group Autonomia, who 
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inherently valued revolutionary violence and possessed the stated goal of making the 
revolution happen, only to disappear afterwards. This is not the first time that terrorist 
groups have been observed to attribute an inherent value to violence. In criticizing the 
SRs, Lenin would state his belief that they had come to view terrorism as an end in itself 
(Chaliand and Blin 2007). The non-tactical or strategic characteristics of violence to 
terrorist groups include the inherent value attributed to violence, and the perception by 
groups of the necessity of violence to social change.  
 Drawing parallels between themselves and the French Revolution, Narodnya 
Volya viewed terrorism as a righteous instrument of revolutionary justice (Carr 2006). 
Years later, the SRs would view “bomb-throwing [as] ‘holy’” (Laqueur 2002:40), and its 
military wing, the SRs Combat Organization, would consider killing a high ranked 
official as a privilege and honor (Carr 2006). Kropotkin, an anarchist theorist, encouraged 
violence as a validating mechanism (Kassel 2009). This sentiment would also be 
demonstrated among anticolonial groups. Harkabi (2009) would state that “Violence 
liberates people from their shortcomings and anxieties. It inculcates in them both courage 
and fearlessness concerning death” and that violence could purify society. This is similar 
to the writings of Fanon that would be influential throughout the anticolonial and New 
Left wave.  According to Fanon (1963), violence was a cleansing force that would 
liberate the individual and rid them of their feelings of inferiority, despair, and passivity. 
Charan (2009) from the Hindustan Socialist Revolutionary Army would state that 
terrorism put fear in the hearts of oppressors, gave hope, courage and self-confidence. 
 New Left groups would similarly elevate violence beyond a mere tactic. The BR 
would vaguely ascribe meaning to all of their actions, raising them to the status of 
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revolutionary antagonisms against the state (Carr 2006). In the BR, killing came to be 
understood as an act of justice or a loving act towards humanity, since it was done in the 
pursuit of a perfect society (Orsini 2011). Part of the reason the BLA split from the Black 
Panthers was Eldritch Cleaver’s advocacy for the therapeutic nature of violence against 
colonial oppressors, which he derived from the work of Frantz Fanon (Roseneau 2013). 
Whether violence is perceived as a therapeutic act for the individual, or a loving act on 
behalf of humanity, imbuing violence with this level of significance effectively renders 
violence an end in itself and draws into question its purely utilitarian nature. In addition 
to this perception of an inherent value to violence, terrorist groups often believe violence 
to be a necessary means to attain their ends.  
The most basic characteristic of violence as defined by terrorist groups is its 
necessity and an emphasis on taking action. The priority of action can be seen in the IRB 
(Burleigh 2010), as well as many New Left groups that emphasize the importance of 
revolutionary action to developing revolutionary theory. The RAF specifically referenced 
Lenin’s belief that Marxist doctrine was only important when it was put into action 
(Colvin 2009). Fanon (1963) would view non-violence, as a solution, a proposal of the 
colonialist bourgeois. In his view, the only means to liberation from colonial rule was 
force. In The Revolutionary, The Hindustan Republican Association would consistently 
reiterate the necessity of violence, stating “It is a self-deception to say that India's 
political liberty can be attained through peaceful and legitimate means.” (HRA 1925). 
Learning from Mao, the Shining Path in Peru would view violence as a universal law that 
is necessary to overthrow the old order (Starn 2019). Emphasis on action, PFLP (2009) 
would note that revolutionary theory required revolutionary action. Marighella (2009), an 
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urban guerilla can only maintain his existence through killing police and those dedicated 
to repression. This lesson would be exhibited by the RAF in Germany, whose members 
would be chastised if they did not fire on police whenever the opportunity arose (Aust 
2009; Schiller 2009; Varon 2004). Consistently across groups violence is not only valued 
inherently but is also believed to be the only means to achieve change.  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 This study has taken a comparative-historical approach to studying terrorist 
groups across the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves of terrorism. In particular, 
this section has focused on the common factors across terror groups with a particular 
focus on those aspects related to subculture theory and the dominant theoretical 
explanations of terrorism. Many of the observations of terrorism made previously were 
reaffirmed to some degree, but this study has particularly highlighted the relevance of 
incorporating the cultural aspects of terrorism. Explaining terrorism as the product of 
subcultural socialization is based on the cultural aspects that facilitate and promote 
terrorist acts, the existence of those cultural aspects across a social network rather than 
unique to a particular individual, group, or organization, and the mediating role 
subcultures play between grievances and rational choices.  
 The evidence from this comparative-historical analysis provides further context to 
the virtual ethnography of ISIS. Specifically, it demonstrates that many characteristics of 
ISIS are present in terrorist groups from prior historical waves of terrorism. Similar to 
prior groups, ISIS emerged out of the larger jihadist movement, is connected to non-
violent social movements, and exists as a movement involving individual attackers, 
groups, and the official organization. Its worldview contains many of the common 
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cultural elements observed across terrorist groups historically, such as the mujahidin as 
their role of the Revolutionist and the holy value attached to jihad. This similarities 
ground ISIS in the context of prior terrorist groups, and provide the basis to compare the 
differences in the uses of the mass media and the diffusion of terrorism.  
There are some notable aspects of the sample used here that may introduce some 
bias in the results. First, by studying groups that are involved in international waves of 
terrorism the groups studied here may be more similar to each other than those groups 
occurring outside of the sample, and artificially inflating the appearance of similarities 
across terrorist groups. However, this study has incorporated observations from groups 
across these waves and nations, and many of the strongest findings are consistent across 
these dimensions. Another major possible limitation of this study is the over 
representation of leftist groups on the observed relevance to repression on terrorism. 
Danzell (2011) found that left wing parties were more likely to adopt terrorism because 
right wing parties were more likely to disenfranchise them once in power. As a result, the 
findings presented here may overstate the importance of repression and political 
disenfranchisement to terrorism in general, and these findings may not be applicable to 
state organized and right-wing groups.  
5.5.1 Subcultures and a Revolutionary Identity 
 The terrorist group distinguishes itself from the larger social movement through 
the construction and adoption of a unique role of the Revolutionist. This role is highly 
valued and praised, inspiring songs, poems, and literature, but comes with stringent 
demands on the part of the would-be Revolutionist. In fulfilling this role, the terrorist 
adopts a worldview that promotes terrorism as a necessary and moral act for the good of a 
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wider group for whom the terrorist sacrifices their bonds, freedoms, and life. However, 
violence is not only a confirmation of one’s identity as a revolutionist or necessary evil 
for a greater good, but an inherently valuable act that enriches its perpetrator or purifies 
the world. The role of the Revolutionist, foundational beliefs of the terrorist morality, and 
value of violence are common cultural elements that are uniquely expressed across the 
terrorist groups in this sample.  
 Prior research on subcultures has emphasized the importance of roles and 
authenticity to gaining status (Melder 2014; Anderson 2009). Furthermore, those roles 
that were most central, or authentic, to the subculture often come with the greatest status 
and demands the greatest adherence to its norms and values. The Revolutionist identity 
reflects these relationships, with terrorists possessing a unique identity that is distinct 
among their supporters and sympathizers as well as the larger movement. This identity 
requires the greatest commitment by the individual, involving self-sacrifice and isolation 
from larger society. However, those that become Revolutionists are often memorialized 
as martyrs for the cause, living on in songs, poems, and sometimes namesakes to new 
terrorist groups.  
 While the Revolutionist identity appears to distinguish terrorists from the larger 
social movements they are a part of, they also appear to have several common beliefs and 
values across groups that justify and facilitate violence. The morality of terrorism is 
extremely consistent across groups, including the minimization of their violence, placing 
themselves as defenders or avengers, and characterizing their struggle as a battle of good 
and evil that can bring salvation to a suffering world. This morality justifies the use of 
violence by minimizing the damage it does, removing responsibility for their violence by 
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blaming it on an attacking state, by introducing utopian ends that would justify any 
means, and by dehumanizing their enemies as a part of the evils of the world.  
 While the morality of terrorism facilitates the use of violence, the beliefs and 
values of groups demand it. Although there are exceptions, many groups believe that 
violence is the exclusive means to attaining their goals. Even when groups do renounce 
violence this frequently results in a break away group or organization that maintains the 
necessity of violence. The perception of violence as the singular means of social change 
is embedded in the ideologies and writings that are influential on the adoption of 
terrorism, and this certainly impacts the evaluations of alternative means. At the extreme, 
violence is valued in itself, far beyond its utilitarian value to obtain social change. 
Popularized by Fanon, violence is described as a therapeutic and almost curative solution 
to the strains facing people, specifically colonized subjects. Violence would similarly 
gain significance to many New Left groups through the belief that Marxist doctrine 
required action to be realized, and this action would further inform their revolutionary 
theory.  
5.5.2 Terrorist Movements 
 Subcultures are distinguished not only by their peculiar norms, values, and 
beliefs, but their distribution through a social network. This study has found that the 
means, goals, and culture of terrorist groups are not limited to the boundaries of groups 
and organizations, but are widely distributed and shared by many individuals, groups, and 
organizations. Furthermore, the cultural elements particular to each group, and those 
discussed above that are common to most, are shared to varying degrees beyond the 
group, in the same way subcultures exhibit varying levels of involvement.  
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 In discussing the forms of terrorist groups it was argued here that it is most 
appropriate to examine terrorism as movements, rather than individuals, groups, or 
organizations. This is because the terrorist groups observed here rarely occurred in 
isolation within their own nations and were frequently accompanied by many additional 
groups and organizations. Frequently the terrorist groups and organizations observed here 
shared similar worldviews and goals, and often there were connections between these 
groups in terms of memberships. In addition to the distribution of this shared perspective 
among terrorist groups, their ideologies and perspectives extended beyond their borders.  
 In discussing the role of the Revolutionist, the relevance of the research on 
authenticity to participation in deviant subcultures was discussed, emphasizing the status 
afforded to those occupying the central statuses in subcultures. Conversely, the varying 
participation in a subculture as a product of socialization provides an explanation for the 
support networks and sympathizers of terrorist groups. These groups adhere to a similar 
belief system, but do not achieve that role of revolutionist. The sister organization to the 
IRA, radical burglars that funded anarchist bombings and newspapers, and even the 
intellectuals and publishers that broadly advocated violence comprise a broader, but 
essential, ecosystem for terrorism.  
 The culture of terror, its moral beliefs, violent values, and revolutionary identity, 
can therefore be seen to be distributed across social networks with varying levels of 
participation and involvement. The worldview of terrorists are not bound by group or 
organizational membership, but is widely shared by multiple interconnected groups. 




5.5.3 Mediating Grievances and Rationality 
The last, central aspect of demonstrating subcultures as a relevant explanation of 
terrorism are their role as mediating factors between the grievances and rational choices. 
Although this study has substantiated and reaffirmed many of the basic findings of 
previous studies testing these explanations, it has also highlighted the importance of how 
these factors are perceived. The impact of grievances and strains on the adoption of 
terrorism is not direct, demonstrated here through the wide range of social conditions that 
have produced terrorist movements. More important is the collective recognition of a 
strain as a social problem. Similarly, rational actors are heavily influenced by the 
collective perceptions of the viability of terrorism and alternative methods. More 
fundamentally, the goal of these actors is socially constructed, and its utopian nature 
justifies extreme measures and necessitates the failure of all other options.  
This research reiterates the inconsistent role of grievances and strains on the 
development of terrorism. While all groups make reference to specific grievances as the 
motivation for their actions, there is a wide variety among these grievances. Some groups 
are comprised of those directly impacted by the strains and grievances, whereas others 
claim to act on their behalf. There is a huge range in terms of magnitude. Regarding 
repression, some groups develop out of conditions of mass incarceration and extrajudicial 
killings, while for others skirmishes with police or a single accidental shooting of a 
protestor is sufficient. However, there does appear to be an upper limit at which point 
repression crushes extremist groups, as seen in the case of the first Zemlya I Volya. 
Economic inequality and deprivation ranges from the extremes of the Irish Great Famine 
to the less life-threatening concern over consumerism of the Japanese New Left groups. 
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Even the level of racial and religious discrimination observed as motivations for terrorist 
groups have a wide range, from the extremes found in colonial settings to the fight for 
equal rights and treatment in Ireland and the US.  
Instead, these findings support an emphasis on the perception of grievances and 
strains. This is likely to be strongly connected to social movements, since they involve 
the construction of social problems and mobilization of a population. Therefore, the 
definition of grievances may not be a direct factor on the adoption of terrorism but a 
consequence of the social movements that terrorist groups develop from. The framing of 
social problems that occurs in the course of social movements additionally explains the 
vicarious connection between some terrorists and the grievances that underlie their 
campaigns.  
 The rational choice explanation of terrorism was largely substantiated by this 
research with several caveats. First, this study substantiates the assumption that terrorist 
groups emerge out of social movements. Furthermore, political disenfranchisement and 
repression were both found to be consistent factors in different groups adopting terrorism. 
These factors would limit or eliminate the ability of non-violent political action, and as 
such it would be expected that they would contribute to the adoption of violence as a 
political tool. Furthermore, the tactics and strategies of terrorist groups are intimately tied 
to the decisions of many groups in how to use violence, with several groups avoiding 
civilian casualties or modifying their behavior in order to appeal to the public. This is 
particularly evident in times of opportunity, such as the aftermath of the World Wars, 




 Despite this support, there are several factors that the rational actor explanations 
do not address. First, the level of political disenfranchisement and repression that produce 
terrorism is highly variable, and it appears that certain repressive events gain a symbolic 
importance that contributes strongly to the development of terrorism, even when there is 
a prior history of repressive action. Second, although there are groups that modify their 
behavior to increase the effectiveness of terrorism, or cease its use altogether, this 
frequently results in splinter groups that continue the use of terrorism due to the belief in 
its effectiveness. This is complicated by the inherent value some terrorist groups have 
assigned to violence, as well as the more common belief that social change is only 
possible through violence. The largest challenge to the rational choice explanation of 
terrorism is the pursuit by many groups of unachievable ends, such as the utopian goals 
of anarchism and Marxism. These utopian or unachievable goals are shared with the 
anticolonial movements as well, either through the influence of Marxism or a politically 
naïve expectation of the outcome of anticolonial struggles.  
 The role of grievances and strains on terrorism appears to be primarily indirect, 
through motivating a social movement. Terrorist groups are often a small element among 
this larger social movement, which includes activists, terrorists, sympathizers, and 
supporters. The participants of these social movements share similar collective action 
frames, particularly a recognition of an injustice. Therefore, part of the worldview that 
motivates terrorist acts is established from social movement involvement. In addition to 
distinguishing themselves from the larger social movement through the use of violence, 
terrorists appear to aspire be revolutionaries, a revered status which demands action. 
Facilitating violent behavior is the morality that frequently accompanies terrorist groups, 
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which minimizes and justifies terroristic violence as an altruistic act and removes blame 
from the terrorist by framing the attacks as defensive. The final recurring cultural aspect 
of terrorist groups is the belief in the necessity of violence, and, to a lesser degree, the 
inherent value attributed to violence.  
This illustrates one of the problems with a purely rational choice explanation of 
terrorism. Although some groups exhibit accurately informed, rational behavior, many 
groups hold particular beliefs and values that directly impact their perceptions of the 
efficacy of terrorism, the political environment, and the importance of their goals. These 
perceptions are important because rational actors, terrorists especially, act based on their 
perceptions of the cost/benefit analysis. The inherent value attributed to terrorism 
precludes its use as a tool for political gain. The belief in the necessity of violence to 
achieve social change is a core aspect of many of the groups’ worldviews examined here, 
to the extent that alternative, legitimate means are renounced, and groups split over the 
use of violence. Furthermore, many terrorist groups perceive their campaigns as mythic 
battles between good and evil, oppressors and oppressed, and view the outcome of their 
struggles in utopian terms.  
Subculture theory provides an explanation for these perceptions, as well as 
separation of activist and terrorist. The role of the Revolutionist, the morality of terror, 
and the value of violence are cultural aspects of the terrorist groups examined that 
distinguish them from their larger social movements. These cultural elements demand 
violent action, justify any means, and promote violence as the only possible means. The 
degree to which individuals internalize these cultural aspects and the groups’ worldview 
orients their relationship to the terrorist group, as sympathizers, supporters, or terrorists. 
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This reflects the subcultural work on authenticity, wherein individuals participating in 
subcultures gain status through their commitment to the lifestyle (Melder 2014; Anderson 
2009). Authenticity, and an obsession with exhibiting it, was explicitly referenced among 
several of the groups examined here. These findings support the inclusion of subculture 
theory as an explanatory factor in the adoption of terrorism, and in the next chapter the 




THE LINEAGE OF TERROR
This study argues that terrorism is not only a product of subcultural socialization, 
but that terrorism and its related concepts exist as a set of cultural ‘tools’ that can be used 
and adapted by different groups to address their particular local conditions. To this end, 
this study has established a social network of the influential connections between terrorist 
groups to track how the concept of terrorism has been transmitted and transformed across 
societies and time. Within countries, terrorist related media was observed to be a constant 
factor, but less prominent than national histories and myths of resistance and national 
identity. Independent of these mythological influences, there were direct relationships 
between terrorist movements of different generations. Examining the diffusion of 
terrorism between the different waves of terrorism illustrated the changing technological 
capabilities of the eras. Influenced by predecessors and contemporaries, terrorist groups 
adopt, adapt and innovate upon the ideas of previous groups. Several of these innovations 
served as further inspiration for their contemporaries and future generations. This chapter 
describes the patterns of the diffusion of terrorism and the role of the mass media in the 
pre-internet waves of terrorism, establishing the basis for comparison to understand the 
unique impact of the internet on the spread of ISIS today. 
 This examination of the influential connections between terrorist groups requires 
some caveats regarding the data that was used for analysis. First, vague connections 
between groups or connections between groups that are implied by historians were 
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excluded from this analysis. Additionally, the present study does not include 
collaborative, instructional, and solidarity actions between groups, except where these 
interactions were a factor in the creation of a group. This is due to the present study’s 
focus on how groups initially adopt terrorism. As noted elsewhere, there are many 
terrorist groups outside of the wave schema, and there is a question as to the validity of 
the wave categorization of terrorism (Park and Sitter 2016, Sedgwick 2007). Although 
some groups outside of the waves are included in this analysis, this is due to their 
connections to groups that are included in among one of the major waves. Notably, these 
groups often served as connections between the terrorism of prior waves and their 
descendent groups. Additionally, the diversity of group ideologies within waves confirms 
Sedgwick’s (2007) observation that waves are more diverse than originally theorized. 
The exclusion of groups outside of the international waves means that the generalizability 
of this research may be limited to leftist and anticolonial violence. Right-wing, fascist, or 
state-sponsored groups were observed in relation to this sample primarily in the context 
of conflict with a group that was a part of a major wave. Previous research suggests that 
international influences may be integral to their development as well (Park and Sitter 
2016).   
6.1 DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACROSS TIME  
 The spread of terrorism within a nation is primarily influenced by the media 
produced by terrorist groups and their related movements, the histories and mythological 
past of the nations, and the direct ties movements had to prior generations’ struggles. The 
use of the mass media in the form of an underground press is a consistent characteristic of 
the terrorist movements examined here. More important to the groups, however, were 
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their mythologized histories, with many groups drawing parallels between themselves 
and groups or individuals in their past. The influence of history is not limited to the 
myths and martyrs of each nation, but the generational overlap that connects the armed 
struggles of successive generations.  
6.1.1 From Zines to Manifestos 
 Although there are differences in the degree of direct involvement of terrorist 
groups in the production of pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and other publications, 
there is consistently a mass media effort related to terrorist groups or the social 
movements they come from. Pamphlets and underground newspapers or journals 
consistently accompany terrorist movements. Although they are not always supportive of 
the adoption of violence, they nonetheless often valorize terrorists and express similar 
worldviews through their articles. The development of the mass media technologies over 
time has fundamentally changed how these texts are distributed, shedding their reliance 
on migrants, translators, and publishers over the years.  
 Within nations there is consistently a widespread use of different forms of the 
mass media by terrorist groups and their larger movements. Narodnya Volya would 
publish their own newspaper and distribute their propaganda abroad (Carr 2006). Later in 
Russia, SRs would distribute its manifesto throughout a number of cities (Chaliand and 
Blin 2007). American, Italian, Japanese, and French anarchist publications would 
advocate for violence in their respective nations, providing instructional knowledge for 
attacks and suggested targets (Carr 2006; Kemp 2018). In the US, the anarchist 
movement would have an extensive press presence, despite the movement’s lack of 
popularity relative to Italy and France (Burleigh 2010). This would include articles in 
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various languages marketed specifically toward immigrant populations in addition to the 
native English language. A guide to anarchist publications accounts for almost fifty 
different recurring English language publications across the United States in the early 
20th century (Longo 2010).  
The anticolonial and New Left groups would similarly be accompanied by 
publications. In the anticolonial wave, pamphlets and radical presses were present among 
the Indian and Bengali nationalists, the Young Bosnia movement, FLN, and LEHI (Gupta 
1997; Getter 1980; Jackson 2006; Revere 1973). In addition to an underground press, 
LEHI would also produce radio broadcasts (Getter 1980). The Weather Underground 
would emerge out of a student movement that included often at least one grassroots, 
radical newspaper in all major cities (Varon 2004). The RAF be intimately connected to 
the German radical press and released many statements through it (Varon 2004; Aust 
2009; Colvin 2009). The publication of newspapers and pamphlets to distribute the 
message of terrorist groups is among the most consistent observation across groups 
examined here.  
 In reference to this study’s application of subculture theory, many of those 
involved in the writing and publication of these papers, pamphlets, and primers would be 
extremely influential through their structural position. The anarchist Johann Most 
founded the paper Freiheit which would provide practical knowledge necessary to 
commit acts of violence and spread anarchist ideology (Burleigh 2010). Other writers 
would be similarly central to the adoption of anarchism and consequent political violence 
in their respective nations, including Emma Goldman, Karl Heinzen, Kropotkin, 
Bakunin, and Chernysevsky (Burleigh 2010). Kotoku would be instrumental in 
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translating and publishing communist and anarchist writings in early 20th century Japan 
(Kemp 2018). Irish Republicans of the same era would similarly be frequent publishers, 
with O’Donovan Rossa proclaiming the virtues of dynamite and publishing his own 
papers that openly solicited donations for terrorism (Burleigh 2010). Sergei 'Stepniak' 
Kravchinsky would export Russian anarchism throughout Europe through his translations 
and publications (Carr 2006). Although it is only loosely connected to the groups studied 
here, the Paladin Press would publish a variety of books often connected to terrorism, 
such as weapons manuals, The Anarchist Cookbook, and books on the construction of 
bombs (Larabee 2015). This publisher would be used by groups across the political 
spectrum, although it would become most associated with right wing militia groups.  
 The Paladin Press illustrates a running theme across the waves of terrorism. 
Frequently the knowledge that groups require to manufacture bombs, handle weapons, 
steal cars, or evade police detection is available without the underground press. Although 
the internet is currently viewed as a dangerous outlet for the acquisition of ‘dangerous 
information’, the freedom of information has always been taken advantage of by 
proponents of violence. Johann Most, possibly the most vocal proponent of anarchist 
violence, developed his pamphlet The Science of Revolutionary Warfare using military 
manuals that were freely available in public libraries (Burleigh 2010). This publication 
would include information on codes, invisible inks, guns, explosives, and poisons. The 
pamphlet is notable not because it was the only source for this material, but because it 
explained the information in an accessible way (Larabee 2015).  These publications 
included not only the practical and technical information, but also justifications and 
appeals for violence. 
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 Within nations, mass media and the spread of terrorism and its related ideologies 
can be strongly demonstrated by the prevalence of local and national publications directly 
by the group, or by the related social movement. In terms of communications interlocks 
in the spread of subcultures, this highlights the role of mass media as well as the 
structural role of those individuals that publish, translate, and import writings from 
anarchist, socialist, and Marxist authors. Terrorism is not only connected to its published 
press, but how it uses information that is freely available in society. This is especially 
relevant considering the availability of bomb and weapons materials for informational, 
academic, or military purposes.    
6.1.2 A Revolution for Every Generation 
 In developing their identities, terrorist groups have often invoked historic and 
mythological figures from their nations’ past. Alternatively, groups have also 
incorporated the history of oppression or other strains into their particular group 
ideologies. The essential aspect of history for terrorism has been how it helps to justify 
violence and develop a unique group identity. 
 History is integral to groups’ understandings of the world. The second Zemlya I 
Volya would connect itself to the national history of activism and violence by taking the 
name of the prior group (Burleigh 2010). Health is within You! (Salvation is within you!) 
would invoke a historical strike when calling for anarchists to seek vengeance.  This was 
actualized when the Gramsci Circle would take revenge for the violent repression of a 
strike (Larabee 2015). 
 The Russian example illustrates the generational connections across groups. 
Although the Narodnya Volya is often remembered as the first modern terrorist 
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organization, the group emerged in the context of a much longer history of armed 
conflict. In the 1860s, the Nihilist subculture in Russia would produce The Organization 
and its terrorist cell, Hell, ending after an attempted assassination of the tsar. In 1866 
Nacheav would write the Catechism of the Revolutionist, describing the revolutionary 
without connections, dedicated to the overthrow of an unjust society (Carr 2006; Nachaev 
2009). In the 1870s the Populist movement would emerge, be repressed, and lead to the 
creation of Zemlya I Volya in 1876 which would give birth to Narodnya Volya in 1877. 
The political violence of the anarchist wave in Russia would persist, with the SRs 
forming in 1902 and leading to several breakaway and related groups (Carr 2006). The 
Russian groups are spread across decades and are embedded in a longer running 
movement with a history of violence. Their influence would extend far beyond Russia’s 
borders through their impact on the other major waves.  
The Irish Republican Brotherhood [IRB] would also be known as the Fenians 
referencing pre-Christian Irish warriors (Burleigh 2010). The Fenians viewed themselves 
as the inheritors of an insurrectionary tradition against British rule. In the pIRA handbook 
decades later the Irish conflict would be placed in the context of 800 years of colonial 
rule (IRA 2016). IRB is the historic core and mythologized model for the IRA and its 
various splinter factions and descendent groups. HRA (1925) would state that it was 
following in “the footsteps of great Indian Rishis of the glorious past and of Bolshevik 
Russia in the modern age”. Prior to the development of the HRA, Indian Nationalists 
would similarly glorify their Hindu past, and the members of this movement would 
become mythical heroes of self-sacrifice for consequent attempts at national liberation, 
including the HRA (Gupta 1997). The Young Bosnia movement made myths out of the 
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martyrs like Bogdan Zerajic, whose grave would become a shrine to the movement 
(Jackson 2006).  
Gupta (1997) argues that there are three phases to the nationalist movement in 
India. Similarly, the experience of the IRA also illustrates how terrorist conflicts can be 
embedded in long running struggles. The Irish Republican movement traces its history to 
1791 and has existed in some form throughout the 20th century (Coogan 2002). The 
Fenians and Irish dynamiters were active in the late 19th century. The IRB and Irish 
Volunteers would merge to form the most famous incarnation of Irish Republicanism, the 
IRA, would primarily be active between 1916-1923. The final well-known incarnation of 
Irish Republicanism would form in 1969 as the pIRA, but smaller groups under the 
banner of Irish Republicanism would exist through the end of the century (Coogan 2002; 
Bell 1997). The pIRA would draw an explicit connection to the history of armed struggle, 
proclaiming itself as the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Eireann Parliament, the 
first attempt at a united Irish government (IRA 2016) Although groups frequently make 
reference to their mythological past, or the martyrs and heroes of previous generations, 
there appears to be a distinct relationship between the generational history of movements 
and the future adoption of terrorism.  
The New Left wave in many ways was an extension of the Old Left, with a 
significant amount of overlapping membership (Parker and Sitter 2016; Grosse 2004). 
The history of the New Left in the US could be traced to the abolitionists and old left of 
socialists, anarchists, and communists (Grosse 2004). In addition to this generational 
relationship between the movements, groups from the New Left illustrate the role of 
historical strains and grievances. The RAF would draw parallels between German war 
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atrocities, Auschwitz especially, and the Vietnam war (Colvin 2009). Similarly, the 
Weather Underground would draw historical comparisons between Vietnam and the 
genocide of Native Americans in North America (Varon 2004). Descriptions of JRA 
members emphasize their nostalgia and attraction to the tradition of nationalist self-
sacrifice (Box and McCormack 2004). Histories of conflict and mythologized warriors of 
the past frequently form the backdrop of the terrorist movements reviewed here.  
6.2 THE INTERNATIONAL WAVES OF TERRORISM 
 Comparing the diffusion of terrorist concepts and ideologies between waves 
illustrates the spread of terrorism has changed over the course of the last century. The 
anarchist wave is characterized by the spread of terrorist ideologies and concepts through 
particular individuals that migrated around the globe and translated or published these 
ideas. Indirectly, this cross-pollination would influence many nationalist groups through 
its influence on prior generations. More directly, news of the Irish victory in achieving 
independence would inspire anticolonial movements around the world. The New Left 
would highlight the changes in communications technology, with almost no diffusion 
through migrant actors. Instead, the television coverage of Vietnam would serve as the 
springboard for these movements.  
6.2.1 The Anarchists - Immigrants, Importers, and Publishers 
 The anarchist movement is notable among the other waves of terrorism in its 
manifestation through lone wolf actors and the importance in immigrants to spreading its 
ideology and worldview across the globe. The anarchist wave is particularly relevant to 
the modern-day issue of cyber-radicalized mujahidin, since the attackers mostly acted 
individually or with a small group under a common ideological banner. The anarchist 
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wave differs greatly from present day in the means to widely distribute a message, with 
the global spread of anarchism tied to several notable, world traveling figures. The 
ideologies, worldviews, and tactics of these groups and individuals would influence the 
generations prior to many of those that would become known as the anticolonial wave. 
By the time of the 1960s such a direct connection was unnecessary, and the publications 
of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che Guevara, and Carlos Marighella would be influential 
worldwide.  
Anarchism would spread around the world through its publications and the 
transitory nature of many of its most influential authors. The role of immigration in 
spreading terrorist ideologies would change over the course of history, but for the 
anarchists and other early groups it would be among the most central mechanisms to the 
spread of terrorism. Several individuals are particularly central to the spread of anarchism 
at this period through their travels. Sergei Kravchinsky would leave Narodnya Volya and 
Russia to publish Underground Russia, effectively translating and introducing Russian 
anarchism to the rest of Europe (Carr 2006). Johann Most would live in several countries, 
and as a result would import his paper Freiheit to these areas (Burleigh 2010). 
Furthermore, his personal relationship with Emma Goldman would even more directly 
connect him to the American anarchist movement. This would be supported by 
immigration from Germany and Eastern European as well (Laqueur 2002). Italian 
anarchists would operate in France, Switzerland, and Spain, further spreading the reach 
of anarchism and anarchist terror (Chaliand and Blin 2007). The US anarchist movement 
would similarly draw lesions from the Nihilists and Fenians (Burleigh 2010). Anarchist 
violence would extend even to Japan and Australia. Kotoku would provide the first 
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Japanese translation of the Communist Manifesto and was a central figure in the radical 
Japanese press. He would introduce anarchism to Japan after being introduced to 
Kropotkin by an American. Although not directly involved in violence, his romantic 
interest Kanno would be among a group that planned to bomb the emperor (Kemp 2018). 
Similarly, an American would play a similar role in importing anarchist ideas to 
Australia, partially inspiring a bombing there (Kemp 2018). 
The anarchists were not alone through this era and were influenced by 
contemporary groups such as the Fenians. Similarly, both groups would be influential on 
nationalist struggles that would bloom in the 1920’s and after. Irish immigration to the 
United States would lead to the establishment of communities supportive of the armed 
struggle in Ireland (Burleigh 2010). In France, Russian anarchist Nicolas Safranski would 
teach native Indians to build bombs, and through his travels Hemchandra Das would 
bring materials from anarchists across Europe into India (Heehs 1994). Armenian 
terrorism in the late 19th century would borrow from the experience of Narodnya Volya, 
and has a direct connection to the group the wife of one of its first leaders who 
participated in the Russian movement (Laqueur 2002).  
Anarchist publications across countries shared similar language and reflected the 
international connections between anarchists as primarily philosophical rather than 
organizational (Carr 2006; Burleigh 2010). These publications were published in a 
variety of languages and circulated worldwide. Translated books on revolutionary 
movements were a central means for the diffusion of terrorist ideologies across nations 
(Sedgwick 2007). Bengali Nationalists used a newly translated book on secret societies to 
structure their own organization based on the Narodnya Volya model and would 
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incorporate writings and memoirs of Irish Republicans into their ideology. This illustrates 
how terrorism spreads internationally but is locally adapted to those nations’ unique 
circumstances. 
In studying the connections between the IRA and Bengali nationalism, Silvestri 
(2000) observed that adoption of Western ideas and ideologies was not wholesale, but an 
eclectic process where elements were adopted to varying degrees. For some aspects, this 
was a conscious decision based on the appropriateness for Irish tactics in the Bengal 
situation. Jackson (2006) illustrated a similar process in the Young Bosnia movement that 
synthesized and localized Marxist, socialist, and nationalist ideologies. This process of 
localizing the writings, ideologies, and concepts of terrorist groups and related ideologies 
is repeated across the other major waves of terrorism.   
6.2.2 The Anticolonialists - Generational Struggles and Foreign Inspiration 
 Many nationalist and anticolonial groups have become central to the 
independence narrative of their countries, which has further inspired emulation (Parker 
and Sitter 2016). The increase in anticolonial terrorism during the 1920s to 1960s is 
possibly explained through the new opportunities for international attention and the 
resources expended by colonial powers through the World Wars. Additionally, the IRA 
would succeed in attaining an independent, but divided, Ireland in 1922, further inspiring 
anticolonial groups around the world. Many of the international influences on the 
adoption of terrorism during this wave occurred prior to the actual anticolonial wave, 
with predecessor movements having connections to the Irish and anarchists.  
The influence of the Irish and anarchists would extend through the history of 
struggles that were influenced by them in the previous wave. In noting the foreign 
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influences on Bengali revolutionaries, Heehs (1994) observed that the influence of the 
nihilists, anarchists, and Fenians would come through translated books or international 
travelers that had direct contact with anarchists and imported it into Bengal. Bengali 
nationalists would learn from French anarchists how to make bombs, copy the structure 
of Russian secret organizations, and build on Irish justifications for violence and 
strategies for liberation (Silvestri 2000). Bengali revolutionaries at the turn of the 20th 
century would mix Fenian and anarchist influences with Hindu religious fanaticism 
(Heehs 1994). Bengali revolutionaries would be influenced by Mazzini, particularly his 
position on resistance to foreign occupation, attempts to unify a divided nation, advocacy 
of active methods, and use of secret societies (Heehs 1994). The IRA would similarly 
influence the leader of Jewish terrorist group, LEHI, who adopted the name “Michael” as 
a homage to the IRA’s Michael Collins (Parker and Sitter 2016). 
Further emphasizing the influence of the early adopters of terrorism, and how this 
influence spreads through central actors, is the example of the Mau Mau uprising in 
Kenya. The Mau Mau uprising would be an example of the use of violence without 
international influence, however it becomes relevant to this analysis in its successor 
groups and in its influence on Frantz Fanon. The Kikuyu Central Association would 
continue the struggle during the anticolonial wave, in part motivated by the historical 
grievances that accompany colonization (Carr 2006). Fanon (1963) cites the Mau Mau 
among his influences in addition to Marx and Lenin. Fanon (1963) would go on to be 
among the most influential Marxist writers related to terrorism, including groups such as 
the IRA, Black Panthers, and the People’s Mujahidin in Iran. Fanon would write from the 
basis of the Algerian experience, involving the FLN and ALN battle for Algerian 
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independence against the British, European settlers, and right-wing organizations (Fanon 
1963). The Algerian War for Independence would gain further significance for the 
diffusion of terrorism when it was featured in the movie, The Battle for Algiers, that 
would influence a new generation of revolutionaries in the 1960s.  
6.2.3 The New Left – A Global Terrorist Movement 
The New Left wave would realize the dreams of the anarchist and anticolonial 
waves of a global movement, with many groups actively collaborating or committing 
attacks in solidarity across the world. In part, this is the result of the Vietnam war and the 
impact it had on many nation’s student movements. Vietnam would have an indirect 
influence globally through revolutionary icons such as Che Guevara, as well as directly 
through the coverage of the violence in the country (Sedgwick 2007; Varon 2004). The 
slogan “one, two, many Vietnams” would inspire student activists around the world, 
including Japan, (Box and McCormack 2004), Germany (Colvin 2009; Aust 2009), the 
US (Varon 2004), France, Italy (Orsini 2011), Argentina (Movano 1995), and Peru (Starn 
2019). The groups of this wave reference far more influences than the previous 
generations, drawing from the experience of prior revolutionaries.  
Unlike the anarchist and anticolonial wave before it, there are few connections 
between groups that involve a personal relationship or rely on migration for the spread of 
an ideology. This review of New Left groups found only one case involving migration, 
the leader of Action Directe (AD), would be involved with the RAF in Germany and later 
establish AD in France (Warnes 2013). This is notable considering the centrality of 
particular individuals in the spread of anarchism and anarchism’s influence on nationalist 
groups. Instead, the New Left wave is characterized by far greater international 
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cooperation, with many groups committing attacks in solidarity with other groups, 
training together, and even committing attacks on other groups’ behalf. These groups 
claim identification to a larger, global movement under the banner of Marxist-Leninism, 
despite a great deal of ideological diversity across nations.   
The New Left would cite a variety of influences, both historical and 
contemporary. Historically, the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon would 
be the most referenced influenced by groups of the New Left Wave. Among their 
contemporaries within the wave, Che Guevara, the Tupamaros, and writers that 
popularized the concept of the Urban Guerilla would be the most influential, in addition 
to a general sense of inspiration associated with Cuba, Russia, and Vietnam. Although 
many groups reference being inspired by these nations, and armed struggles elsewhere in 
the world, there is rarely any specific concept attached to this influence beyond general 
inspiration. The influence of Che Guevara appears to be primarily inspirational, or rather 
aspirational, as well, with his image as a revolutionary icon and his call to create “one, 
two, many Vietnams” as the major influences on the groups of this wave. Many groups 
would answer this call to turn their home countries to new ‘Vietnams’ but would make 
few references to Che Guevara and his writings otherwise. The Battle of Algiers, a 
documentary about the revolutionary violence in Algeria, would be the first impression of 
the Algerian War for Independence many would have, and thousands of revolutionaries 
around the world would draw tactical inspiration from it (Carr 2006). The documentary 
would depict a culture of heroic self-sacrifice and nobility, as well as introducing a scene 
on the moral ambiguity of killing civilians for a cause. However, none of the groups 
reviewed here made explicit reference to the film, despite Fanon’s connection to Algeria 
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and the New Left groups. Other international influences include the modelling of the 
pIRA’s manual based on Colonel Qaddafi’s book of the same name (Carr 2006). 
Inconsistent with a pure ideological interpretation of terrorism, the ideologies and 
texts used by groups within this sample were applied inconsistently. When analyzed, the 
statements of the RAF and Weather Underground were found to lack a coherent ideology 
(Smith and Moncourt 2009; Varon 2004; Colvin 2009). The most glaring example of the 
piecemeal nature of groups’ adoption of ideologies is the central influence of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin, despite each dismissing (non-state) terrorism as ineffective, 
undesirable, or fundamentally opposed to Marxist-Leninism (Laqueur 2009).  Although 
Lenin (1963) spoke admirably of terrorists in terms of self-sacrifice, he largely criticized 
them as ineffective and disconnected from revolutionary theory (Laqueur 2009). Most 
orthodox Marxist-Leninists would similarly reflect this rejection of individual terror 
(Sedgwick 2007). In part, this may be why Mao is cited the most frequently among the 
Marxist-Leninist groups. Similarly, the concept of the guerilla and urban guerilla would 
be coopted by some groups and applied in wildly different conditions than it was 
developed for (Moyano 1995).  
Despite varying sizes and sociopolitical environments, most terrorist groups 
would try to emulate the guerilla warfare of Mao or urban guerilla strategy created by the 
Tupamaros and spread through the writings of Marighella and Guillen. Often these 
imported tactics would be poorly suited for the local campaign. For example, the ERP 
would try to emulate the tactics of the Vietnamese in Argentina despite this making little 
sense militarily or politically (Moyano 1995). However, the parallels drawn by terrorist 
groups between themselves and guerilla campaigns may be part of the reason that 
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terrorism is perceived as a viable political option, since guerilla campaigns do have a 
history of success (Abrahms and Lula 2012). Most terrorist groups would not participate 
in a traditional, rural guerilla campaign, but instead become urban guerillas. 
The Tupamaros invented the concept of the urban guerilla out of necessity.  
Recognizing that eighty percent of the population lived in urban areas, the Tupamaros 
would focus their attacks in cities despite prior emphasis in Marxist-Leninism-Maoism 
on rural guerilla warfare. This innovation, emerging out of the local context of the 
conflict in Uruguay, would be widely adopted across South American terrorist groups. 
Involved with the Tupamaros, Abraham Guillen would write The Strategy of the Urban 
Guerilla, however this would not be the definitive text on the urban guerilla. The founder 
of the Brazilian ALN, Carlos Marighella, would write the Minimanual of the Urban 
Guerilla which would be translated into many languages and referenced by groups 
around the world (Chaliand and Blin 2007; Laqueur 2002; Colvin 2009). The 
popularization of this text may have further facilitated the influence of other texts, with 
an extensive ‘recommended reading’ section at the end of at least one edition, including a 
list of technical army manuals for camouflage, survival skills, combat skills, weapons, 
explosives, and other militaristic skills (Marighella 2002). The mini-manual would 
espouse the virtues of the urban guerilla, enumerate the skills that the urban guerilla must 
become an expert in, and describe basic tactics. 
In addition to the questionable adoption and inconsistent application of the urban 
guerilla strategy by many groups, many groups would similarly modify the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine to which they subscribed. The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path 
possessed a unique form of ‘Peruvian Marxism’ through its interpretation of Marx, Lenin, 
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and Mao through a charismatic leader, a Judeo-Christian tradition of salvation, and an 
adoption of urban warfare, despite criticisms that the ideology lacks any aspect of 
Peruvian culture (Starn 2019). Argentinian groups would similarly synthesize the views 
of a popular leader, Peronism, with traditional Marxist-Leninism. In Japan, the URA 
would synthesize their Marxist ideology with the spirit of Bushido, leading to one of the 
more unique terrorist attacks observed here: an airline hijacking using samurai swords 
(Laqueur 2002). In contrast to many similar New Left groups, the URA would also be 
focused primarily on the mass consumerism of Japanese society, while espousing many 
of the other elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology (Igarashi 2007). The Weather 
Underground and RAF would identify themselves in the international context, drawing 
parallels between their struggles and those in Vietnam, Cuba, Palestine, Bolivia, 
Uruguay, China, Guatemala, and more. However, there was little basis for this 
comparison (Colvin 2009; Varon 2004). Additionally, the RAF would incorporate 
Germany’s Nazi past into their ideology while the WU would emphasize elements of 
Black Liberation ideology (Varon 2004). Despite the common ideological banner groups 
of this era claimed, a significant amount of variation occurred in how they applied this 
ideology to their local context.  
In addition to these unique adaptations, many groups studied here also used 
Marxism in conjunction with other ideologies such as nationalism. At times, this has led 
some groups to have changing ideologies over time. In Ireland, the traditional ideology of 
Irish Republicanism would incorporate Marxist ideas with the development of the pIRA 
in the 1960s. The PFLP would espouse Arab Nationalism as well as Marxism, in contrast 
to other Palestinian groups such as al-Fatah. The PFLP (2009) would place Palestinian 
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struggle against Israel in the context of Marx, arguing that the struggle against Israel is 
first a class struggle. The LTTE would initially espouse a Marxist-Leninist ideology but 
would eventually evolve into a primarily separatist group (Yass 2014). The FLQ would 
similarly be a nationalist group forming during the 1960’s that espoused Marxist views 
(Duerr 2015). The Breton nationalist groups, incorporating Marxist ideology and 
occurring during the New Left wave, would emphasize the importance and relevance of 
the methods of other nationalist movements (Duerr 2015). In part, these groups illustrate 
the appeal of particular authors and revolutionary icons across a century of terrorism.  
6.3 TERRORISM ACROSS TIME AND SPACE 
 Examining the connections between terrorist groups and their premiere authors 
illustrates how concepts and ideologies are developed within particular social contexts 
and subsequently applied to a diverse range of social milieus. Although groups 
commonly have an array of influences this study illustrates the importance of several 
central actors in influencing the history of terrorism across the last century. A long 
history from the French Revolution to the Irish struggles of independence and the Marxist 
writers would spark the development of terrorism around the globe. The Irish struggles 
would inspire anticolonial movements and influence the anarchists as well as other 
Russian movements. The Russian movements, including Populism, Nihilism, and 
Anarchism, would be influential in Lenin’s development, and his writings that would 
subsequently inform future generations, including other central Marxists Mao and Fanon. 
Anticolonial movements would build off of the template of the Irish and the anarchists as 
well as directly inspiring Fanon. Lenin, Mao, and Fanon would inspire the New Left, 
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including movements in South America that would innovate the urban guerilla concept 
and strategy adopted around the world by New Left terrorist groups.    
6.3.1 The Jacobins 
 Many histories of terrorism and discussions of its definition begin with the 
historical root of the word-the Jacobins and the French Revolution. These sources often 
accurately describe the concept of terrorism as it existed in the French Revolution as an 
instrument of the state, and it would be groups such as Narodnya Volya that would 
popularize the term in reference to individual, non-state terror (Carr 2006; Laqueur 
2002). Far less time is spent on the influence that the Jacobins, the French Revolution, 
and, a century later, the Paris Commune would have on the one of the major genesis 
points of terrorism. These would be the influences that inspired the first wave of 
terrorism, from Russian Populists to global anarchists.  
 Carr (2006) argues that almost every terrorist group has retained some elements of 
the Russian tradition in terms of tactics, organization, or morality regardless of their 
specific aims. Narodnya Volya would be the ones to coin the term terrorism to refer to 
their assassination of the tsar with the intent of influencing public opinion, specifically 
their supporters and those within the regime (Carr 2006; Laqueur 2002). This was a direct 
reference to Maximilien Robespierre’s and the Jacobins’ self-conception emphasizing 
religious and political purity, and view that the world was corrupting, infested by 
aristocrats that must be exterminated (Chaliand and Blin 2007; Orsini 2011). This 
extermination was virtuous since it saved the world from these harmful elements and this 
combination of virtue and terror would be exported worldwide and influence several 
individuals and groups central to the diffusion of terrorism, including Narodnya Volya, 
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Nacheav, and Lenin. An influential connection links this prehistory of terrorism to its 
New Left Wave. Eldritch Cleaver of the BLA and Black Panthers would cite Robespierre 
and Nacheav among his influences, and he would in turn found the BLA, influence the 
Weather Underground in the US and the RAF in Germany (who consequently inspired 
the founder of the French group, Action Directe). The French roots of terrorism also 
appeared in the anticolonial wave, with the Young Bosnia movement reprinting article 35 
of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which describes the right of revolution. 
 An additional influence came from the Paris Commune massacres in France. 
Within France, many members of the anarchist movement would have direct ties to the 
Paris Commune (Chaliand and Blin 2007). It would be a symbol of revolutionary martyrs 
to the French anarchists and more. The violent suppression of the Paris Commune and 
consequent repression of the left across Europe was a part of the motivating force for 
anarchist violence (Carr 2006). It would lead anarchists and Russian Populists to view 
dynamite as a great equalizer in political conflicts. This includes provoking the Russian 
revolutionary movement to action, despite its initial non-violent orientation (Chaliand 
and Blin 2007). After suffering through state repression and the failure of their 
propaganda, this revolutionary movement would produce the second Zemlya I Volya, 
precursor to Narodnya Volya, and ancestor of SRs and their most renowned member, 
Vladimir Lenin. However, the impact of the Paris Commune would not be limited to the 
influence of Lenin and the anarchists, since participants in the anarchist wave would 
provide some inspiration and instruction for the early nationalist movements.    
6.3.2 The Irish Influence 
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 The Irish insurrections are among the first innovations that would come to be 
known as terrorism. Their influence reached fewer groups than Lenin, Mao, and Fanon 
would, but that influence is foundational to the history of terrorism. The use of dynamite 
campaigns by Irish revolutionaries were an innovation in a long history of armed 
struggles. In part, the long running history of Irish armed struggle before and after the 
advent of terrorism is a significant factor in its wide influence on the adoption of 
terrorism. The initial influence of the Irish would be through their ties and influence on 
early anarchists and nihilists in Russia as well as early nationalist movements occurring 
in the same time period directly and indirectly through the influence on the anarchists. 
Their influence would expand with their success in obtaining an independent Ireland in 
1922, and this success would be influential on other nationalist movements. The Irish 
model’s influence would extend beyond the primarily leftist and anticolonial groups 
studied here, even inspiring the British state organization, the Special Operations 
Executive [SOE]. The SOE that would employ lessons learned from fighting the Irish 
against the Nazis, spreading these tactics across occupied Europe. 
 The Fenians of the late 19th century would derive their strategy from the 1798 
rebellion that worked to transform British imperial difficulties into Irish opportunities 
(Burleigh 2010). This strategy would persist through World War II, which was seen as an 
opportunity for Irish Republicans due to pressure on Britain from the fight against Nazi 
Germany. The Irish Republican movement is a part of a long running history of armed 
struggle against British rule. Their adoption of terrorism may have emerged in their 
specific national and historical context, but it would be extremely influential. The Fenians 
and their descendants under the IRA banner would influence the anarchist movement as 
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well as Indian, Bengali, Jewish, and Cypriot nationalist movements directly. Through 
their influence on the anarchist movement the IRA is further connected to many more 
anticolonial and New Left groups.  
6.3.3 From Marx to Mao 
 The most influential writer on terrorist groups reviewed here is Lenin, both 
through his direct influence through his writings as well as his indirect influence on other 
central actors like Mao and Fanon. However, Lenin was explicit in his position that 
individual terror (non-state terrorism) was ineffective and against Marxist philosophy. 
Lenin was embedded in the context of a history of terrorism however, serving as a major 
link between the early terrorism of anarchists, populists, and nihilists in Russia and the 
New Left terrorism that would extend into the 1990’s as well as influencing many 
nationalist and anticolonial groups. 
Lenin is imbedded in the history of terrorism, emerging in the context of populist 
and anarchist terrorism in Russian groups and later influencing anticolonial and New Left 
movements. The work of Lenin would be informed by his involvement in populist and 
socialist movements in Russia (Lenin 1973). He would contribute to the development of 
Marxism especially through the incorporation of imperialism and its criticism (D’Mello 
2009). Populists would be influential on Lenin’s work, teaching him that revolution was 
an inner journey focused on discipline and sacrifice (Orsini 2011). Chernevysky, Lenin’s 
greatest influence, emphasized revolutionary sacrifice, even renouncing love in order to 
serve as the liberator of the oppressed (Orsini 2011). Among the Russian groups 
connected to Lenin, Narodnya Volya would be the first to claim a lineage to the Jacobins 
of the French Revolution and their ideas of purity and a corrupting world (Carr 2006, 
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Orsini 2011). D’Mello (2009; 2010) describes how Lenin and Mao would develop, revise 
and reinterpret Marxist theory through their experiences in the implementation of his 
ideas. Specifically, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon would develop their revolutionary theories 
through the practice of revolution in Russia, China, and Algeria.  
 Lenin’s indirect influence is just as important, inspiring other groups and writers 
that would be central to the development of terrorist groups across the world and 
throughout generations. Among these influences is Mao Zedong, who adopted Lenin’s 
interpretation of Marxism and would add to it. Mao developed his concept of the people’s 
war through his experience in the 1930s fighting the Imperial Japanese Army and 
Chinese Nationalist Army using guerilla warfare (Parker and Sitter 2016). This concept 
and the emphasis on guerilla warfare would later influence the activities of the 
Tupamaros, RAF, Shining Path, BR, pIRA, ASALA, PFLP, and ETA, as well as Che 
Guevara and Carlos Marighella whose own writings would also be highly influential. In 
discussing the Shining Path, Starn (2019) notes the dominant themes of Maoism; the 
necessity of violence, the need for a vanguard party, the need to combat imperialism, and 
the primacy of class struggle as a right versus wrong, black and white battle. 
In the anticolonial wave, Frantz Fanon (1963) would develop his own ideas on 
terrorism in the course of the Algerian war for independence. His ideas would be widely 
cited by other nationalist and New Left groups. Notably, Fanon (1963) would build on 
Marxist analysis by incorporating ideas of colonialism and race and would strongly 
emphasize the necessity of violence for social change. Fanon’s ideas of the therapeutic 
value of violence would be later adopted by Eldritch Cleaver and facilitate BLA’s split 
from the Black Panthers (Roseneau 2013).  
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6.4 CONCLUSION  
 In the previous chapter the cultural aspects that accompany terrorist groups were 
described, their diffusion across social networks debated, and how they connect 
grievances and rational choices deliberated. The central cultural elements discussed were 
the role of the Revolutionist, the morality of terror, and the value of violence. Although 
there is evidence that terrorist groups possess similar cultural aspects reflecting these 
themes and that these ideas are spread across the population, the international spread of 
terrorism, and these cultural aspects, begs the question—where do these ideas come 
from? It is possible that they are a necessary precondition for violence. Beliefs that justify 
the morality of terrorism facilitate these violent actions. This study, instead, argues that 
these cultural aspects are a part of a set of cultural ‘tools’, cultural elements individuals 
are aware of and apply to situations, that have spread and evolved over the course of the 
last century (DiMaggio 1997). This is demonstrated through the presence of these themes 
across terrorist groups examined in this sample, the influential connections between these 
groups, and the adaptation of these cultural aspects to the local conditions of groups.  
6.4.1 The Lineage of Terrorism 
 The theory presented here argues the diffusion of international terrorism is the 
product of groups adapting the ideas developed by other groups and individuals to their 
unique circumstance. This necessarily requires that the groups within this sample are 
connected in some way, and these theorized connections not only exist across waves of 
international terrorism, but across the history of terrorism. The precursors to the 
international spread of terrorism are the Irish Republicans, who trace their movement’s 
history back centuries, and the Jacobins of the French revolution. The long running Irish 
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struggles would adopt the invention of dynamite as a political tool, which would inspire 
the anarchists of the time. Within the same wave, the Irish example would also directly 
and indirectly influence Bengali and Indian nationalist movements that would predate 
those of the anticolonial wave. At the same time, the Russian Populist movement would 
draw from the Jacobins to define terrorism as acts of violence for the purpose of 
influencing the people in the state as well as their supporters. This would lead to the 
outbreak of the first international wave of terrorism as Russian anarchists migrate across 
Europe importing translated works from the Russian experience. Immigration from 
European nations would play a role in introducing the ideas of Irish republicanism as well 
as violent anarchism. World travelers would introduce the works of anarchist and 
socialist writers to future extremists in Japan, Australia, Armenia, Bengal, and India.  
From these seeds there are historical roots of many national conflicts. Present day 
Bosnia. Bengal, India, and Ireland would have anticolonial struggles that can be traced to 
the earlier movements and influential connections of the anarchist wave. In the US, the 
anarchist wave would be among the Old Left that would overlap and influence the New 
Left of the 1960s. It is highly possible that this relationship is relevant to other nations 
with significant left-wing movements during these time periods. Lenin emerges from the 
anarchist wave in Russia, producing an interpretation of Marxism based on his 
experience in the Russian Revolution. This interpretation, Marxist-Leninism, would 
begin to appear among the anticolonial movements, including in Algeria where Fanon 
would add race to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This innovation would persist and be 
adopted by groups within the New Left.  
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 By the time of the New Left wave, the spread of information was increasingly 
accomplished through texts, with translated pamphlets, books, and manuals being 
distributed around the world and a decrease in the spread of terrorism being directly tied 
to the migration of specific individuals. Lenin’s works influenced several revolutions 
around the world, and members of those revolutions would contribute to the growing 
literature of terrorism. Vietnam, Che Guevara, and Mao were highly influential to the 
adoption of terrorism around the world, despite not being direct advocates of terrorism in 
themselves. Vietnam would echo the impact of the Paris Commune on the anarchist 
movement, an example of extreme and unjust government violence. Che Guevara would 
make a call to action to the radicals of the world and become a revolutionary icon that 
they would aspire to. Mao, however, would provide ideas that resonated with 
revolutionaries in Uruguay, Argentina, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Palestine, Iran, 
Canada, and more. Further innovations would develop, and the Tupamaros of Argentina 
would develop the concept of the urban guerilla which was borrowed and applied by New 
Left terrorist groups around the world.  
6.4.2 Localizing Terror 
One of the key hypotheses examined by this study is that groups will adopt and 
adapt the cultural tools of terrorism to address their particular problems and socio-
historical context. An examination of just the multiple ideological influences on the 
various groups illustrates the degree to which each group actively applied and modified 
the larger ideologies to their unique circumstances. Sedgwick (2007) observed that many 
groups within waves and across time reflect a tendency of groups to exhibit multiple 
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ideological influences, most commonly combining anticolonialism or nationalism with 
Marxist-Leninism. 
Although groups in the anticolonial and New Left wave claim a Marxist ideology, 
they vary in the school of Marxism most central to their group’s worldviews, the 
centrality of Marxism relative to other ideological influences like nationalism, and the 
degree to which their local national-historical context modified, adapted, or added to the 
overall doctrine. Marx and Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon had differing levels of 
significance to groups across this sample. In addition to this, many groups claimed 
multiple ideologies, most often varying forms of nationalism. Finally, Marxist doctrine 
was almost always localized in some way, with each group adding unique elements to the 
ideology and adapting its analysis to their local circumstances.  
For instance, Laqueur (2002) argues that although the Black Panthers would 
derive their ideology from Che Guevara, Malcolm X, Lumumba, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao, 
these sources were not subject to significant study and the primary focus was on 
particular concepts, such as Mao’s belief that power grew out of the barrel of the gun. 
Although this is inconsistent with an ideological interpretation of terrorism, it is 
consistent with a subcultural explanation—parts and pieces of these sources are adopted 
according to their appropriateness to the situation. This was observed early in the 
development of terrorism among the Bengali nationalists who adopted Irish and anarchist 
ideas piecemeal. Even among anarchists there was differentiation in terms of how the 
ideology was applied, with individual attacks, groups and organizations, and various 
forms of support varying across countries.  
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Furthermore, these adoptions are not necessarily tactical or strategic—terrorism 
was rarely adopted because of its proven success by another group. The major exception 
to this is Irish independence, a partial victory that would inspire anticolonial groups, 
some of which had already been influenced by the Irish Republicans prior to their 
victory. However, this came after the anarchist wave and had almost no direct influential 
impact on the New Left. Furthermore, it incorporated a rural guerilla campaign which has 
a history of success and is far different than the tactics of the New Left urban guerillas. 
Despite the emphasis by Mao on rural guerilla campaigns and Lenin on the 
ineffectiveness of terrorism, New Left terrorists applied the urban guerilla concept to 
varying degrees of accuracy and political success, but consistently they emphasized the 
importance of being an ‘authentic’ urban guerilla. 
6.4.3 The Cultural Evolution of Terrorism 
Given the findings of this study, there is considerable evidence that points to the 
diffusion of cultural aspects of terrorism across influential connections between groups. 
Furthermore, the cultural aspects that appear to be the elements most frequently adapted 
are those tightly connected to the cultural aspects most frequently found across terrorist 
groups. In the context of the spread of the cultural aspects of terrorism, the influence of 
the Irish is far smaller than the anarchist and Marxist writers. The Irish influence appears 
to be primarily inspirational, the Irish campaigns exemplified to the potential of 
terrorism’s effectiveness for terrorist groups in this sample and at least one state-
sponsored group.  
The cultural aspects of terrorism can be traced through the history of Marxist-
Leninist terrorism. Robespierre and the Jacobins would be remembered for their 
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subscription to a higher truth, that the world was corrupt and decadent because of the 
enemy (aristocrats for the Jacobins), and only the revolutionaries could purify the world 
through eliminating the enemy. Lenin’s influences include the Jacobins, Chernevysky, 
and the SRs he participated in, influences that describe a morally bifurcated world in 
need of salvation, a description of revolutionaries as heroes that sacrifice everything, and 
describe bomb throwing as a holy act, respectively. These influences are present in his 
writings and would be among the aspects terrorist groups adopt.  The Italian BR would 
learn from Lenin that the world was divided into two camps and adopt his Marxist 
doctrine as an omnipotent source of knowledge (Orsini 2011). Despite criticizing the 
methods, Lenin would recognize the terrorists of the Russian revolutionary movements as 
self-sacrificial heroes that were revered among the movement.  
 These themes would be adapted and reproduced by Mao, reiterating their 
importance. Mao’s writings maintain the Manichean struggle narrative, but instead of 
terrorists as the heroes of revolution he emphasized the need for a vanguard party to lead 
the way. Although Lenin may have previously discussed it, Mao would popularize the 
necessity of violence among revolutionary groups while groups influenced by Fanon 
would view violence as inherently beneficial. And from the Jacobins to Narodnya Volya 
to Lenin to the New Left, and all of the groups on the periphery, there has been a 
consistent identity to aspire to in these movements that grants one the status of a mythical 
martyr, one that demands violence, the Revolutionist, also known as the urban guerilla, 




EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM 
This dissertation has focused on an examination of ISIS’s international spread 
through its use of the internet, placing this within the larger context of prior historical 
international waves of terrorism. The proposed explanation for understanding how these 
groups spread internationally has been subculture theory. Terrorism is argued to be the 
product of socialization into a subculture with cultural elements that encourage and 
enable violence. The international spread of terrorism, therefore, can be understood as the 
result of the cultural diffusion of these elements across time and space. Specifically, it is 
expected that these cultural elements are adopted by groups facing local problems. 
Therefore, this dissertation must demonstrate that terrorist groups reflect the 
characteristics of subcultures, that their cultural elements spread through communication 
interlocks, and that they are adapted to the local circumstances of terrorist groups.  
The spread and adaptation of the terrorist subculture is illustrated through the 
social network demonstrating the relationships between groups and their influences 
across time. This social network demonstrates that groups apart of the historical waves of 
terrorism have been intricately connected through their texts and influences. ISIS 
provides a minor replication of the results from the historical study, extending its 
relevance to non-left wing (socialist, anarchist, communist, etc.) terrorism. This study has 
observed relationships between left wing terrorism and religious, state, and right-wing 
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terrorism, and prior research suggests that the national terrorism has similar international 
influences.  
7.1 A CULTURE FOR TERROR 
  The most fundamental assertion of this dissertation argues that terrorist groups 
are accompanied by subcultures that inform their actions. Subcultures are defined by 
three components (Fine and Kleinman 1979). First, they are a set of related cultural 
elements, such as values, beliefs, norms, and style. Second, these cultural elements are 
distributed across a social network, rather a social group, demographic, or organization. 
Finally, subcultures include an identity component that is claimed and distinguishes 
members from non-members. This study has largely affirmed the relevance of subculture 
theory for terrorism, an observation that is frequently asserted by terrorist groups 
themselves. An ISIS manual for the mujahidin states: “Supporting the Islamic cause is a 
mentality and ideology more than anything else”. This is reminiscent of the position of 
the BLA from the 1960s, that it was less of a group than a concept that realized through 
any group of African Americans sharing the philosophy and engaging in violence 
(Roseneau 2013). 
7.1.1 The Culture of Terrorism 
The related cultural elements that comprise subcultures include several forms, 
despite the focus on style within subcultures (Williams 2007). These cultural elements 
also include norms, roles, specialized knowledge, language, beliefs, and artifacts (Fine 
and Kleinman 1979; Hunt 2008; Downing 2010; Holt 2009; Williams 2007). Within 
terrorist groups, this study has found three consistent cultural elements that are widely 
shared across terrorist groups: the role of the Revolutionist, the morality of terror, and the 
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value of violence. However, the detailed investigation of ISIS, in conjunction with the 
historical study, suggests an additional cultural element possessed by some terrorist 
groups, a belief that the group possesses a sacred, or infallible, truth that informs their 
actions.  
Historically, the groups researched here exhibited an identity component that is 
highly romanticized. Given different names across the various groups, the Revolutionist 
is often described as a romantic hero by anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left groups and 
writers. Revolutionists are frequently glorified by terrorist groups as romantic heroes 
characterized by self-sacrifice, dedication to their cause, and highly skilled warriors. ISIS 
similarly describes the mujahidin as warriors of Allah, virtuous and dedicated to their 
holy cause. ISIS also emphasizes the element of self-sacrifice that is incorporated by 
other groups into the Role of the Revolutionist. The mujahidin aspire to martyrdom, one 
of the two final outcomes of jihad along with complete victory. The mujahidin, 
particularly those in the West, would also be described as experts in revolutionary 
methods, just as their predecessors. A manual for mujahidin in the West makes frequent 
references to becoming a spy and a one-man army, with skills in weapons, tactics, 
espionage, combat, and other necessary areas. These same skills are emphasized by other 
terrorist groups in their description of the revolutionist as a professional occupation, with 
writings from the Catechism of the Revolutionist to the Mini-Manual of the Urban 
Guerilla emphasizing the necessity of these skills for the dedicated revolutionary. 
In addition to the role of the Revolutionist, the terrorist groups reviewed here 
shared a consistent set of interrelated beliefs and values that form their moral 
justifications for terrorism. This morality first evaluates the violence of the state and 
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terrorist group, and always concludes that their violence is insignificant relative to the 
state’s. In addition to its relatively minor scope, terrorists define their violence in 
altruistic terms, as an act for the benefit of mankind. The last part of this morality system 
of terrorist groups observed here is the definition of their struggle as a war between good 
and evil, with no middle ground. ISIS’s worldview also exhibits these qualities of the 
morality of terror observed across the historical terrorist groups. ISIS frames its violence 
as insignificant when compared to the collateral damage caused by the West through the 
wars in the Middle East, particularly drawing these comparisons in their discussions on 
the execution of hostages. ISIS uses this violence to justify its actions, which it 
continually refers to as defensive in nature. According to ISIS, the group is combating a 
crusade, and is merely defending itself from the aggressions of the US and other Western 
powers. ISIS also frames the conflict in Manichean terms, placing itself as the force of 
good combatting the evils of the world, the West, Shiism, and tyrannical governments in 
the Middle East. These forces must be defeated in order to achieve the utopian goal of the 
group, which further justifies its violence, a world unified under Islam and dedicated to 
the worship of Allah.  
A review of terrorist groups across the first three international waves of terrorism 
demonstrates a consistent valuing of violence beyond its utility as an instrument of social 
change. Rooted in terrorism’s historical relationship to the French Revolution and the 
Jacobins, terrorist groups have frequently shared Narodnya Volya’s glorification of 
violence as holy, honorable, or an act of justice or love. Furthermore, violence was also 
described by several groups as validating or therapeutic, framing it as a solution to a wide 
range of personal issues independent of the tactic’s political success. ISIS similarly 
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imbues violence with greater purpose, meaning, and value than its utility as an instrument 
of social change. ISIS frames jihad as the greatest act one can engage in. ISIS would also 
claim violence could cure the feelings of alienation the Muslim feels living in the 
Western world. ISIS presents violence in many different ways, each echoing the words of 
prior terrorist movements, and the possibility exists that previous groups similarly 
ascribed diverse purposes to violence. This may be significant in the study of recruitment, 
since it effectively presents violence as the solution to whatever problem a specific 
individual faces.  
7.1.2 A Final Cultural Element – The Possession of Truth 
The virtual ethnography of ISIS highlights a lesser theme from the study of 
historical terrorist groups regarding the beliefs of terrorist groups. At the most basic level, 
ISIS emphasizes a possession of the ‘Truth’, an accurate and absolute evaluation of the 
world and how it works, through its religious beliefs in Allah and the principles of Islam. 
More relevant to this discussion of the ‘Truth’ and terrorism is ISIS’s claim as the sole, 
true practitioners of Islam, their complaints of media distortion, and encouragement for 
followers, or potential followers, to seek out knowledge and do their own research. The 
claim of legitimacy as the true representatives of an ideology, the possession of the 
accurate evaluation of reality, and the emphasis on seeking knowledge were observed in 
terrorist groups throughout the earlier waves of terrorism. The emphasis on the 
possession of a universal or absolute truth by terrorist groups is less constant than the 
other themes described here, however its importance to ISIS demands a reexamination of 
the concept’s importance to terrorism historically. The ‘Truth’, the importance of 
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possessing it, and how to obtain it is explicitly discussed by several groups within this 
analysis and is arguably among the contributions of Lenin to the ideologies of terrorism.  
In India, the HRA (1925) would include a party aim to establish truth and spread 
it to the world. In Ireland, the IRB would view themselves as an enlightened vanguard 
(Burleigh 2010). It was only explicitly observed in a small number of the reviewed 
groups, although the idea of revolutionary theory and practice by Lenin could arguably be 
considered to be an implicit example that was influential in many of the groups 
considered here. Orsini (2011) refers to this as revolutionary gnosticism, a superior 
knowledge that only an elect few possess, often encompassing a perception that the world 
is immersed in pain and sin, an obsession with purity and the end of the world, and belief 
in a radical catastrophism that would lead to a perfect world.  
Lenin (1973) emphasized the importance of truth and knowledge, revolutionary 
theory in his words, and how it could only be achieved through action. Lenin alludes to 
this special knowledge and the process to attain it in his writings, stating that “the hate of 
the representative of the oppressed and exploited masses is the origin of every wisdom, 
the foundation of every socialist and communist movement and victories” (Orsini 
2011:5). Mao (2004) would emphasize the scientific determinism of Marx, Engels, and 
Lenin. This emphasis on the scientific and authoritative knowledge of communist writers 
is seen in the context of many terrorist groups among the New Left. In Argentina, the 
Destacamento Montonero 17 de Octubre de las Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP) would 
split between the ‘Obscure’ and the ‘Enlightened’, who argued that the group should 
focus on developing adequate ideological formulations (Moyano 1995). In Peru, the 
Shining Path would also emphasize the scientific authority of Marxist-Leninism (Starn 
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2019). The BR and RAF both emphasized their exclusive access to knowledge of truth 
and morality (Orsini 2011; Colvin 2009).  
7.1.3 The Distribution of Culture Across Social Networks 
 Fine and Kleinman (1979) connect the boundaries of subcultures to the social 
networks through which they are distributed throughout, rather than a group, 
organization, or other demographic. One of the most fundamental observations based on 
this review of terrorist groups is that terrorism typically is not limited to an individual, 
group, or organization, but are shared across many individuals, groups, organizations, 
their supporters, and sympathizers. Furthermore, terrorists, groups, and organizations do 
not operate within a vacuum, but in the larger context of the social movement from which 
they originate. This finding highlights that the culture of the terrorist groups are not 
bound to groups or organizations, but are shared widely across several groups, 
organizations, individuals, as well as supporters and sympathizers to a lesser degree.  
 Based on this study, focusing on terrorists, groups, and organizations in isolation 
from each other is a mischaracterization of how terrorism frequently occurs. Although the 
most well-known French anarchist terrorists carried out their attacks alone, they received 
assistance from groups that did not directly carry out attacks themselves (Shaya 2010). 
Rarely in this study did the terrorists within countries and sharing an ideology unite 
underneath a single banner. It was much more common to see many groups or 
organizations operating at the same time, generally for the same ends. Movano (1995) 
chronicles how the New Left terrorist groups of Argentina operated independently, 
cooperated, splintered, merged, shared membership, or absorbed the members of another 
group. Overlapping memberships were a frequent occurrence of the smaller groups that 
 
217 
shared a common area within society, such as the German underground and the 
originating social movements (Aust 2009). Supporters, support groups, and sympathizers 
similarly illustrate that the worldview of terrorists extends beyond group or 
organizational lines. Furthermore, these domestic movements are localized parts of larger 
international terrorist movements that claim solidarity to each other, claim similar 
inspirations, share a collective action frame, and exhibit a great deal of similarities across 
nations. This pattern of cultural elements spread across groups and individuals is 
consistent with subculture theory. These shared cultural elements are shared across a 
social network, which can include groups and organizations, as well as possessing 
varying levels of membership and involvement based on the degree of socialization, 
including the supporters and sympathizers within the explanation. It includes 
international connections between groups, and the same consistency and similarities 
across local scenes or nations has been observed with other subcultures (Anderson 2009; 
Futrell and Simi 2004).  
7.1.4 The Terrorist Identity 
As discussed above, the terrorist groups reviewed here consistently possessed an 
ideal role of a Revolutionist that members often aspired to emulate. The importance of 
this role is not limited to its impact on behavior, but also serves to distinguish the terrorist 
group from their originating social movement. Engaging in this role distinguishes 
terrorists from related social movements as men and women of action, the true and 
enlightened warriors of social change. Performing this role has been described frequently 
as a central preoccupation of terrorists, emphasizing authenticity among the New Left 
revolutionaries and sincerity among the mujahidin. Among the New Left terrorist groups 
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this would be defined by the practice of criticism sessions and extreme punishment for 
deviating from behavior expected of a Revolutionist. The New Left groups extended this 
criticism to their non-violent counterparts within the larger social movement, arguing that 
the social movement was lacking, ineffective, or merely talked of action (Colvin 2009).  
ISIS also polices the boundaries of this identity, criticizing those whose behavior 
does not conform with the ideal role of the mujahidin, particularly those who are boastful 
or insincere. This identification is also used to distinguish members of the group from 
related social movements. ISIS praises the mujahidin for their action or their observance 
of Sharī’ah, criticizing related, non-violent Muslim activist groups focused on injustices 
or violence against Muslims or the establishment of a unified caliphate for their inaction 
(non-violence) and other jihadist groups as not truly being mujahidin due to flaws in their 
practice of Sharī’ah, often referring to them as so-called jihadists or sarcastically as 
“jihadists”. Although the findings of the virtual ethnography largely confirm the 
mujahidin of ISIS to be consistent with the historical Role of the Revolutionist, the 
detailed examination of the group demonstrates the importance of multiple roles within 
groups that the historical study only alluded to, particularly the unique roles for women 
and the propagandist.  
7.2 INDIVIDUALS, SUBCULTURES, AND TERRORISM 
 Four dimensions impact an individual’s deviant behavior as a result of subcultural 
socialization. The first is the individual’s social position within society, specifically 
focused on those statuses through which a collective problem is shared with a wider 
population. This position ties subculture theory directly to the strain and grievance 
approaches through its inclusion of the strains as a motivating factor to entering a terrorist 
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subculture. Second, the individual’s position relative to a subculture predisposed to 
terrorism effects the interpersonal pathways to becoming involved or exposed to the 
subculture. Becoming more involved within a subculture involves a varying level of 
socialization of its values, beliefs, norms, and other cultural elements. The greater this 
socialization, the more likely an individual is expected to engage in terrorism, or deviant 
behavior generally. It is the socialization of these cultural elements that complicate 
rational actor models of terrorism, since terrorist actors frequently appear to be operating 
on a socially constructed understanding of the world, the effectiveness of terrorism, and 
the potential outcome that strongly deviates from objective evaluations. 
7.2.1 Collective Problems and Societal Position 
 Terrorist organizations have consistently organized around particular 
demographics. The most direct population that these groups draw their membership from 
is not those experiencing the strain or possessing the grievance however, but the social 
movements that form around these strains and grievances. Although the terrorist groups 
reviewed here appear to be largely homogenous individually, there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity across groups, consistent with prior research (Victoroff 2005; Smith 1994). 
Terrorist groups have drawn from the peasantry and working class, the middle class, 
students, and intellectuals, as well as the lesser nobility and petit bourgeoise. Terrorist 
groups have drawn from religious populations of every faith, including Christianity, 
Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism. They have been minority groups that experienced 
discrimination and have come from the majority group’s middle class. Depending on the 
group’s gender norms, women have had a varying degree of involvement. No 
demographic category has had a monopoly on terrorism, and the importance of 
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demographic characteristics derives from their effect on the individual’s and groups’ 
experiences and relationships within society.  
 The role of demographic statuses is much more essential in structuring the 
experiences of individuals, producing collective problems that are addressed by social 
movements and terrorism. Members of the IRA shared common experiences in a 
religious education and discrimination (Burleigh 2010). Members of the ETA were 
connected prior to the group’s formation through religious activities that allowed them to 
share the Basque language (Carr 2006). Anticolonial groups would draw from the shared 
experiences facing the colonized, and the student movements of the 1960s often produced 
terrorist groups in reaction to repression of the non-violent movement. The essential 
observation is that the specific status is unimportant to the development of terrorism. It is 
the consequences of that status for the populations in society that produce grievances that 
motivate social movements and terrorism. 
 ISIS illustrates this point in its framing of the problems facing Muslims around 
the world. The group highlights cases of prejudice and discrimination against Muslims, 
and directly targets those Muslims that feel unable to fully practice their religion in the 
West. The injustices highlighted by ISIS range from job discrimination to war crimes in 
the Middle East but are consistently portrayed as consequences of being Muslim in a 
world dominated by non-Muslim countries.  
7.2.2 Personal Connections to Terrorism 
 These social movements, their organizations, and the areas of society from which 
they draw support are the primary areas through which individuals are exposed to, and 
enter, terrorist organizations. Even the lone-wolf terrorists that operate entirely 
 
221 
independently emerge from the networks that comprise social movements. Terrorist 
groups and organizations are not formed by a convening of random, disconnected 
individuals predisposed to terrorism, but existing groups of interconnected individuals. 
By definition, social movements involve many individuals sharing a collective action 
frame recognizing a social problem or injustice and holding some group or entity 
responsible. Social movements may therefore be among the primary pathways to 
internalizing worldviews conducive to terrorism, similar to the pathways to other 
subcultures such as the workplace, events, family, and other relationships (Sutherland 
1955, Haynie 2002; Haynie and Osgood 2005; Schafer, Mullins and Box 2013). This is 
partially substantiated by the constant presence of social movements that terrorist groups 
emerge out of, drawing their membership from fellow protestors or through the 
splintering of social movement organizations.  
7.2.3 Positions within Subcultures 
Prior research on subcultures has noted that membership is not uniform but varies 
depending on the degree of involvement (Anderson 2009; Melder 2014). Although the 
role of the Revolutionist is the primary position within a terrorist subculture, other 
positions also exist that are defined by lesser degrees of involvement. Supporters and 
sympathizers of terrorism play an instrumental role in terrorism. Sympathizers represent 
the most dedicated public support for terrorist campaigns, and in many instances the 
strategy of terrorist groups is oriented towards recruiting among these sympathizers. 
Supporters are more directly involved in the commission of terrorist acts through 
providing essential infrastructure and resources, but are not considered terrorists 
themselves due to their lack of violent behavior. These positions often incorporate 
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women’s supporting role in many terrorist groups, but also include groups that involve 
specialized positions or support groups and positions. ISIS, however, specifically 
identifies a position present in prior terrorist organizations that is not often elaborated 
upon, the virtual mujahidin or propagandist of terror. These include those individuals that 
do not engage in terrorism directly, but publish the texts advocating, justifying, enabling, 
and encouraging terrorism. This includes the individuals that focus specifically on the 
management of the underground terrorist press, and it is a role that has changed 
dramatically with the introduction of the internet.  
7.2.4 Rationality, Culture, and Behavior 
 Although the present study cannot directly observe the degree of socialization an 
individual has, the impact of the values, beliefs, and norms of terrorist groups is evident 
when compared to a purely rational choice-based explanation. Several observations from 
this sample of terrorist groups are consistent with the rational choice explanation. All of 
the groups observed here, including ISIS, emerged out of a larger social movement, 
typically due to the repression of the movement, a perceived lack of success, or an 
impatience with the rate of change. However, this research has found terrorist groups to 
consistently aspire to utopian goals, ascribe inherent value to violence, and attach 
themselves to particular interpretations of ‘The Truth’. These aspects of terrorist groups 
significantly impact the basic factors in the rational decision calculus assumed by rational 
actor models but can be explained as the product of the shared cultural world view a 
terrorist group.  
Subculture theory argues that deviant behavior, in this case terrorism, is a result of 
an individual’s socialization into the subculture (Einstadter and Henry 2006). This 
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socialization is argued here to contribute to values and beliefs that decisions are based 
upon, connecting subculture theory to the rational actor explanations of terrorism 
(Pescolido 1992; Spickard 1998). Explaining the cultural factors in rational actor 
decisions to adopt terrorism can provide an explanation for the use of terrorism despite its 
low rate of success (Harmon 2010; Abrahms 2008). The rational actor approach to 
terrorism assumes terrorists have stable political preferences, evaluate expected political 
payoffs of the available options, and only adopt terrorism because the expected benefit is 
superior to alternative options (Abrahms 2008). The cultural elements present in the 
terrorist groups reviewed here directly impact terrorist’s evaluations of their available 
political options and the perceived benefit of terrorism.  
The first challenge to the rational actor explanation is the varying degree to which 
terrorists’ worldview is accurate. Frequently, this study observed terrorist groups to 
possess inaccurate evaluations of their political circumstances, ranging from their degree 
of public support to their evaluation of the problems in society. Narodnya Volya and the 
Corsican independence movement similarly failed to recognize that the public they 
claimed to represent did not support their agenda (Carr 2006; Chaliand and Blin 2007). 
Groups such as the RAF and BR would hold inaccurate perceptions of the world 
described as a superficial political analysis at best, and fantastical at worst (Carr 2006). 
 Although some terrorist groups possess concrete political goals, many more 
describe a utopian vision of society. The anarchist movement lacked substantive, 
achievable goals in general (Kassel 2009). Anticolonial groups, who generally possessed 
the most concrete political goals, tended to include utopian goals. The HRA (1925) did 
not seek only the independence of India but advocated an international agenda for world 
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peace and mutual respect between nations. The pIRA argued that removing England’s 
influence from Northern Ireland would solve the nation’s problems, failing to recognize 
the sectarian conflict would persist (English 2004). Groups among the New Left were 
largely consistent with Orsini’s (2011) observations of the Red Brigades in Italy, 
possessing a utopian dream for the world that could only be achieved through mass 
violence.  
Historically, the terrorist groups reviewed here have often claimed that terrorism 
was necessary as the only means to attain their goals. This belief is reinforced by a great 
emphasis on taking action. The fracturing of terrorist groups over the use of violence 
illustrates the importance and perceived necessity of terroristic violence to some groups. 
This is particularly true in cases where the split comes after the original terrorist group 
renounces violence, but can also be seen in the persistent use of violence despite its 
questionable utility and non-violent approaches frequently being more successful.  
Furthermore, groups throughout the history of terrorism have viewed violence as 
far more than an instrument of social change. Since the ‘holy’ act of bomb throwing by 
Russian populists, terroristic violence has been consistently imbued with grandiose 
qualities by terrorist groups. The Red Brigades of Italy would understand murder as an 
act of love and justice for humanity (Orsini 2011). Other groups would extend this, 
ascribing curative functions to violence for the afflictions they faced. By various groups 
violence has alternatively been described as liberating, inspirational, purifying, 
encouraging, and emboldening. ISIS has followed this pattern, describing jihad as the 
greatest deed one can undertake, one which strikes terror in the hearts of the group’s 
enemies and alleviates the sense of alienation experienced by Muslims in the West.  
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 This valuing of violence confounds the rational choice perspectives, since it 
changes violence from a means to an end to an end in itself. In addition to this, terrorist 
groups have frequently exhibited utopian goals that are unachievable. This does not 
discredit the rational actor explanations of terrorism, but the extremity of terrorist goals 
has significant implications for modeling their behavior. Effectively, groups with these 
goals will never be successful, and will never be satisfied by anything less than complete 
success. This can be seen in the anarchist groups and individuals that hoped for the 
abolition of state power, the anticolonial groups that envisioned an upending of the global 
power structure, and the New Left groups that desired a communist future. ISIS’s 
Khilafah parallels these goals, with the goal of bringing the world and humanity 
underneath the Islamic State’s flag and its perverse interpretation of Islam. 
7.3 COMMUNICATION INTERLOCKS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
 The social networks of individuals are the micro-level existence of local groups, 
and the connections between these local groups comprise the internal structure of 
subcultures. Specifically, subcultures exist as cultural elements that are shared across 
local groups, or idiocultures, and these connections are formed through communication 
interlocks. Within this research, the focus has been on the role of the mass media in 
uniting the terrorist groups and organizations within nations, and national movements 
internationally. Texts have played a significant role in producing a cultural uniformity to 
terrorist groups, both within waves and across time through several central authors and 
examples. However, ISIS’s spread through the internet and its virtual mujahidin reflect a 
growing importance of propagandists of terrorism that has been present since the 
anarchist wave. This is due to the ramifications of the internet for the production and 
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dissemination of media, since the medium effectively lowers the threshold to broadcast a 
message to a wide audience.  
7.3.1 Communication Interlocks 
 Communication interlocks are the mechanisms of cultural diffusion that spread a 
subculture beyond its local origin point (Fine and Kleinman 1979). They include multiple 
group memberships, weak ties, structural roles, and media diffusion. This dissertation has 
focused specifically on the role of the media in spreading and uniting terrorist subcultures 
around the world. Terrorist groups around the world and throughout time have shared 
significant similarities, particularly within the same waves and ideological frames, and 
this pattern reflects the similarities across local communities found in subculture research 
(Anderson 2009; Futrell and Simi 2004; Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk 2006). Specifically, 
the uniformity observed across subcultures in the local groups that comprise them is 
made possible through the spaces and media that allow these local groups to meet and 
interact with others, such as the internet.  
The media consistently played a significant role within terrorist movements. 
Many of the terrorist movements studied here included some degree of an underground 
press, producing pamphlets, newspapers, or journals. However, until the rise of the 
internet terrorists’ direct media production has been limited to print, with the single 
exception of LEHI’s radio broadcasts. In addition to independently produced media 
content, terrorist groups have also been able to publish their statements through 
sympathetic outlets. Within waves of terrorism, the consistencies within terrorists’ 
worldviews can be traced to their common textual basis, from the anarchist writers to 
Lenin and Mao.  
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Furthermore, several central texts and authors have been influential across many 
terrorist groups and time periods. The consistency of terrorist groups around the world 
within and across waves can be tied to their reliance on these specific texts. The central 
link between terrorist groups across time has been the writings of Lenin, connecting the 
Russian movements that he and anarcho-terrorism developed from to the anticolonial and 
New Left terrorist movements. Influenced by prior writers and groups, Lenin popularized 
concepts that comprise the ideal type terrorist subculture presented here, including the 
valorization of terrorists or a revolutionary vanguard and the necessity of violence for 
social change. 
Most of the groups examined here are connected by a communist inclination that 
unite them. The virtual ethnography of ISIS provides an affirmation of the importance of 
media in terrorist groups from a substantially different type of terrorist group. Although 
this research focused on ISIS’s internet presence, it is clear from their statements that 
traditional media remains important or has been converted to a digital format. A manual 
that provides instructions and advice on recruiting new members states, “Get him used to 
reading, because reading entertains everyone who feels lonely, and the jihadi library is 
very big and filled with the books written by martyred blood, tortured screams, and 
truthful and jihadi actions”. Furthermore, ISIS shares this library with the larger jihadist 
movement, and the specific writings of ISIS comprise only a fraction of this larger 
literature.  
7.3.2 The Propagandists of Terror 
The history of terrorism, from anarchism to ISIS, is circular in many ways. The 
inspiration of lone wolf actors across nations is the obvious comparison, but the two 
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movements also share a similarity particularly when compared to the New Left wave in 
terms of the role of propagandists. In addition to the unique role of the media, these two 
movements illustrate the importance of a structural role, the propagandist, that is related 
to the media. The spread of the anarchist movement can be traced to several core 
publishers that came to represent the movement despite not directly engaging in violence 
typically. Kravchinsky introduced the ideas of Narodnya Volya to the rest of Europe, 
Most would similarly spread practical and philosophical advice for terrorism, and Kotoku 
would be instrumental in introducing socialism and anarchism to Japan. The influence of 
migration would similarly characterize the spread of terrorism during the anticolonial 
wave, although increasingly imported books became referenced as they were translated. 
The anticolonial wave would retain some of the influence of migrant actors introducing 
these ideas abroad, but by the 1960s, the media of terrorism shifts from the independent 
and secret presses towards radical bookstores and publishers. Radical texts appear to be 
increasingly available over the course of the 20th century, as the New Left movements 
frequently make reference to many more texts and sources than the anticolonialists and 
anarchists. 
 Throughout the history of terrorism, groups and movements have frequently 
involved individuals, publishers, or distributors that spread the messages that advocate 
terroristic violence, that do not engage in that violence themselves. Johann Most, whose 
writings included calls to violence as well as instructions on the construction of bombs 
and primitive chemical attacks, is possibly the best example of this role. The 
propagandists of terrorism are most discussed within the anarchist wave, and by the New 
Left wave the discussion of them moves from individuals to publishers and radical 
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bookstores. The contemporary observations of ISIS are consistent with a shift away from 
the centrality of specific propagandists that publish their own works towards a diffuse 
group of cyber-propagandists, ISIS’s virtual mujahidin. 
The central role of the virtual mujahidin has been to spread the materials and 
propaganda of ISIS in order to facilitate support and recruitment. It is a position that is 
essential to effectively spreading a message online, and the outsourcing of this role to the 
wider public is consistent with changes in publishing ability that has accompanied the 
internet age. Virtual mujahidin are encouraged to distribute and preserve ISIS materials 
online, provide alternative news about the caliphate, and to recruit new supporters 
through the internet. These behaviors are not unique to the virtual mujahidin within the 
history of propagandists of terrorism, but within the digital age these pursuits take on 
several unique dimensions.  
7.3.3 From Print to Digital  
Research on internet culture has highlighted the increasing ability of the general 
population to easily publish and distribute materials to a wide audience (Jenkins 2006; 
Burgess and Green 2009). Prior to the internet, the ability to widely disseminate a 
message was restricted to those entities that had access, technology, or the finances to 
afford it. The absence of a significant direct role of television in the distribution of 
terrorist messages is a logical observation of this limitation created by gatekeepers that 
limit the content published on major platforms. In contrast, the internet enables 
effectively anyone to publish content, rather than only those with a printing press, a radio 
transmitter, or the resources necessary to broadcast a television program. The lower 
threshold to producing and disseminating content provided by the internet has created the 
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conditions necessary for the propagandist of terrorism to become a viable role to a much 
larger population. The virtual mujahidin represent the evolution of propagandists of 
terrorism as they take advantage of the new, dominant form of the mass media.  
In addition to enabling the publication and dissemination of media, the internet 
differs from traditional print in the way it structures the dissemination of information and 
enabling interpersonal interaction. The internet has been particularly effective at 
facilitating contact between individuals involved in rare, risky, or stigmatized identities 
(Griffiths and Frobish 2013; Frederick and Perrone 2014). Although frequently referred 
to here as a single communication interlock, it is important to note that the internet is a 
medium through which many interrelated platforms and texts, such as traditional 
websites, exist. Larger platforms, such as Facebook, Youtube, and Twitter possess larger 
audiences than specialized websites, and groups may exist within or across various 
platforms. The virtual ethnography of ISIS illustrates the persistence a group can have 
existing across multiple platforms, as well as how this creates exponentially more points 
of entry to the ideas and media of the group. This is in addition to the interpersonal 
connections that the group allegedly used to recruit prior to its removal from most 
platforms (Erelle 2015).  
7.4 REPRESSION, HISTORY, AND TERROR AS A CULTURAL TOOL 
National factors condition the relationships that terrorist groups and movements 
operate within, and, repression and political disenfranchisement typically accompanied 
the adoption of terrorism. However, other national characteristics associated with strains 
and grievances were less consistent across terrorist organizations, likely due to this 
study’s focus on international terrorist movements. Instead, international or historical 
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conditions that have a uniform impact across nations were the most common, underlying 
problems that terrorist movements mobilized to address. These include the drastic 
societal changes accompanying industrialization, the aftermath of the World Wars, and 
colonialization. Similarly, international relationships influenced the spread of terrorism, 
particularly through immigration within the waves examined here. In addition to national 
and international factors, history has also played a significant role in the adoption of 
terrorism, particularly through influencing future movements and serving as a mythical 
basis and moral justification for violence.  
7.4.1 National factors 
One of the most important national characteristics that are related to the 
development of terrorism is the distribution of collective problems through society, such 
as poverty, discrimination, or political disenfranchisement. This dimension links the 
macro level of analysis back to the individual experience of these collective problems. 
The largest terrorist groups appear to emerge from those societies where the largest 
population is experiencing these strains, particularly minority groups. The IRA, LTTE, 
FLN, the Mau Mau, and other groups would emerge due to discrimination, poverty, and 
colonization.  This study found that limitations on legitimate political opportunities and 
state repression of social movements were highly influential in the adoption of terrorism. 
In contrast, groups whose grievances are vicarious have tended to be significantly 
smaller. Most likely due to this study’s focus on international terrorist movements, the 
strains that occurred the most in this sample are those that are shared internationally, such 
as colonization or industrialization.  
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 The most important national factors in the development of terrorist groups are the 
degree of political disenfranchisement and the repression of social movements. Many of 
the terrorist groups observed here formed in response to state repression, or violence from 
other non-state actors, and several were similarly inspired due to a lack of political 
opportunities. Terrorist groups in this sample often formed or turned to violence as a 
direct response to the violent repression of a social movement. Many of the writers and 
intellectuals that argued to justify terrorism specifically used the violence of the state as 
the basis of their argument (Burleigh 2010). The level of repression that produces 
terrorism varies across groups, but criminalizing social movements, arresting their 
leaders, and using violence to silence them is a constant precursor to terrorism. In 
addition to repression, political disenfranchisement has frequently contributed to the 
development of terrorism. The FLN, Shining Path, LTTE, and Argentinian groups would 
develop in situations characterized by political disenfranchisement, including the refusal 
of political rights, political exclusion, and a lack of political representation (Starn 2019; 
Yass 2014; Movano 1995; Revere 1973). 
7.4.2 Global Conditions and Terrorism 
 At a global level, the relationships between nations further conditions the spread 
of terrorism. Immigration played a significant role in spreading anarchism.  Colonialism 
lead to the conditions shared across nations that produced the anticolonial wave of 
terrorism. Many New Left groups were directly opposed to US imperialism and 
engagement with countries around the world. The international waves of terrorism have 
been strongly connected to international events that impact populations across nations 
similarly. Industrialization led to drastic changes and societal upheavals that motivated 
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many within the anarchist movement. The experience of colonialization produced an 
experience shared by populations of many nations, and the fall out of the World Wars 
would provide the opportunity for social movements within these nations to act. These 
international strains contribute to the direct experiences of local populations, which 
differs from the New Left movement of the 1960s. The groups that comprised the New 
Left movement differed in their direct experience of strains, but they were united in their 
condemnation of an international event—the Vietnam war.  
The findings from the research on ISIS suggest that the larger factor may be 
general violence by the state. ISIS notes discrimination and oppression against Muslims 
throughout the West. This frequently includes the over-policing and repression of 
Muslims by police and intelligence services globally. They also frequently point to state 
violence in the Middle East, in the form of oppression by authoritarian regimes and 
international wars, to justify their actions. The common problems facing Muslims 
internationally, or problems that they can identify with, serves as the basis for the group’s 
indictment of the current status quo.  
The international strains alone did not produce terrorism in many of the cases 
reviewed here. Frequently the diffusion of terrorism-related texts across nations presaged 
the emergence of terrorism. Within the anarchist wave, several central publishers would 
introduce terrorist concepts across Europe and the US. More minor actors, inspired by 
this initial spread would introduce terroristic ideas to India, Japan, and Australia. The 
anarchist wave would be intimately tied to the anticolonial wave due to this migration, 
the Irish example, the example set by Narodnya Volya, and the writings of Lenin strongly 
influencing these movements. The New Left of the 1960’s would similarly draw from 
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these original sources, particularly Lenin, and would be historically connected to the 
earlier anarchist and socialist movements. The New Left would produce its own 
contributions to terrorism, specifically the concept of the Urban Guerilla and the 
integration of Mao’s writings. The diffusion of the texts that often serve as the basis for 
the culture of terrorist groups has been traced here across waves and history, and these 
connections through texts combined with the consistency of terrorist cultural systems 
provide strong evidence for explaining terrorism in terms of cultural diffusion.  
Although immigration is not necessary for ISIS to spread its message, the 
experiences of Muslim immigrants in the West are among the primary grievances the 
group uses to recruit. The history of Western intervention in the Middle East is used as 
both, a grievance and justification for the group’s violence. These grievances are shared 
globally and serve to attract followers to the group internationally. Furthermore, the 
internet has effectively abolished the geographic limitations on accessing texts or 
interpersonal contacts. Consequently, the direct importation of texts or ideas through 
travel is largely obsolete. 
The final global characteristic consistently observed here across terrorist waves is 
the international orientation of the terrorist groups. Anarchism, socialism, and 
communism have possessed international perspectives since their conception, and several 
anticolonial groups shared these philosophies or similarly took an international stance 
against colonialism, such as the HRA. Events in other nations also frequently inspired 
domestically formed or acting groups. Russian groups that presaged the anarchist wave 
made frequent reference to the repression of the Paris Commune, the New Left uniformly 
condemned the Vietnam War, and often the New Left groups acted in solidarity with 
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Palestinian groups. Similarly, the mindset of ISIS is globally oriented, unified by the 
religion of Islam, This helps to extend the initial findings on the historical waves of 
terrorism, since the foundation of ISIS’s global orientation is separate from the general 
left-leaning ideologies of the other international waves that share an interrelated history. 
7.4.3 A History of Violence 
 Historical events can take on a significant symbolic importance for social 
movements (Armstrong and Crage 2006). Similarly, it [what] has a central role in the 
narrative terrorist groups weave for themselves, their justifications for violence, and their 
adoption of violence. Parallels are drawn between historical atrocities and contemporary 
issues, lending a greater gravity to the terrorist group’s struggle. This is exemplified by 
the comparison of Vietnam to the genocide of Native Americans by the Weather 
Underground or the Holocaust by the RAF (Varon 2004). Sometimes, parallels were 
unnecessary, and groups pointed to historical grievances to justify their violence, 
particularly in the case of the anticolonial groups. ISIS, of example, includes within their 
grievances a long history of conflict with the west, traced back to the Crusades and 
particularly highlighted in the group’s discussion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 
 In addition to comparing contemporary problems to historical events, terrorist 
groups also frequently tied their role of the Revolutionist to historical predecessors. 
Historic social movements, protestors, fighters, and warriors are among the sources of 
inspiration that terrorist groups draw on. Narodnya Volya would claim the French 
Jacobins as their ancestors. The IRB and IRA would consider themselves present day 
incarnations of a historical line of Irish martyrs (Burleigh 2010). ISIS similarly claims to 
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be among a line of martyrs and heroes, and this comparison is frequently employed in 
their propaganda.  
 The most direct influence of history on terrorism is the generational nature of 
some terrorist movements. The IRA is perhaps the quintessential example of a 
generational terrorist movement, with uprisings, guerilla campaigns, and terrorist 
movements frequently developing and receding for hundreds of years (Coogan 2002; Bell 
1997). However, other generational movements were observed in the course of this 
research. Gupta (1997) describes the Indian nationalist movements as occurring across 
three phases years apart. In the US, the New Left wave was partially a continuation of the 
Old Left decades later (Parker and Sitter 2016; Grosse 2004). Prior terrorist movements 
within a nation are likely the most direct way that terrorism can be available as a 
historical solution with current circumstances.  
7.5 CONCLUSION 
 Some researchers have argued that terrorism is unique to its socio-historical 
context, and as such defies general explanation (Tilly 2004; Laqueur 2001). This null 
hypothesis would expect minimal, coincidental similarities across terrorist groups across 
time. However, this dissertation has found a significant degree of consistency across 
terrorist groups compared to the subcultural explanation. Particularly, terrorist groups 
consistently possessed an interrelated set of cultural elements that had a direct 
relationship to the decision to engage in terrorism, which were widely shared across 
individuals, groups, and organizations that exhibited varying degrees of their 
internalization of these elements, and this internalization was also associated with an 
identity component. These subcultures frequently addressed collective problems within 
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societies, although the specific type of collective problem varied. The development of 
these subcultures was strongly related to the diffusion of texts and ideas that underlie and 
inform their creation, illustrating the existence of terrorism as a set of cultural elements 
applied by populations to address collective problems. These cultural elements reflect the 
concept of culture as a ‘toolkit’, an eclectic collection of elements that are strategically 
employed by individuals (DiMaggio 1997). This spread may explain a great deal of 
consistency across the subcultures within this historical sample, since the groups here are 
highly connected through their common sources of inspiration and mimicry of each other. 
However, this may be due to the centrality of Lenin to this sample, and the presence of 
these same elements within ISIS suggests instead that these elements may simply be 
essential to this form of violence, independent of international influences. The pattern of 
cultural diffusion observed in prior waves of terrorism provides a substantial basis for 
understanding the spread of ISIS through the internet, as well as the unique aspects of this 
new technology. It particularly highlights the growing role of the internet propagandist, 
exponentially increased pathways to exposure to the subculture, and the abolishment of 
geographical and temporal limitations that restricted the spread of prior movements. 
7.5.1 Evidence for subcultures 
 Subcultures are defined here as interrelated cultural elements that are distributed 
across a social network that include a claim to an identity or membership. Terrorism 
across the anarchist, anticolonial, and New Left waves has consistently exhibited these 
characteristics. ISIS also exhibits these characteristics as a singular terrorist entity that 
includes an organization, inspired groups and individuals, supporters, and sympathizers. 
Not only do the terrorist groups reviewed here exhibit the characteristics of subcultures, 
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but there are consistent themes across these groups. These include the role of the 
Revolutionist, a morality of terror, a value of violence, and a belief in their possession 
and monopoly on the ‘Truth’.  
 All terrorist groups exhibit an identity component referred to here as the role of 
the Revolutionist, an aspirational hero figure defined by self-sacrifice, dedication, and 
revolutionary expertise. This role is referred to differently across different terrorist 
groups, from explicitly embracing the title of terrorist in the anarchist era to the urban 
guerillas of the New Left. It is a status that is glorified and valorized, and stories, songs, 
and poems praising past martyrs are common across terrorist groups. The status is 
frequently described as a defining feature to individual terrorists, and there is a dedication 
to espousing the behaviors expected by a Revolutionist within particular groups. This is 
seen most clearly in the criticism sessions of New Left groups as well as the emphasis on 
sincerity within ISIS. Finally, this identity component is the central way that terrorist 
groups define themselves apart from the social movements they emerge from.  
 This identity component is accompanied by other cultural elements common to 
the terrorist groups observed here. Terrorist groups share a common morality system 
justifying violence based on comparisons to state violence, the definition of their violence 
as altruistic, and their belief in a morally dichotomous society. Violence is not only 
altruistic and utilitarian, but is frequently necessary, therapeutic, honorable, or 
praiseworthy. Finally, a less regularly observed cultural belief of terrorist groups is their 
understanding of the world. Terrorist groups argue that they possess a monopoly on the 
‘Truth’ that further justifies their adoption of violence.  
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 These cultural elements are not distinct or limited to individuals, groups, or 
organizations, but frequently are shared across a larger movement within society. This is 
best exemplified by the numerous individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in 
terrorism, sharing goals, ideologies, and even members, within nations. These various 
groups and entities often share the general cultural elements of the terrorist subculture, 
with its minor unique aspects within waves and national circumstances. Furthermore, 
these cultural elements are not shared only by entities engaged in terrorism, but are also 
distributed across supporters and sympathizers, mirroring the varying positions of 
involvement observed in other subcultures.  
7.5.2 Terrorism as a Cultural Tool  
 A subcultural explanation of terrorism is substantiated not only by the persistent 
presence of cultural elements across terrorist organizations, but in they have spread 
throughout the history of terrorism and in the contemporary case of ISIS. The shared 
cultural elements of the terrorist groups reviewed in the historical part of this study, the 
relationships between the groups and their influences, and the adaptation of these 
influences to local conditions and collective problems is largely supportive of regarding 
terrorism as a cultural tool that has spread through cultural diffusion, particularly through 
media sources. This has been observed within domestic circumstances wherein current 
movements draw from historical terrorist counterparts and geographically as texts and 
ideas spread across the world and are introduced to new nations.  
 The terrorist groups observed here shared several significant cultural elements, 
discussed above. This uniformity of cultural systems is common within international 
subcultures, wherein local and national collectives are connected through international 
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media and events. However, the differences between groups in the details of their cultural 
systems are equally important as evidence of how groups adapt the larger cultural system 
of terrorism to their local circumstances and collective problems. This is observed in how 
groups apply concepts and draw parallels to history. It is also seen in how groups modify 
these cultural systems, giving rise to new concepts, as is seen in the example of Fanon’s 
contributions to Marxist-Leninism and the creation of the urban guerilla concept. The 
central pillars of the terrorist subculture observed here largely remain the same despite 
these variations or incorporate them.  
 These historical groups made frequent use of the mass media outlets available to 
them to spread their message, gain support, and recruit followers. This has primarily 
occurred through the extensive use of underground newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, 
and manifestos. ISIS carries on this legacy, but the internet has magnified their ability to 
produce and distribute their materials. These media sources also served to spread the 
terrorist subculture globally, as influential texts ranging from Marxist-Leninist writings to 
biographies of Irish martyrs were exported to other nations. These texts are frequently 
explicitly referenced by terrorist groups as inspirational, and in turn these groups generate 
new texts or examples that are chronicled and influence subsequent groups. This has 
occurred throughout the history of terrorism in the course of each international wave, but 
the uniformity of groups across waves can be traced to the common linkages between 
these waves. The most central of these observed here was Lenin, whose writings were 
connected to his experience within the Russian movements that began the anarchist wave, 
inspired groups through the anticolonial and New Left waves, and also informed several 
other influential writers and groups. 
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The presence of the same cultural elements within ISIS challenges these 
conclusions to a minor degree. The argument presented here is that the prior international 
waves of terrorism share these cultural elements primarily because they integrate them to 
address their local problems through their shared connections to similar textual sources 
and inspirational examples. It is difficult, therefore, to disentangle the cultural elements 
common to terrorism from the leftist bias within this sample of terrorist groups. ISIS has 
no directly observed connections to these prior groups or sources but shares the same 
cultural elements. As a result, it is unclear if these cultural elements are common to all 
terrorist groups and cultural diffusion is a redundant or non-existent factor, ISIS is 
influenced by these prior groups through intermediary groups such as al-Qaeda and these 
connections are unobserved in this study, or ISIS, or its influences, independently arrived 
at the same cultural elements which spread through cultural diffusion parallel to the leftist 
movements.  
7.5.3 A Brave New World 
 The virtual ethnography of ISIS demonstrates that the group shares many of the 
qualities of prior international terrorist movements. ISIS exhibits the same cultural 
elements as its ancestral precursors, similarly operates beyond the confines of a group or 
organizational structure on the basis of one’s socialization of these cultural elements, as 
well as spreading and being distributed across a population through communication 
interlocks, specifically the internet and the platforms it provides. The internet has 
abolished the geographic and temporal limitations of prior movements, exponentially 
increased the pathways to recruitment and spread of its ideology, and transformed the 
role of the propagandist of terrorism into a collective effort. 
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 Furthermore, the geographic and temporal limitations of prior groups are largely 
abolished by the internet. This has enabled the group to spread further and faster than 
previous groups that relied on print sources or news coverage to gain exposure in foreign 
nations. Furthermore, it has introduced the ability of recruiters to engage individuals 
around the world, an interaction not possible through traditional print. These 
developments, along with the efforts of propagandists, have amplified the number of 
pathways through which ISIS’s culture can spread and the size of the population it can 
reasonable spread to. Social media platforms connect millions, and the prolific and 
effective use of these platforms by ISIS effectively elevates the groups’ visibility. The 
pathways of prior terrorist groups appear to be considerably more limited, particularly 
focused around the originating social movement or areas of societies frequented by 
terrorists, sympathizers, and supporters. This is consistent with the larger trend of the 
internet in connecting disparate individuals and populations sharing controversial 
identities, allowing groups to form where previously geographic and temporal limitations 
would leave them isolated (Griffiths and Frobish 2013; Frederick and Perrone 2014). 
The role of the propagandist is now much greater than before due to its role in the 
diffusion of the terrorist subculture, and it is now a role that can and is engaged in by a 
much larger portion of the movement. This is most clear in ISIS’s recruitment around the 
world, but the preservation of the group’s extensive media materials and the relative ease 
of accessing them may have yet unseen consequences for the group’s lasting impact. If 
history repeats, the success of ISIS in its online recruitment is likely to inform future 
groups, just as groups in the past have adopted the techniques of other groups that have 
proven useful. The most significant of these lessons was unobserved in the course of this 
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study, although it remained frequently referenced. The ubiquity of ISIS content and 
followers across internet platforms, increasing the number of potential pathways towards 
extremism that an individual might encounter is likely a pattern to be repeated into the 
future. Unfortunately, it is likely that these new groups will be able to spread widely 
without the same level of social control measures enacted by law enforcement and 






Since the modern conception of terrorism in the 1880s there have been four major 
waves of international terrorism. These waves included the development of terrorist 
groups sharing similar agendas and claiming solidarity with each other across the world. 
ISIS represents another iteration of this international diffusion of terrorism, unique in its 
effective use of the new mass media form, the internet. This dissertation sought to explain 
the spread of ISIS through the internet through a virtual ethnography of the online 
environment in which individuals become radicalized, and to distinguish the unique 
dimensions of this spread by examining the prior international waves of terrorism. This 
research supports a subcultural explanation of the international diffusion of terrorism by 
providing evidence to support the existence of terrorist subcultures and demonstrating the 
interrelationships between groups and influences that serve as the pathways for cultural 
diffusion
ISIS reflects these findings in its spread through the internet, and a comparison of 
the findings from the two parts of this study illustrate substantial changes to the 
international diffusion of terrorism. The internet has abolished the geographic and 
temporal limitations on exposure and involvement in terrorist groups, enabling otherwise 
isolated individuals and groups to connect and mobilize. This general trend in the internet 
is accompanied by a second practical consequence of the digital age. The widespread 
ability to produce and distribute media provided by the internet has, within the context of 
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ISIS, changed the face of the propagandist of terrorism role, moving it from central 
writers and publishers to a task widely engaged in by supporters of terrorist causes.  
8.1 IMPLICATIONS 
 The first major implication of this research is a fundamental observation on the 
nature of appropriate level of analysis to best understand the development of terrorism. 
Rather than focusing on terrorism as the behavior of individuals, groups, or 
organizations, the historical review of terrorist groups and examination of ISIS 
demonstrates the importance of studying terrorism as a form of social movements using a 
specific means for social change. This can first be seen in the diversity of actors involved 
in terrorism. Although the focus is often on the specific actors engaged in violence, 
dedicated support groups, supportive populations, and sympathizers all provide essential 
resources that impact the ability and magnitude of terrorist campaigns. Within nations 
this is observed by the multiplicity of individuals, groups, and organizations operating 
parallel to each other, using terrorism to achieve a similar goal. Across nations, this is 
seen in the influence, consistency, solidarity, and cooperation between these national 
movements and the entities that comprise them.  
Furthermore, this is substantiated through an in-depth analysis of ISIS, which 
reflects the multiplicity of actors and entities, including inspired actors carrying out terror 
attacks in their native nations, international supporters that donate to the group, virtual 
mujahidin that recruit and spread the groups message, the mujahidin fighting in the 
Middle East, the bureaucratic structure of the Islamic State as a nation, community or 
familial support within the Islamic State, and the groups from other nations that have 
pledged allegiance to ISIS, carrying the group’s war to domestic front.  
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The implication is that research on terrorism should focus on addressing on 
explaining terrorism as a broader movement, with the specific individuals, groups, and 
organizations as nested within this larger context. First, such research would more 
accurately reflect the reality of terrorism. Second, this classification of terrorism has 
significant implications for qualitative and quantitative research on terrorism. Treating 
multiple terrorist entities within a larger movement as discrete, independent entities 
artificially inflates and distorts the scope of terrorist movements, their characteristics, and 
undermines the inferences that would be drawn from research using such a classification.  
Regarding the international diffusion of terrorism, this research has demonstrated 
the importance of international factors, particularly cultural diffusion through media 
sources, on groups that are traditionally classified as domestic terrorism. Traditionally, 
the international terrorism is focused on attacks across national boundaries. However, 
most of the groups studied here engaged in violence primarily, or exclusively, within 
their national boundaries. Despite this, international influences played a significant role 
in the development of these movements. Research on other inspirational across forms of 
terrorism suggests that this international impact is present for groups outside of the 
limited scope of the international waves of terrorism, and the pattern of international 
diffusion holds for terrorism with non-leftist ideologies (Park and Sitter 2016; Sedgwick 
2007). Although this international influence appears to include the characteristics of the 
global order, impacted by factors such as the World Wars, industrialization, 
colonialization, and foreign interference, the most consistent explanation for terrorism 
based on this research focuses on its cultural diffusion through media sources.  
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This research has demonstrated the importance of understanding the cultural 
systems of terrorist groups and the mechanisms that condition their spread. Based on this 
research, cultural transmission through mass media avenues is of particular importance to 
understanding the spread of terrorism within and between nations, as well as across time. 
This has been demonstrated through the prolific use of print media by earlier terrorist 
movements, their frequent citation of the sources that inspire and influence them, as well 
as a detailed examination of ISIS’s online presence. The importance of the historical role 
of the mass media in the cultural diffusion of terrorism highlights the need to understand 
the implications of the internet as a mechanism in the cultural diffusion of terrorism 
particularly, and violent, extremist, or dangerous subcultures generally. 
ISIS is not alone among terrorist groups using the internet, nor is terrorism the 
only potentially hazardous entities that is spreading through the medium. Incels 
(Involuntary Celibate), the alt-right, conspiracy theorists and others have been among the 
groups effectively coalescing online and are connected to real world violence. In addition 
to potentially dangerous groups, this research can also inform the study of other 
collectives and subcultures that coalesce through the internet and other forms of mass 
media. White nationalists (Schafer, et al. 2013; Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk 2006), 
social movements like Anonymous, conspiracy theorists, sexual subcultures (Frederick 
and Perrone 2014), criminal subcultures such as pedophile rings (Aiken 2016) and more 
can benefit from this research. 
The specific lessons for the further study of the internet’s role in the spread of 
terrorism, ideologies, or subcultures include the importance of signifying language, the 
structure of the internet, the cross-platform existence of these groups, and a tentative 
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observation on the consequences of deplatforming. First, ISIS illustrates the importance 
of understanding the language, meanings, and symbols to successfully navigate online 
subcultures that are clandestine in nature. For researchers, it is also important to 
understand the use of similar community’s language so as to not conflate two related but 
distinct entities. This is best exemplified in the close relationship between ISIS and other 
jihadist groups, where an intimate knowledge of the differences between the groups is 
necessary to distinguish the two. Language is also important to the structural conditions 
that impact the navigation of the internet, particularly the role of search engines, social 
media and content sharing platforms, and recommendation algorithms that serve as 
mechanical ties to new content. These factors strongly influence the content one is 
exposed to, independent of their intent and interpersonal connections. This is also tied 
strongly to the necessity to understand internet collectivities, such as ISIS, as possessing 
a cross platform existence that increases their exposure to other populations, makes their 
policing difficult, and likely has further unknown implications. Finally, this study can 
tentatively conclude that deplatforming, when a community is removed from a particular 
social media or content sharing platform, is effective in minimizing the group’s ability to 
contact new populations but cannot fully erase these communities, as they are able to 
migrate to new platforms (Johnson et. al. 2015).  
  Theoretically, this research has substantiated a cultural diffusion-based 
explanation of terrorism generally, and finds significant support for the study of terrorism 
using subculture theory. Furthermore, this study supports several of the assumptions of 
prior explanations of terrorism, particularly when they are examined in conjunction with 
subculture theory. Most definitively, rational actor theories’ assumption that the origins 
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of terrorism in social movements that have been repressed is wholly supported by this 
research. Similarly, the common underlying international strains present within the waves 
of terrorism, but affecting specific nations in varying ways provides some support for the 
grievance and strain explanations. However, the observed evidence raises some 
inconsistencies within these explanations that are addressed within subculture theory, 
which is consistently supported by the research here. There is substantial evidence that 
terrorist movements meet the criteria of subcultures, that terrorism is a cultural tool 
adapted to local circumstances and collective problems, that these cultural elements 
spread through communication interlocks, and that subcultures provide a mediating factor 
between grievances and rational choices.  
8.2 LIMITATIONS 
 Despite the promising results of this study, there are several limitations that 
condition the overall findings of this research. These are primarily the consequences of 
the scope of the study, nature of the data gathered, and the availability of data. The study 
on the virtual caliphate was limited in scope to the traditional internet accessed via a web 
browser, and did not include the other communications platforms that the group is known 
to use, such as apps and the dark web. This is particularly significant since the study 
period began after the group was removed from most popular internet platforms, and 
much of its content was removed (although frequently reposted in ways to avoid easy 
detection). As a result of deplatforming efforts, the group shifted towards app-based 
communication in addition to its presence on the dark web. As such, this study does not 
encompass the entirety of the virtual caliphate, but merely its most accessible and stable 
form. This also highlights the necessity to further understand the implications of the 
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different types of communication platforms available in addition to traditional websites 
such as apps and the dark web.  
 The comparative-historical study suffers from a similar limitations, restricting the 
confidence with which its findings can be generalized to terrorism by groups with non-
leftist agendas. The international waves of terrorism frequently incorporated a Marxist-
Leninist component, and with even the anarchist wave largely overlapping with socialist 
and communist movements. Although Park and Sitter (2016) argue for a similar approach 
to tracing the roots of terrorism and include other ideologies, it is unclear how substantial 
these connections are. Furthermore, prior research has suggested that leftist movements 
may be more likely to engage in terrorism due to right wing political parties increased 
likelihood of implementing policies of repression or political disenfranchisement 
(Danzell 2011). This raises an additional issue regarding the consistency of repression as 
a factor in the adoption of terrorism. While it reaffirms the findings of Danzell (2011), it 
is unclear if this finding generalizes to groups of other ideologies.  
 In addition to the limitations due to the scope of the historical study of terrorism, 
the availability and nature of the data collected restrict the degree of confidence in these 
findings, despite their general consistent support for a subcultural explanation. First, the 
use of qualitative data for substantiating the theoretical arguments posed here and the 
construction of a social network between terrorist groups and their influences preclude 
the use of statistical controls that could uniformly demonstrate a greater level of 
confidence in the findings. However, the evidence collected in the course of this study 
strongly indicates that the construction of such a dataset is possible in the future. The 
larger issue regarding data limitations is the limited amount of information about terrorist 
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groups, the secondary nature of much of the data, and the large variation in the amount of 
information available for different groups. As a result, groups that are frequently written 
about make up the majority of observations across all indicators, and it is unclear how the 
results would change under a condition of uniform observations across all groups. 
However, this is a limitation inherent to research on clandestine groups, and no 
significant outlier cases were observed. The most unique case within this study was the 
Irish Republican movement, whose inclusion is primarily secondary in nature due to the 
movement’s influence on other groups and the incorporation of Marxist-Leninism in the 
1960s. Although the data is limited, based on the research conducted here there is no 
explicit signs that the findings are misleading as a result. 
8.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
 Future research can extend, substantiate, and clarify many of the findings of this 
research. Most directly, research into ISIS’s use of communication apps and the dark web 
can provide important information regarding the different uses and presentations of the 
group across these related mediums. Furthermore, research focused on the experiences of 
individuals that were radicalized through interaction with the virtual caliphate can 
complement the findings here, and demonstrate a direct connection between the online 
environment described here and terrorist behavior. Generally, the examination of less 
policed or clandestine groups can additionally provide greater details regarding the use of 
the internet by extremist social movements and its implications for them.  
 Regarding the comparative-historical study, future research should focus on 
extending these findings to non-leftist groups. Of particular interest are terrorist 
organizations that represent majority groups within society as well as the organizations 
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that enact state terrorism. Parker and Sitter (2016) classify these groups as Social 
Exclusion terrorism, including groups such as the Ku Klux Klan [KKK] and Nazi 
Sturmabteilung (Stormtroopers, or SA). In Sedgwick’s (2007) alternative waves of 
terrorism, the right wing, state-organized, and fascist groups are similarly demonstrated 
to have spread internationally from the Nazi Stormtroopers. These groups are of 
particular interest due to their substantial differences with the groups researched here, 
since they represent powerful majority groups within society or are the instruments of 
repression. Furthermore, they are intimately connected to the development of leftist 
terrorism through their repressive actions.  
 In addition to extending this research to different forms of terrorism, future 
research should focus on the dynamics between terrorist groups and their originating 
social movements. This avenue would clarify the findings here, particularly by 
highlighting the ways terrorist groups deviate from social movements in addition to their 
choice to use violence for social change. This research can also illuminate the struggles 
for legitimacy between terrorist entities and social movements that were observed here, 
primarily with reference to ISIS. Similar research comparing terrorist groups to guerilla 
groups can clarify what substantial differences, if any exist between individuals, groups, 
and organizations that engage in these behaviors.  
 In addition to directly extending the empirical findings of this research regarding 
terrorism, future research should focus on the development of subculture theory. 
Although the primary focus of this research was the explanation of terrorism, the 
evidence supporting subculture theory and its relevance to internet communities 
demonstrates a renewed importance for the concept in the digital age. The theoretical 
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development of subculture theory has been uneven but developing the theory may be 
useful for its application to the development of internet cultures and their increasing 
impact on the modern world. This can be further developed through research focused on 
research on internet use generally. The interconnections between online populations can 
explain the growth of internet communities across platforms. Based on the observation of 
competing actors in the virtual caliphate, research may further seek to understand the 
effects of competing viewpoints, the oversaturation of available information, and how 
individuals choose which sources and information to adopt. Such research could directly 
speak to the process by which individuals enter a process of radicalization, ignoring 
contrary information in favor of extremist sources such as ISIS. It is imperative to 
understand this process, since there is little to suggest that ISIS is truly unique beyond 
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